

## **China- African Relations: Comparative Analysis of Chinese Investment in Eastern and Southern Africa**

Greetings to you all. And welcome to the tenth for 2022 of the SAPES Trust Policy Dialogue Forum on Zoom. Today we are looking at China African relations. The comparative analysis of Chinese investments in and Southern Africa. and we have experts. We have Deborah Rottergam. Director of the China Africa Research Initiative. At John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. The young scholar. From Tanzania. Gilead Terry. Who's doing a a doctorate on US China competition. In Africa. An economist. Uh really his area his political economy of infrastructure development in East Africa. At the University of Manchester. We have discussions. We have Chennai. Who has been on this platform before. a development economist. And it would like you to have innocent but sunny Ngube, a post doctoral research fellow at Sowell's. Also involved in the China studies And Claude Kabemba who might join us from the Southern National Resource Watch. which which is looking at really at the nature and content of extractive industries In in Southern Africa. The background to this summit just if I may just digress. The background to

this is that I was 2 weeks ago one of the participants in the Nyerere US Nyere Centenary celebrations at the University of Darosfam. A very nostalgic event. Uh some of us who had been in lectures in the seventies. And in the course of that period Terry presented a paper. On on infrastructure development. So that sparked this idea of this discussion and then by sheer questions one of the experts we've been looking for.

Deborah was visiting Zimbabwe. In fact she's in Zimbabwe right now. And so it was a happy coincidence. So we have two very able and very informed people in this area. The other matter which prompted this discussion is was the glaring contrast. In in development especially in the area of of infrastructure. Between my own countries Zimbabwe. and East Africa. Tanzania and Kenya in particular. Which has caused me to conclude that we in Zimbabwe were 40 years behind. Countries which were in nineteeneighty. were said to be far behind Zimbabwe. And if you remember in 1918 you did a visiting state visit in July 19 eighty. He said to have told Mugabe. This is the jewel. Please don't destroy the jewel. Well clearly. the jewel is no longer Such. And so I was presently impressed. And it it really evolved around the nature of investment. Chinese investment

in particular. And you'd see the skyline in Daraslam. You see the Chinese signature cross from the airport. To the harbour. There are some harbour. it's all clear. When you get to to Nairobi, the roads from the airport which is take a good 45 to a minutes to now 15 minutes you are in town from the airport. And the airports right now it's Zimbabwe's Rare Airport is being developed by Chinese companies. And likewise we have a airport at Victoria Falls. A glamorous one. And likewise in Osaka. and Jerusalem. So, as the title suggests, we'd like to consider, one, what is the motivations of Chinese investment? secondly secondly is there any differences in terms of the nature of investment between Southern Africa and Eastern Africa? Especially in the power, transport, mining and construction industries. So I will ask Deborah to start the discussion for us. Deborah brought together.

Deborah

Deborah, you're muted. Yeah.

Hello. Okay. So, hello

everyone. Um Let's see. Yeah.

Uh thank you for having me

here. I'm thrilled to be in

Zimbabwe speaking to you. Um I

am going to just give you a

little overview with some data

and I'm going to try to share

my screen. So, let's see if we

can make this happen with this

technologies. So, there's my, that's what I want to share. and I'll bring it into Yeah. Yeah, it's working. Great. So, I want to put it into the, what do we do? Slideshow. Okay, there we go. Play from start. Alright, so this is presentation prepared for your seminar tonight on China Africa Relations. So, I thought at the beginning, I would give an overview of some of the Africa-wide data and so what we can see here is China Africa trade and it's quite obviously gone up from two thousand two where it was barely visible into a height of 2 thousand fifteen. And then because so much of the trade is commodity related. When commodity prices especially oil fell, the trade fell and the black part there is China's imports from the continent. So, those shrink but the exports also shrank as well and those exports have been slowly growing African economies have recovered. But then the pandemic hit at the end of this period. And that's not very well reflected yet. So the next slide is guess if I already get to the next slide. So, let me try that. Okay. Yeah, the next slide is Chinese Foreign Direct Investment and I have to say that the data on foreign direct investment is not very good. In part, because a lot of Chinese foreign direct investment goes out of China through Hong Kong and it does

that because Hong Kong is an offshore financial center. and so anything that comes from Hong Kong onto the African continent doesn't get captured by this. Or if it goes to or other offshore financial centers. It will look like investment coming from those centers into Africa. So that won't capture all of either China or the United States. But what this shows is I think an interesting comparison. So the blue is the United States and the red is China. So it's foreign direct investment, equity investment in this case. And so China's equity investment has been going up. It's still not that long on an annual basis. So this is a flow per year. Well, what's striking to me when I show this to Americans is how the US foreign investment in Africa has been going down, down, down. And you can see in several years, like 2016 and 2019, it's actually been negative. So there's been more repatriation of capital going from Africa to the United States than vice versa. So, this is China's global foreign aid. We don't have an official. All of these are official figures. We don't have an official figure for for an aid to Africa but we do know that the official foreign aid to Africa is about 40 to 50 percent of the total of China's foreign aid expenditure. And this only includes things like

the zero interest loan, the grants, for example, Zimbabwe's parliament building is built out of the foreign aid budget. It doesn't include all of the other China most of the China exembag loans are not covered under this foreign aid expenditure. But we can also see that that dropped in two thousand sixteen. Um and started to go up again. So it reached a peak in two thousand nineteen. These are not adjusted for inflation. By the way. And then this is also official data. And what this shows is is something that a lot of people don't talk about or notice. And it's Chinese construction companies. Projects in Africa. These are the gross annual turnover. Or the gross annual revenues of Chinese companies that are doing projects in the continent. And so what we can see here if you can look at the figures. This is a very very significant figures. 50 billion dollars a year in 2014 through about 2018. And it's been going down as as the economies have been weakening on the them. But much of what I think Ebo was looking at in Dara Salam. Many of the buildings there are built by Chinese companies. They may not be funded by China. Or Chinese banks or China's foreign aid program. Some of them will be. But many of the buildings that I've seen in Dar also are just funded by

others. And Chinese construction companies win those contracts. And that's very common. So about 50 billion dollars around the continent. Now, here's something on the more controversial side. The number of Chinese workers in Africa. And so we can see again this peaked in about 2015 where there were over two hundred fifty thousand Chinese workers. Now I want to tell you that the majority of these workers go to a very small number of countries. They are mainly in North Africa, in countries like Algeria. And before that it used to be Libya. Uh but Algeria has a a lion share of this. And Angola is also a country with a lot of Chinese workers. Uh traditionally because than a lot of Chinese construction projects there. We can talk more about that later if you're interested.

So, the next is an overview of Chinese lending in Africa and most of the data here, not all of it, but most of this comes from a database that I started at Johns Hopkins University of Chinese loans in Africa and it's loan by loan country by country, project by project. We have over a thousand loans and now this this database is being curated by Boston University. So, we partnered with them because they have a global database. So, we've added our Africa data to theirs.

what we see here, first of all, again, is the picture for the continent, and what we can see from two thousand, is that the, the share of loans has been somewhat uneven. There was a peak in 2013, and I point to this, because 2013 was the first year of what we know as the belt and road initiative. Um, and another significant thing about this slide is that the red portions of these columns referred to loans to Angola. And so, you can see right away that a lot of Chinese lending. In fact, it's about almost a third of Chinese lending in total during this period has gone to Angola. You take Angola out and just look at the blue, you can see again that it peaked in 2013 and since then, it's been going down.

So, it's not just during the pandemic but that happens. So, another important finding in our research is that it's kind of a misnomer to talk about China because there are multiple Chinese lenders. There are multiple Chinese actors and in my field, we call China a fragmented authoritarian system. It's not something where Xi Jinping sits at the peak of power and directs everything, obviously. It's a very complex system. So, there are multiple Chinese lenders and they're not very well controlled or monitored or managed in Beijing. So, here in

Zimbabwe, we have only two lenders. There's the China International Development Cooperation Agency, Sidka, the foreign Aid Agency, and China Exxon Bank. And in other parts of Africa, you also find China Development Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Bank of China, and 25 other Chinese banks and companies in our data. So, if you look at the Zambia example, it's rather extreme but it's illuminating. So, this is a data for Chinese lending to Zambia by lender and you can see here that it breaks down with China Exen Bank in blue, industrial and commercial bank of China in yellow. Contractors or suppliers credits coming in in green, other commercial banks in orange, China Development Bank in Turquoise, Sidcop, a little bit of purple there. And so Zambia right now is having to negotiate in the common framework. Um it's going to have to negotiate with 18 different Chinese lenders. As well as dozens of other lenders that to which Zambia owes money. So this shows how the debt relief and debt restructuring is very complicated. And Chinese have made it even more complicated coming in. So a little bit on Africa and debt. what this slide shows here is a picture of history from 1980 to 2020. And what we have there here is public and publicly guaranteed

debt stock. This data is from the World Bank. As a percentage of gross national income during this period. And so what we see here is the and I'll point to just a few here. The purple. You can see how the purples slide at the bottom. The purple band. It's very very small in the early years. But it gets bigger and we by the time we get to 2020 the purple is the largest. Across the continent and then we have the navy blue band which is multilateral lending of various kinds, African Development Bank, etcetera and then, green is a world bank, also quite significant. The blue is bilateral lenders that are not China. This includes a Paris club that also countries like India, Brazil, and then red is China. And so you can see how Chinese lending has been growing and growing. But it's still as a percentage of G of gross national income across the continent. It still is not the, the largest, and although it's, and then, also, the African debt problem is growing again, but it's nowhere near what it was in the 1980s and 1990s. Still something to be concerned about. Um, here we look at debt service, and there, the Chinese, because many of the Chinese loans are commercial lawns. Um, China's a larger share of debt service than it is of debt per se. So, in 2022, this year, 30% of debt

service in the country, support countries that were eligible for the debt service suspension initiative of G20. Um 30% of their debt service this year will be going to China official bilateral China. And here the World Bank is including China Development Bank. Which China doesn't agree with. Um but that's included in that 30 percent. And also a lot of that is for Angola. As we as we saw before. We can come back to any of this data. So again this I'm going to go over this very quickly. But this was before the pandemic. Chinese loan commitments from our data. Um between thousand, 2000, to two thousand eighteen, aggregated altogether as a percent of GNI. And we did this in order to look at the countries that were more at risk. And before the pandemic. We saw Zambia up there, the Republic of Congo, Angola was there, but they were not yet considered by the international community to be at risk of debt distress. Djibouti, and then you can see there's a whole cluster done at the bottom. Of which Ethiopia, Cameroon have all come emerged now as debt-stressed countries. But a lot of the countries that are borrowed from China are, were not at risk depth of stress. They're down there at that lower lower level here. So, it's it's these outliers that are the ones that are are of concern. And those are

in this little list here. So, we in 2 thousand 18, we identified 7 countries which would not including Kenya. Um where China was the number one creditor and we said these are the ones to watch. These are the ones where the Chinese lending is really the problem. So, Zambia, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Angola, Djibouti, Republic of Congo, and Mozambique. And the rest of the countries Africa. Uh Chinese lending was not a significant issue. This does not include Sudan or Zimbabwe because the World Bank didn't have data for them. And they're also not DSSI eligible. So not to focus and I won't be talking too much longer on the Southern and Eastern African countries of of the focus tonight. So we've we pulled out some data for just for these countries. And so this is from China. Total lending FDI and contracting revenues. Remember I showed you the Chinese contractors, their revenues from doing projects which may not be paid for by Chinese loans. And then FD is equity investment only and then lending is in blue. So, if we look at, these are all as a percentage, it's normalized to be a percentage of the gross domestic product for these countries. So, what we can see here is that for example, in Tanzania, lending from China is very small. It's not significant at all And FDI from

China is also very small. Contracting is larger. Um it's about the same as in Zimbabwe and Kenya. But the Chinese loans are not paying for those contracts. That means that other entities are paying for them. I don't know who. Zambia, on the other hand, the Chinese lending is very large. The FDI is called also substantial and the contracting relationship is huge in terms of percentage of GDP. Uh Zimbabwe is more moderate on both but there's a substantial amount of FDI going into the mineral sector. Kenya, the FDI is low. Um the contract relationship is a little bit higher and then the loans again are in terms of a percentage of GDP, it's pretty modest. So, Zambia is the one that out here.

And these are, again, just to look more closely at the sectors that the Chinese are lending into in these countries. In Zimbabwe, you can see down here that we'll start with transport at the bottom. Uh, well let's look over at Kenya. So Kenya is the standard gauge railway that's the bulk of that. It's about \$5 billion dollars for the two phases of it so far. Uh, Zambia, it's mostly roads, the transport, and airports fit into these as well. And then electric power. So the red bars here are for electric power. And it's interesting. In Zimbabwe,

Tanzania, and Kenya. The share going into electric power is almost identical in terms of the absolute value. Zambia is a lot higher. Uh they've had more hydropower projects funded by Chinese entities. I was going to share where this comes from and maybe I'll do that in the Q&A because all of this data I can just let me see if I can give you a quick yawn. So this is the China Africa loans database that Boston University is hosting and I got the data here. It's a really fun thing. You can go to Kenya. You can click on that. You can get all of the loans in the different sectors there or here's Tanzania. We got Zimbabwe there and here's Zambia. And then you can scroll down and all the four countries that I pulled out here. You can look at the all the the projects that are funded by the Chinese. So all of these were funded by China and Zambia. You can look at the ones in Zimbabwe. And you can do this for all the different sectors. Like transport and again clicking on it. The number of loans, the value. So I'm going to stop there and I look forward to everybody else's and I have an I hope I haven't talked too long. Thanks. Captivating stuff Deborah. Captivating stuff. The tables are most illuminating. And I think it's very educational for some for many of us. Um I've tended to

generalise this subject. Um and a really thank you indeed. For what you have done so far in this discussion. I I'm I'm fascinated by the figures. I mean the construction for example 40 billion. it's massive and the difference, the comparison in terms of lending between Zimbabwe and Kenya were the same. You know, different results. We'll we'll come to question time. We really want to know why Angola. And Zambia stand out so. So glaringly. Yeah but the point you made about the fragmented reportless nation of Chinese investment in Eastern Southern Africa. Is most most starting. So let's move straight to to eh Gilead Terry Eh because we want to have a discussion as soon as possible. Though it will be led by our discussions. Because Deborah is to leave us at 7 o'clock. So take advantage of that. So Gilead please. Thank you. Let me try to share my screen. Um we can see it Great, just a second. Uh just a second. You muted Gilead Great. Yeah. So thank thank you very much for the for the opportunity and I wanted to I'm trying I'm trying to figure out just a second. and just try to reshare it. Lost your screen. Elliot, it was looking great before we could see it. Okay Fantastic. So the the angle

that I'm trying to approach this subject on is part of an ongoing research project that I have here at the University of Manchester. And as professor Ibu mentioned it's about the political economy of infrastructure development. Um in the global south. Uh and taking an entry point of great power competition and what hedging strategies states are using to navigate this increasingly complex relation. And China is quite central to this question. So China and Africa relations is certainly an area of interest and I'm taking lessons from from East Africa.

Yeah, let me try to move to my next slide. Perfect, perfect.

So, the argument that I'm advancing is that in a new cold war world, African states are forced to hedge between great powers to achieve their development. Um objective. Uh and what I'm trying to say here is that infrastructure as we have noticed from the previous presentation which is a huge chunk of investments happening not only from global powers but also from domestic act state actors are becoming fields of great power competition. And states are being forced to use via mediating ah strategies to hedge between these ah global powers. Ah and I will try to also touch on what implications are there ah some of the ongoing debates. As well as ahm

ah the way forward. Now the argument ahm that I'm making on this particular research is that China is changing. Ah is part of this ah ah major actor within within ah within Africa. Ah and some of the changes that are happening are that first it is to become a high income country. So it is changing ah the value chains within ahm ah within ah within its country ah with an objective ahm of aspiring to become ah to to move to move up the value chain from from eh from a low income country to a middle income country. And it and in so doing it's entering and competing into value chains that ahm that are putting it on a coalition course ah with the US and western neoliberal order. Uh and I think Hofang Hung has really written quite extensively on this. His recent book in 2022 is is called the Clash of Empires. It talks about all these areas where we are seeing competition and challenges between US and China including technology as well as as other areas. So that is one way that China is changing is is a global actor. Secondly in so doing it's also tweaking its global reach to support Chinese lead firms. Uh and what I'm saying here is that it's the relations that China used to have with the world including Africa in the nineties in the early two 000 prior to two thousand and 8. A significantly

changing to the kind of relations that China is having now. Team Zion has written a very interesting article where he calls the Chinese of these days which are quite different from the Chinese previously. And here Shindla is advancing an argument that China is now using infrastructure to try to control the network of resource frontiers where resources come from. All the areas where transport is happening all the way to connecting it to zones of exports like ports and orienting them to support the Chinese lead firms and this has been emerging as part of the discussion of global China at the moment. I think he has moved this argument completely to the far end, saying that China is trying to project a global geopolitical ambition and to replace the US as a leading global hegemonic actor. On the other side, Africa is also changing. I think Chiquan Lee has done a marvelous job in trying to also showcase how African actors are becoming much more assertive in terms of defining and pursuing their own objective. But also you know, recent studies are showing that there's a lot of middle level contestation that is happening that on one side it's improving competition and agency within the African context. So China is a major actor in the continent. Fits

quite in this you know has to  
has to navigate within this  
complex geopolitical realities  
and this is the context that my  
research is situated on. Now  
the new code ah where am I  
coming ahm ahm ah from with  
this particular ah with this  
particular ah context. Around  
2008, you see a lot of increase  
ah in Chinese assertiveness and  
mainly because of the global  
financial crisis. There's this  
you know symbolism that ah it  
implies the decline of America  
as a leading hegemonic power.  
And you have China being able  
to weather that storm much more  
effectively you know.

Unleashing all these massive  
investments in infrastructure  
domestically and being able to  
weather that storm and becoming  
a much more assertive global  
power. You see a lot of Chinese  
advances within global  
institutions including the  
World Bank which I had a  
privilege of working at at that  
particular time. So I think  
this particular assertiveness  
and this particular confidence  
that China brought to the world  
system put a bit of America on  
the back foot. And you also see  
following that following  
Obama's re-election in 2012, a  
new strategy emanating, which  
had started certainly shaping  
up around twenty11, with pivot  
to Asia, understanding that the  
Pacific is now becoming an area  
of, increasing strategic  
concern. And US marshals up its

geo strategic competition to contain China. Uh, you know, at the same time, the, the narratives of Cold War kept being invoked, that China feels like encircled, with US and its pacific allies, and built and road initiative was its response, to you against the the western encyclement. And then from that point in time ah China ah put to use infrastructure as a tool to reshape not only geographic locations, patterns, ah networks of floors all over the world. And infrastructure moves from just being a service that ah ah a state provides to its economy to become a tool of geopolitical ambition and geopolitical advances and it just changes in so many ways which I'll try to touch on the following slide. And from the belt and road initiative, you see consistent efforts not only from the US but also its western ally. To come up with responses ah ah through infrastructure. So the global gateway initiative which has you know was inaugurated last year ah with the European ahm ah union ah pledges of ah ah of ah of a 300 million ah euros in investment. Ah B 3 W's which has also currently been tweaked as ah ah ah a partner for global infrastructure investment through the G7 summit that has just concluded in Madrid. Now again through this context, this is where my

argument is sitting that African countries are increasingly compelled to live in this competitive global power and trying to find ways to hedge between them to achieve their objective. Now the area that I have looked into is mostly in Eastern Africa and this is just a blueprint that was put by Oxford Analytica that just showcases the kind of infrastructure investment that are happening within the Eastern African coast. So you know you have not only the lapset the the the Kenyan standard gauge railway you have the Tanzanian one. And there is a lot of conversation about going all the way to to eastern Congo. And I think one thing that you also realising that I'll come at the end of this presentation is that all road all of these roads sort of lead to areas of resource frontiers which which are Eastern Congo. Um and in this particular talk I'll just focus on two particular infrastructure investment. Uh the Kenyan SGR railway as well as the Tanzanian one. Though in my research program I'm keen to look at areas beyond that. I mean in a case like Kenya provides a huge and a fascinating case for infrastructure research. Trying to see what China is doing is and his actor. We I'll touch upon in ah in a few slides from

here. So one of the things that I'm finding out is that ah infrastructure network are increasingly become ah fields of competition between China and other actors. So you have again as I mentioned this global infrastructure program, the BRI, the B3 W as well as the ah global gateway ah initiative. The big question that I think in a lot of discourse that we have not asked is is to why there is huge ah by global powers ahm on infrastructure development. So I identify ah three reasons. Ah the first reason ah is what ah professor Hang has identified as a crisis of accumulation and he is building on ah conversations from ah from Max ah as well as Giovanni Arigi. Which says that an economy sort of changes its behaviour when profits starts to decline within ah within its ah within its ah geographic location. And what eventually happens is that they try to find zones outside their own geographical locations to valorize their capital to make sure that they are able to find areas of investment where they can they can recoup their profits much higher. Mark said that when capital leaves a certain location, it's not because it prefers an outsider environment. It simply moves to an area where it can get higher returns. So we are seeing a lot of foreign reserve back during

the time of commodity boom and you know export export led growth that China experienced, sitting on trillions of reserves. So one way to safely hedge as well as, reduce the risk domestically, is to pump some of these funds into infrastructure investment and then collect the amounts that you can get in terms of debt repayment for, for a longer period of time. So this is one of the area that China has increasing invested on over the last couple of years. Now on the US side there is a you know a similar kind of crisis but certainly not from the state led kind of accumulation that China is leading. This is more on private sector ah kind of ah a liquidity blood. And what they have done on the other side is what ah Tom Goodfellow has called financialization of infrastructure. We are now infrastructure ah being designed through complex ah ah modalities and complex ah arrangements in a way that they become zones of profit making. And and a world bank study from from 2010 identified infrastructure as one of the premier areas where you can put your money in and get a higher return. And I think this loss of fuels part of the part of the global movement towards investment on on infrastructure. And and the last reason that I try to earmark here is what Shindler

called sort of if a structural arms race. Which I mentioned earlier on where youth infrastructure as a means to control zones of extraction as well as access to markets. And I'm and I'm happy to talk about it further. Um in in some in some of the and some of the interviews. One one expert that I spoke in one of the interviews said something quite interesting that you know from from DRC there is just a lot of transport zones from you know towards different sides. So you have the northern corridor in Kenya. You have the central corri have the Tazara zone, you have the Wildish Bay, you have the Durban, and all these are just, you know, zones where, zones of floors that that some of these great powers are trying, are trying to control and reorient them towards, towards their own, their own lead firms. Now, the, the other thing that I found is that, you know, African policy makers are, you know, developing quite complex hedging strategies and, you know, as, as this is an ongoing research, I have, I have tried to group them much broadly on diversification strategies, competitive strategies and distributed strategies. I'll just touch on those three three slides and I'll be out of your way. So with respect to diversification is that countries now are able to use resources that

traditionally were not were not available. So because of because of the flaws that are increasingly coming not only from China but also from other middle powers. It's altering the political structure. It's offering elites opportunities to and also disrupt ah some political settlements. I think Dobra has written a very interesting case of Namibia where there is sort of an alliance between a certain fraction of elites. With all these ah foreign ah flowing ahm ah funds which really ah alters ahm alters the ah the political ah settlements within within the country. Ah there is also divergence of development financing as we have seen ah you know previously you know there was huge ehm ah traditional ah a huge volume of traditional western funding mainly through you know the World Bank and International Financial Institutions. But now there's a there's more of you know human development focus from all these traditional actors and where you have emerging actors willing to go into spaces like infrastructure, energy, extractives, among others. Um some countries have also tried to have a bit of a mixture of partners in some of the large scale projects. So for example Tanzania recently has allocated one of its lot instead of having a one you know one

railway network built by one partner. They have tried to introduce to diversify by using by using China as a separate as a separate contractor. And they have got the last the last lot of two hundred and forty-nine kilometres. So this is just one of the the map that shows the diversification that Tanzania has done with its with its railway construction On the other side you have ah some states also opting for a competitive and open and open access one. Ah here countries decide to have to create an open ah ah ah platform and in a way it's trying to reenact ah what was ah the non-aligned ah sort of ah ah sort of logic back then. Where you know you pull you expect to pull in actors ah to compete you know is saying you know we are neutral. We are an open field. We you know we use ah ah institutions to create this ah sense of political ah fairness ah railway development authorities take charge. You have a bit less of ah ah ah of political interference. And you find this quite different from how sort of the staging engagements happened with the Kenyan ah standard gauge railway compared to you know how it is happening with ah with the Tanzanian one where you know have all these competitive tendering process and so forth. Ahm the last one is what I call distributive and

this this is it's it's one of the areas that I'm still developing. But I think Kenya provides a very interesting interesting case. You had they had in a very short space of time over the last couple of years. Uh visits from three presidents from Xi Jinping President Xi Jinping, Emmanuel Macron, as well as as Barack Obama. And at the end of the day, all one, one of the things that each of the president did when they went to Kenya, is to sign on the construction on a construction to to oversee the construction of a signing of a construction a construction deal. So Manuel Macron was also part you know you know was there when there was a signing of of a highway that was was will be built from Nairobi. I think they've already broken ground from Nairobi to Rironi all the way to Mount Summit. Uh and this again is a private public partnership. Uh it is said be part of the global gateway initiative. It's funded by the Meridian Infrastructure Fund. Yeah, and constructed by a French firm called Vinci Construction and you know, when President Obama visited Nairobi, they also signed an MOU with Bektel corporation to build the Mombasa, Nairobi, highway. Which hasn't broken hasn't broken ground yet and I'll talk to some of the risks that are associated with some of these strategies. So in this

particular strategy, you see territorial actors, mainly states, taking their plead in identifying incentivising as well as guaranteeing some of these bills. Uh now the implications is that some risks also still exist despite trying to trying to have these strategies. So for example, when Tanzania tried to play these great powers now to say, okay, we going to open the you know, the tender process, we're going to be just the Chinese firm that was sort of single sourced back then or you know, was was shortlisted back then in the in the in the tender process which is going to reopen. Uh firms did buy ah the the tender process. But during the submission all of them did not ah did not ahm ah ah return their bids. And this is how Tanzania ended up ah sort of giving that first couple of lots to a Turkish firm. So again what we are seeing is that when when global powers are also when when when ah African countries are also trying to sort of find their way to to to get a better deal. You also have ah ah strategies on the other side of powers to see how to manage those ah those processes as well. In some lessons ah some on a more positive note is that some some lessons that that work with respect to open access. They are also ah adopted with ah with actors and ah on the

ground ah and one thing I've I've I've heard quite recently on an interview is that ah you know competitive and open access has gone beyond construction in into operations of this infrastructure. And then one of my ah one of my respondents is quite privy to ah to the infrastructure sector in East Africa said that the Tazara railway I think for the first time ah over the last two three years they've been able to make money enough to pay the salaries of their own their own staff through a collaboration with the South African operator called Calabash. So this is you have a private operator using ah using an an infrastructure an infrastructure that was ah that was built ah ah by ah by traditional ah by the government of traditional actors. Ah last but not least in some instances also placing political processes ahead of businesses can lead to an impulse. Uh and this is what you have with the Bektel Corporation ah ah ah in Kenya where they ahm you know we haven't ah you know we have we did not agree to some of yeah we we haven't we haven't agreed to some of the details of ah ah ah in that way agreed during the political process ah with respect to the to the Nairobi ah Mombasa highway. So ah I'll just finish now ahm that I mean the presence of you know China certainly is an

actor ah impacts the political opportunity structure and and and you know and also through access resources that were previously unavailable and this is also something that is increasingly happening ah with that amino powers but also there is a perception of risks increasingly by, by other, by African policy makers, of being locked in sort of a core periphery elections. And I think the big question that we, we ought to ask ourselves when we're having this discussions comparing Eastern Africa in Southern Africa. Be it extractives and be it transport infrastructure. Uh, the fundamental question is that, any of these investments be it by Chinese or other actors? Changing fundamental mentally how Africa interacts or integrates with the world system. Because at the end of the day I think both ends up being you know quite extractive oriented. And I'll just try to sort of cement that point with something that I had in my in one of my interviews. Where an expert said that well we are surveying the central corridor railway in Tanzania trying to see all the infrastructure there and see how we can support ah its its revitalization prior to the decision of building a new SGR. And and we found some infrastructure within that with that dated 1900. When it was

built by the Germans. And he said something that really struck me. It was the same route that was used through the self trade. The German used it to build a private railway. The post colonial Tanzania government built a central railway and now it's part of the Chinese build new central central corridor central corridor railway. So the fundamental question remains does it really change you all these all these influx where it's infrastructure where in transportation does it really change the fundamental way that Africa or at least this part of the world, eastern and southern Africa interact with the global system. Thank you very much professor. I'll I'll pause there. Thanks Gillard. Thanks very much. Very very detailed stuff. Um particularly fascinated by the the the issue they referenced the clash of empires. and what informs investment in Africa, are there a crisis of accumulation? happening on one of our former teachers Giovanni Arigi In Zimbabwe. And in particular his funeral peace on the political army of religion. Um financialisation of infrastructure. The point you made in Daraslam that maybe one of the one of the motivations. Uh behind Chinese investment is polarization. Of surplus. And competition. For control of

zones of construction and markets. Again, reminds me of statement. In the 185-8. That that if you want to avoid revolution in England you need to become colonialists. In in pursuit of raw materials to feed the factories at home. And markets. Uh to which to sell finished products. The question of course is has anything changed now? And is there any any any difference in the nature and content of investment between the west and the east? These are some of the questions that I hope we our discussions can raise. And please after the discussion Chennai would like end of our participants to raise their hands and make a contribution as they wish. Chennai Thanks Abel. Um so what I'm going to do is I'm going to try and highlight to Debra and Gillard possibly something that they already know but I'm going to going to use three case studies in Zimbabwe just to try and highlight what how China's lending, what it looks like in Zimbabwe and kind of the implications in terms of that kind of bilateral bilateral debt. As some would call it the debt trap diplomacy. What does this look like perhaps try and answer a little bit of how we are seeing this variations in development in spite of the fact that other countries are borrowing from China and perhaps are looking

better in terms of the infrastructure development. So as I said I'll look at these three case studies but just to come back to on Deborah's figures just to say Deborah thank you so much for the work that you guys are doing at John Hopkins and the Boston University data sets because these are really proved invaluable to us when we're trying to understand what is going on in Zimbabwe because as you know much of China's landing is shrouded in smokes and mirrors. It's very hard to understand who is being learnt, what, what are the terms and conditions of each kind of debt loan structure that's coming out of China, into the different entities. So the data sets have, have, have proved really, really useful, please do take that feedback. Um, back to your team. So, what we had. So I'll look at two specific case studies within the Diamond sector. I'm sure we've all heard of AFEC. I'll do a little bit of a walk through to understand how the China Exim Bank which currently in the last public debt statement it was I think over 50% of our public borrowing is from China Exim Bank and Sinosure. So this excludes other landing that we have had access to through the China Development Bank, through the Bank of China, other interests like Sino Hydro, or the Industrial

and Commercial Bank of China. All of whom have interest in Zimbabwe. This is not listed in our public debt statement. However, just looking at this ethic case studies, I hope to highlight the big elephant in the room around, are these loans resource backed? Are we giving up equity in exchange of China lending? And why are we not seeing the direct development from this kind of long arm of help that we are getting from China as it were. So to look at Athex. So Afec in two thousand and nine, Afec was given 50% equity. In an enterprise or a company called Action. Which has concessionary rights in the in Marange, in the Chiatwa, diamond mining. So this 50% equity was then exchanged for construction of the National Defence College So I said then go ahead and borrow from China Exim Bank 98 million US dollars to construct the National Defence College. So we are seeing some sort of equity relationship between the lending and the the infrastructure development. So so if you just pay attention to that because that's important. Apex then go ahead and borrow an additional 2 twenty-5 million from China Development Bank. This allows them to fund sorry operations in Kiazwa. a 2016 report. So here we have 2 hundred and twenty-five million being borrowed from China Development Bank by AFEC which

is a Chinese entity. But this is this is for the purposes of diamond operations in Chiadswa. In 2016 a report is then released to say okay so AFEC has been in Marange. We have been mining. However we've not really had any payment back to Zimbabwe on royalties taxation etcetera etcetera. And I think at that the government at the time decides to to to take away the concessionary rights for AFEC and continue using the Zimbabwe consolidation diamond mining. And this kind of puts AFEC in a default position. Which is the first risk structure that we see. The the way that Zimbabwe's equity. The way that Zimbabwe's resources can be exposed to Chinese lending. So once they're on the default list with China Development Bank and with the Chinese Exim Bank, this does put Zimbabwe at risk. However, in 2018, their new, in April, new bilateral agreements where Afic is returned the concessionary right to continue mining in Tiadswa. And in addition, as a goodwill gesture, two billion contract is awarded to them for the Chirinda Highway Highway Bite Bridge. So what does this tell us in terms of the risk exposure, in terms of equity based resource based loan. AFEC is a high risk Chinese entity. Currently its current company is bankrupt. And so the the situation that it may go

default is not far fetched to think so. If this happens it causes a direct risk on the equity holdings that AFEC has in Zimbabwe. One of which is the is the partnership or the joint venture agreement with In which is the currently in were doing the diamond mining. But also we know the Longshang Plaza. We all know the the Mutare Hotel. And so many others. Some of which you know I personally don't know of but suspect that they are. So these are some of the risks that Chinese lending brings to Zimbabwe that go past even this present generation. Another example of how Chinese lending sort of manifests in commercial enterprise and commercial partnerships. Is we can have a look at the Sinohydro so what we have is a one billion loan that China Exim Bank has given to Zimbabwe. Specific to the development of Wange Kolio unit 7 and 8. This 1. 1 billion is insufficient to then pay up for the contract that we award to Sinohydro. Which is a completely state owned Chinese contracting company. So we them \$1. 5 billion. So Zimbabwe raises through its own resources and other loans. Nought. 5 billion to meet this contract. The 1. 1 billion we get from Chinese eggs alone. Includes 80% concessionary. At 2% interest. And 20% sorry 80% concessionary yes and 20% non-concessionary. So we are

paying commercial rates on 20% of \$1.1 billion. But I mean it's not clear how much that is. But it is stated that it is non-concessionary. So this is another example. Wherein we've got a commercial partnership that is backed by that infrastructure frontier loan that I think Gilliad was made reference to. That's coming through China Exim Bank. But is being awarded to a Chinese state owned enterprise. So what is the risk to Zimbabwe? The risk to Zimbabwe is the cost of a 1 billion loan. So we have to repay the the principle. I think we have a extension on the loan. We have to pay the interest which is we know for the bulk of it is at 2% and the remainder on 20%. We don't know what other commercial terms and conditions are associated with the 20 percent. We are awarding that one billion is being paid back to China to sign a hydro. If not paid after 20 years, we're not sure what the terms are. Again, we have seen through the public debt statement that was issued that other borough that is meant for other projects. So for example the India Exam loan that was borrowed for the Deca project. That is rediverted and is being used to pay some of the China Exam loan that was used for Wangekoliary. And this is stated in the public debt statement. The other way that we see Chinese lending

manifesting in Zimbabwe is affiliation to resource extraction. So what having the China as I've said at the start. China Exim Bank currently our public borrower is at 50% of our public borrowing is from China and Simba Bank. So this does give them a great foot in the door in terms of bilateral diplomacy. Etcetera etcetera. It gives an end as it were. In terms of negotiating of commercial deals. And we have seen some of these commercial deals that do not entirely benefit Zimbabwe in specifically in the long run. One such the Zamasco which is currently owned by Sino Steel. Um trying to find how much sinus purchased Masco for is like looking for a needle in a haystack. But the first time I find something it states that it was acquired for \$200 million US dollars. Now imagine the fifth largest Pherochrome deposits. Sold for 200 US million dollars. We know in also trying to even understand the revenue in itself is another needle in a in the haystack but I have managed to see that at least in twentyeleven. had a revenue of a hundred and ninety-four point nine million. That's in one year. And yet that's the value that it was acquired for. So how do we look at this from a from a whole life cost? From a return on investment. How do we

align the debts that China is so kindly giving to Zimbabwe. Visa V, the Chinese interest in Zimbabwe and their association with resources in Zimbabwe with equity. Um in Zimbabwe. I mean there are so many others deals that that we have seen that we are able to find information on. I mean the list goes on. Um we have US \$20 million dollars to the infrastructure development bank which was given from China, from the China Development Bank, which we know is non-concessionary. So the infrastructure development bank of Zimbabwe was given \$20 million. This is not really, is not included in the public debt statement as far as I can tell. He's not included in the loans from China bank. We don't know what this was attached to. Because on paper it's recorded as being for the use of working capital. So what does that mean? In terms of the infrastructure development bank of Zimbabwe. To what extent have we what have we given in exchange of that borrowing? Um we have for for parliament. I know we had a grant aid. 100 million dollar grant aid for for a very beautiful Mount Hampden. Not really sure, you know, how that fits, where we need hospitals, etcetera. So without even going into the, the finer detail of then what are the political nuances? What is the impact on the democracy

agenda for Zimbabwe, of this kind of friendly landing that we get, this free landing that we get from China. The other thing to pay attention to as well, is the fact that a lot of the Chinese bank loans are very liquid so they will issue loans to Chinese interests that want to to acquire resources in Zimbabwe very easily. But what happens then is with those interests if they are to go into default that extends that puts at risk the Zimbabwean resources the Zimbabwean equity shares that are attached or assigned to those companies that are borrowing from China. So these are all some of the other things that I think specific to Zimbabwe perhaps more so than elsewhere. Though I doubt that I have had a look at for example Angola. We've seen a lot of military involvement in the Congo, from China, etcetera as well. So it's almost as though we have this long arm that comes in through the China Exim Bank. It has concessionary loans. They are long term. Their interest rates are low. But what that gives is that debt trap diplomacy begins. And that will introduce other you follow through the Chinese development loans. Sinohydro. Um the industrial Bank of China etcetera etcetera. there's so many that you follow through and see how their interest has also expanded from the time

that Chinese lending through the China Exim Bank increased. So I think that's the spanner that I would like to throw in the works in terms of that debt trap diplomacy. Yes we have landing. Yes if you speak to China Exim Bank they'll tell you that. it's not resource banked. It's not equity backed etcetera. But when you start to look at those wall web of relationships that starts with a Chinese loan from the China Exim Bank. This is where you are going to get a lot of nuances around the resources that have been transferred to China. The risks that Zimbabwe is taking on. How it's going to impact us even for generations to come potentially. And ja. I think I will leave it there for now Ebo. Thanks. Thanks very much. I'm hoping that the our Chinese guests from the Zimbabwe Embassy. It's a Chinese embassy in Zimbabwe. And we of course welcome to to contribute. And also to debate the issues that Chennai has put on the table. With regard to Chinese investment. In in in Zimbabwe. And including the allegations that were one of the causes the reasons for the coup in twenty seventeen. It was the issue a report produced for Mugabe on the base of which Anjini was thrown out in twenty sixteen. We should remember that. And then Jean came back after the call. It's a it's a matter that maybe Shanai would

like to reflect upon later. But I think it's something that needs to be put on the table too. Um I noticed that people here who may want to speak people like Gordon Moyo. Uh we have been doing some research on China relations. And you did anybody else. Please go to your life to come in Chennai. We would like to come in. Yes I mean you raised a very good point around the the the coup and the relationship. Because what actually happened is once we had Afec in Zimbabwe with a partnership with Angien. In 2016 this is when we get the report that says there's no royalty staxation etcetera. And Mugabe pulls that out. When AFEC is now in trouble. China then withholds some of their commitments to Zimbabwe through the China Exim Bank. The Wangekoliary being one. So they withhold the disbursements of some of those loans. But what we see in April 20 18 is a new agreement that happens with the Second Republic and the Prime Minister in China. And this then regenerates AFEC by giving them the \$2. 5 billion to run rebate bridge highway contract which was actually awarded to someone else. And then also they have given back their concessionary rights in Chiadswa. And it is at that point that the Wange Kolia remind 1. 1 billion loan is disbursed as well. So this is

this is all it's it's all down  
on paper. It's not something  
I'm making up. Um ja so this is  
how it happened in summary.  
We'll come back to that Femi.  
And then Christopher. Mulenga.  
Femi first.

Femi. Yeah, sorry. I had my mic  
muted. Can you hear me now?  
Yes, can you hear you? Yes,  
yes, thank you. Um yeah, it's  
it's yeah, it's wonderful to  
hear all of this and and the  
person all in equal measure. Um  
were you coming from? Uh I'm  
calling from Tanzania. I'm in  
Salam at the moment. Um one of  
the things that's really I  
suppose it it's the same old  
story and and you know we've  
been discussing these things  
for I think as many have said  
for for for donkeys years. We  
have the African continental  
free trade area. We know it's  
not perfect but it it certainly  
a a a really significant a  
symbolic you know. statement.  
Uh and yet everything still  
seems external. Everything  
seems still to be flowing  
outwardly. We know we've seen  
the figures of where you know  
continents or where blocks  
actually grow so much more when  
there's internal trade. When  
there's internal you know  
exchanges. Um what what's  
happening from from you know  
our experts point of views. In  
terms of the growth, the the  
internal growth of our markets.  
Are are the roads literally  
going to the ports or are they

now converging inwards?

Thanks Femi. I'll be asking the panelists to come back. But in the meantime Christopher Mulenga please.

Christopher Mulenga.

Um good evening. Um can you hear me? Yes, can hear you now.

Yeah. Um thank you very much for the opportunity. Um I'm calling from Zambia. I I I

sorry Rebounds you are good oh.

I I like to echo a lot of what

Chennai said about the experience with the Chinese so-called help. To our Africa in our country in particular.

Uh in Zambia we've just had a regime change from one government to the other. Uh and the other government the previous government is really in trouble and having to account for so many and

so many crooked things they did with the Chinese. And some Chinese contracts are now being cancelled here and there and they're in real trouble because some contracts are halfway done. You see our experience with our Chinese is that they they come in saying oh our aid is not like the west. Where there are conditionalities for us. We don't care what you do in your own country. It's none of our business. As long as we advance our agenda and we support you for everything is okay. But where it's not okay for us as we found out is that they don't have ethics. They

corrupt politicians. openly for them gifts in form of briefcases full of dollars. Was the order of the day here. And that really went to a very very reckless level. That some people even got helicopters. not one but two, parked in their farms. You know, so you you wonder what type of age this is. And then when it comes to doing infrastructure, their quotations for roads, were so exaggerated, even for buildings and other different forms of support. You know, but we were being told that if I had to allow for the kick bugs. But kickbacks were not going to come to a to a extent where one of the roads which was stopped by public outcry. Which was three times the cost of industry. Um norm or comparison in the whole region. So these people Chinese they have to be managed. I think their aid could be of some use. But it's going to only be of some use if the government is responsible and able to check on them. Another issue we found very very difficult to to to digest. Africa has a problem of labour, jobs for the general workers. But when these Chinese come with their construction companies, they come with their own laborers. Now, you know, we need jobs for the these builders out of employment and the labourers eh you know site workers. But these guys come with their own. These are not

investors. Some of them are get  
I I went to school in Nigeria.  
And my friends call me in the  
middle of the night scolding  
me. They said Chris don't you  
guys know how to roast maize?  
It starts off simply like that.  
Then I say of course we do.  
Then they say. But why do you  
have Chinese on the roadside  
roasting maize for you? so what  
type of investor is that? Now  
to come to Zambia and to have  
investors status you need to  
bring in half a million  
dollars. Okay. But these guys  
are staying in Shanti compounds  
impregnating young girls. And  
having children who can't be  
taken back to China. That's  
one. Two. These guys are  
calling Africa their second  
continent. Their books written  
in that to that.  
you know, to attest to that. So  
and when they come into our  
societies, they are not even  
friendly. You can't mix with  
them. They will get the big  
tract of land and build houses  
in there and and put up a big  
war fence and you can't even  
talk to them. You can't even go  
in there. So these guys are  
slowly but surely occupying  
Africa and never to go back.  
now in places like for example  
Mozambique they build a very  
very nice port there harbour  
and everything. I'll be very  
brief. I need to Okay quickly.  
Yeah quickly to allow others to  
talk. They like to lend you  
even preferably when you can't

pay back so that they foreclose and these things become theirs. So that is becoming very very despised and that's why the previous government for us here got voted out overwhelmingly. So now we are back allowing other players from the west as well and other European countries to participate in development. Thank you so much. Thanks Christopher. Uh I'm sure the panelists especially the two panelists who will respond to some of your shall I call them allegations? Or maybe exaggerate reactions to the Chinese factor. I would ask Eleanor to come in quickly and then I will ask Deborah to speak before she leaves. She has to leave very soon. Eleanor Sisulu. Welcome. Thank you very much boss fascinating presentations. Uh let me just put my video. Okay. Thank you for the presentations and I just want to comment on not on China but on us, on us Africans and on our governments. That we have data on China and Chinese relations with Africa being aggregated at John Hopkins University. And we are not doing this ourselves. We don't have data on ourselves. I mean this is is the thing that you I I hear the anger of the previous previous speaker. But we are the ones that are responsible for for this. And I was interested when Femi talked about oh no Gilead talked about hedging. How our government's

hedge. But do they do it in our interests? For example we can't blame China for building a parliament in Zimbabwe. Which is absolutely useless and unnecessary. It's it's us who those decisions. It's our governments who make those decisions. And those decisions are not in the interests of African people. So quite frankly whether it's China or whether it's the west I think in both instances we have governments which are not acting in our interests. And I won't even get into the area of human rights because that's a whole other area. Uh where African interests are or the interests of African people are just trampled under foot. So I really think that yes we can criticise China. We can criticise the West too. But we really have to have our get our work together. Thank you. Thanks Eleanor. Uh I'll now call on Deborah. To respond where you can. Add hivo. Thanks. Um it's been a very interesting discussion and it's really it's how to put it. Um I really appreciate being here and being able to be part of this seminar here in Zimbabwe. And sort of in the Southern Africa region. I think the I want to I think make two comments following on what some of the speakers have said. And the first is about the issue of corruption. And Chinese engagement. I think it's a real

problem. It's something that I've been pointing to for a long long time. I think it's really the the weak, the weak point, the dark side of the Chinese engagement, I don't see, you know, things like asset seizures or the debt trap diplomacy in terms of the Chinese want to grab your your strategic assets but I do see, as, as being the issue, I think that corruption is the issue, and it's because the Chinese companies are not restrained, by any institutional hold. There's, there's, in the countries where corruption is a problem here in Africa, they're not being restrained by local governments, and they are being by the Chinese government. Um foreign corruption actually is illegal for Chinese companies to bribe government officials overseas. It is against the Chinese law. The criminal code was revised around 2011. And that was made illegal. Just as the United States made it illegal in nineteen seventy<sup>7</sup>. And European countries made it illegal in 1997. Up until that point it was until legal. It wasn't a crime for our companies to bribe government officials overseas. They could just deduct it from their tax returns. But I think that putting the pressure on the Chinese to actually enforce that law. It's article 60 in their criminal code. So in it's it's one of my campaigns.

Enforce Article 60. And let's see some examples of Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign being carried overseas as well. So I think that would be a wonderful shift. And then the second point that I would make is following up on the last person Eleanor. Who commented on what happens here with African governments and African agency. And in my travels and interviews, I have seen the problem of trust, the broken trust between citizens and the governments here is so severe. It's why people in NGOs and among citizens and the media, they don't trust their governments when they finally do publish the debt statistics in a very detailed manner. It's still not trust and we saw this in Zambia, our own research in Zambia. We published our data on Chinese lending there. Um which showed that it was over as twice as much as the government had been accounting for. And then the government there published its own list which was almost identical with ours. So we felt that we were helping with the transparency. But it is it is a job for you all here. I would love to have transferred. In fact some of our work is being transferred to Vets University in South Africa in Johannesburg. Um but this this what I'm often told is that the Chinese are like water in a way. They take the shape of the vessel that

they're poured into. So in the United States the Chinese are not very corrupt. Uh you don't hear allegations about Chinese companies bribing government officials. There are other issues. But that's not the issue. And so I'll just stop with that point. Thanks.

Thanks. Thanks Deborah. Are you leaving now? I can be here for 7 more minutes. Okay. There's literally one one way when you're leaving. I'd like to thank you. Uh profusely for fantastic job done. Uh Gordon Moyo, before I call on Gordon Moyo. Before I call on Gilead. Gordon. And thank you Igbo. Uh I would like Deborah to comment on my submission.

China

benefited in the 1970s.

Uh from Japan Through the resource for infrastructure investments. Um as actually China benefited a lot. And the Japanese were among the first to to introduce this resource back loans in some way. Uh what is it that they did Deborah? Uh that Africa is not doing. Uh to benefit from the the Japanese loans. Which are similar to Chinese loans offered to to to Africa today. Uh that's my first question. The question number two. Um and again I would like maybe Deborah and Chennai to to to offer some some insights. Uh over the past 20 years two decades. We have seen a lot of of decline in the levels of funding from the

multilateral institutions, bilateral institutions, the traditional financials. Um the decline in in a finance to infrastructure in Africa. Um if we are to pull out or if China or Africans would stop the Chinese finance coming into Africa. What would happen to our infrastructure development. I'm a critic of of Chinese funding. Uh don't take me wrong with this question. Um I'm looking at the infrastructure. Um given the fact that a lot of of funding is going to infrastructure from from China and less is coming from multilateral institutions. The the traditional ones. What what is your take on that? Okay, day breakfast. Then I'll go to thanks Gordon, that's a, that's a great question. Um in the mid 1970s, when China was still doing the cultural revolution, there was a huge amount of instability. Um, the Japanese leaders and Chinese leaders came up with a, an agreement for a \$10 billion dollar line of credit. That would come from Japan. And it would be used to import goods and equipment, and Japanese expertise to build infrastructure and develop natural resources China. And that loan was secured with exports of coal and oil that were already going to Japan from Chinese state owned companies. So that kind of resource backed loan it it worked well in the beginning.

Um it the projects were undertaken and a number of them in the first few years were funded through this line of credit. And then what happened was that the Chinese decided that their economy was overheating and they couldn't actually afford to take out that much. Um and so they basically put a cap on it. They never borrowed the full 10 billion. But I think the reason why why this worked in that context was in nineteen seventy-eight I think when they signed that loan. China wasn't credit worthy. No international banks would lend to China. Um the World Bank was not they weren't a member. So they didn't have the ability to access credit. And so in countries where the risks are high and creditors are not coming lining up to just offer unsec credits. Uh this kind of resource secured or it's a somehow having a collateral collateralized lending can be very fruitful for African development. And I give the example the one I like to give a lot is in Ghana. They use this structure for the buoy dam in 2006 or 2007. And they actually secured that loan with exports of cocoa beans which were having a growing market in China. So the the Ghana cocoa board linked up with a buyer inside China. And then buyer paid for the cocoa beans and paid part of it into an escrow

account with China Exxon Bank which was part of how they secured the Bowie Dam in the years before Bowie Dam was actually producing electricity which were were then how they made the loan payments later on. So, that was in the in the first part when the risk still looked very high. So, I do and that worked that worked very well in Ghana and there haven't really been any complaints about it. So, I think the important thing is having a a government that's really taking out these loans for developmental purposes there's, you know, you have an interesting structure with the Defense College. It's it's structured very much in a very similar way but do you really need a huge defense university here in Zimbabwe for \$100 million dollars? I'm not sure that was the best use of a concessional loan from the Chinese. That's what your government negotiated. Um but it's it depends. The Chinese will fund a lot of different things because the China Export Bank Export Import Bank is their whole purpose is to support Chinese companies. To of Chinese goods and services overseas. That's what Exim Banks do. So let me just stop there. Thanks Deborah. And thank you very much indeed. I hope we'll see you before you leave Arare. Yeah well I'm leaving on Saturday. This is

yeah. It's today. Today's Thursday right? It's been so quick. But I want to say goodbye to everybody. Thank you so much. Uh it was a pleasure being on a panel with you. I'm sorry I have to go. The thing you have lunch tomorrow Deborah. I'll phone you morning. Right. Let's go to Chennai and then I'll go back to Femi. Hi, thank you. So yeah, so very good question Um, from, from Gordon there. So, in terms of infrastructure support, yes, it's true that we get the infrastructure lending from China, and does it help? And I think here, we need to look at it from a cost benefit, perspective. If you look at it and think, okay, so for instance, I mentioned the Sinohydro deal for Wange Poliary, where we get a billion from China. But we pay back for five times as much. We get a billion from China to pay to we pay interest to China. The same company has access to other contracts as well. Because of this one deal. It's a it extends etcetera etcetera. So you start to think what in the long run is the cost of this lending? How does it fare when we compare it with actual private financing? You know. So you look at what we've done with Zimasco. Where we sold it for for the equivalent of one year's revenue. And we've sold the rights to the fifth largest Ferrochrome deposit in the

world. So I think for me we need to start considering. We need to really look at things differently. Understand what is our asset. Look at what is our asset resource. How can we engage private sector finance. How can we derive the best from what we have before we sell our souls for a song basically. Which is what we're doing with the Chinese lending. That debt shop has opened up, opened us up to being plundered through these agreements. I mean I was going to ask Deborah in terms of corruption. So in Zimbabwe the corruption is a is a lot more coveted. You know it's not so obvious. Because what we are having is we have partnership deals. Between for instance defence personnel. And Chinese companies. So therefore that becomes a legal standing somewhat. You cannot necessarily go at it with the corruption figure. You can go at it with in terms of ethics. In terms of how they operate. it is a viable legal standing. You see. So we don't always see briefcases of money. We we get into partnership whether it's defence personnel or other states personnel get into partnership with Chinese companies. The Chinese companies bring the investments in terms of the cheap money that they can access through the Chinese banks. In terms of operationalising these deals. And so in terms of corruption

it's a really difficult one to go after. Because it's not so obvious. What we need to do is revalue or re-evaluate our engagement and our bilateral agreements with China altogether. And actually see how much are we owed by China? Is the question. Rather than how much do we owe China? But does it state our state have that capacity? Uh it appears to me that as the point raised by Eleanor that our states are under on the receiving end. They're so porous in terms of capacity to to to interrogate loans and and and packages. And the kind of opaque nature of these loans and I mean the public doesn't even know the extent of these loans. You know we hear about them and the the people are shocked thereafter but generally it goes on you know. On and on. Uh let me bring in Femi again and then I want to give you to come in. Glad you have enough time to respond to questions. Uh thank you. Thank you for indulging me again. Um yeah in fact the the last discussion point about commodity backed credit kind of regimes or or arrangements. It it's something that I'm particularly interested in and wanted to know if there was more on that and of course this is in respect of China I understand. But I I suppose most of our concerns fall at well what are we doing within our 54 states to actually

assist one another? Is there for commodity backed exchange arrangements continentally. I mean if we think of the expertise that exist within the continent, you know, from north, south, east, west, what is there on the ground? What have our kind of expertise telling us about, can we do, can the expertise that's in South Africa that maybe needed in Nigeria can, you know, how can we exchange or or based on our commodities, you know, oil its country here and particular expertise in another area that's needed eh in Nigeria. What kind of exchanges can be developed around ah what we have in abundance which is our commodities which is our natural resources. So if we could of course dealing with China and and the ills I don't think any of those countries will ever do things differently. It's part of how you stay powerful. Now it's how does Africa regenerate? And what do what are we doing within the contin to ensure that we have the means to circulate what we have. Asante Femi. Uh Tony. Karibu. Thank you. Um What are the things that strikes me about this is to go back to a very interesting dialogue many years ago about extractive industries. When Claude Kabembe outlined what was going on with extractive industries. And he pointed out

that when it came to extractive industries there were many fronts and many people behind the fronts. And he made the comment which I thought was really interesting. So he thought the most aggressive exploiters of extractive industries were actually South African companies in one way or another. But the striking point he made was that if you looked at the difference between trying to do business in China and you wanted to do business in Africa, when you went to China, you got an inciclopedia of forms that you had to fill in, to establish your bonafide areas and what the contracts were and stuff like that. But if you went to many African countries and you went to the the ministry that was in charge of minerals, and you asked them what their mineral policy was and what their policy was in minerals. The guy would travel around and adjourn and you pull out three sheets from the bottom drawer and he say this is what our policy is. And I think that goes to the heart of what Ananom is saying. Is that it's very easy to scapegoat and I'm not excusing exploitation by any of the imperialist powers with the American, EU, or China. But the point is that if you don't put your own house in order then you have no capacity to be able to deal with the problems downstream. And I

think is part of the problem.  
Aaron is right. You know, we have to put our own house in order. If you want to deal with China or the EU or America or anyone else, we have to be up our game very substantially. Thanks Tony. Uh Gilliad, would you like to come in now? Femi questions quite interesting. I'm happy to sort of share my two sense on them. So I think there was a question about if we are seeing all this, I think this was from Femi if we are seeing all the investment in infrastructure converging at the port. Are we seeing anything happening? Um with respect to inwards. I mean the last paper that I sort of looked at you know in a similar subject, spoke of the coloniality of, of, of infrastructure investment in Africa, which is quite, quite the same. And one of the things that was striking when I'm looking at East Africa, is that, I think the happy thought of trying to connect Nairobi and Arusha as not your car to anyone working in the infrastructure space. I mean, this is one of the largest hubs of tourism in Africa. And you have one of the largest hub of financial and business and commercial investment in Eastern Africa including the airline industry. But the happy thought of connecting you know these I

don't know three hundred, 400 kilometres of two cities in the in north. Um Northern Tanzania with with the capital of Kenya has not happened but everyone is just rushing parallel all the way to DRC. I think that talks about about sort of the absence of this Pan Africanist fought when it comes to infrastructure investment. That is that is just coast one particular point. I think Eleanor asked a question about if if the hedging is happening or is occurring ah for our interest. And one of the things that I'm finding out on the research now it's quite interesting how you know one thing could be a different I mean the same thing could be interpreted in two different ways in two different instances. So so for example some of the early conversations that I've had with ah my respondents with ah in Tanzania said you know China was you know earmarked ah to be ah to be the contractor for, for, for the, for the Tanzania and SGR, same, same way it was with the Kenyan SGR. Um, the government when it came to power, the new administration came into power twenty sixteen, they say, you know, there were elements of corruption, so there's just scrap that bill and reopen the tender, and this is when the Chinese boycotted. And then a Turkish firm was announced. And now, that, that strategy of

hedging in between them and trying to create competition, worked quite well they you know they've got a competitive bid for the contractor. They they got a very fairly competitive bid for the the financing as well because that also goes in the same in the same bidding modality. And they have gone all the way to lot three, lot four, I think those are like sort of ah ah already in the pipeline, you know, the competition is is working out quite fine. And then you know, recently someone came with a happy thought, that you know, maybe we are too competitive, we need to hedge against having one firm winning competitively against it, we should single source a Chinese certain section of it. Uh, and it's quite interesting last week, on Monday, during the discussions on the budget, one member of parliament, raised a very important question, which I really hope, when I go to the, to the field again, to, to really research about it, that there is a different of \$600 million dollars between ah what the minister of finance had indicated in the budget speech the the amount allocated for the ahm ah for the project the the Chinese section of the project compared to what the public procurement system ah had indicated ah ah to have given ah allocated to to to the single source Chinese firm. So

this tells me that on one side you know the same strategy was used to sort of create fair competition and ah ah and ah and and have and have ah ah a very good result but at the same time it was sort of perverted to a different result which we don't really know if that is the case or it's just ah sort of a misreading of events but I think injuries still out on that one. So you are right I mean about about the hedging it has really to work ehm ah to our own interest and that really depends on on how on on what is the interest of the state or at least the actors that are working on that particular project at that point in time. I think there was a on the reduction of financing from multilateral institution. And this is quite right. I tried to point out that much more recently these institutions especially from the west have been quite interested to fund more human development project, you know, general budget support, you have, you know, several development policy operations. I've worked with, you know, along along some of them during my days with, with, with, with the World Bank as well. But what I have noticed is that, the pretty much the determinant is who has the money. You know with China the state has the resources so they can have sort of state to state relations

with African states and sort of dish out these resources. But within the west the money sits with firms. It sits with you know private companies, investment funds, you know mutual funds and the rest of it. So the only thing that the state-like institutions like the World Bank can do is trying to leverage the resources. And hoping that the private sector would follow for and invest in the same investment. And this is why you have all these technocratic and very creative ways of financing which tries to leverage in private capital. So your typical public private partnership, your typical you know bonds, infrastructure bonds, you know mezzanine finances, you have things like blending, you know all these mechanism like road tours and so forth, they are all designed to to make this infrastructure and investable proposition. Which you can put in front of institutional investors. And they will put money not for the importance of infrastructure. But merely as an instrument where you can get higher returns from. And I think this is the thing that you are seeing different between what's happening with China and what's happening with US and funders. I mean the west simply can't do the traditional ah investment. The bread and butter that China is doing. Ah and certainly ah ah China cannot do what ehm

what is happening ah ah in the west. I think those are the ones that I could call ah ah for now and and I'm happy to talk about some other ah questions later. Over to you professor. We'll back to Theri just now with one question I have is or two questions. One is ah how Africa can take advantage of this competition. What we call superpower competition. Um yesterday the G seven announced \$600 billion investment into infrastructure in Africa to compete with China. Yesterday. Very significant. that's the first. So how does Africa increase its capacity to take advantage this competition for this new scramble for Africa, one might call it. And secondly, how can Africa as as a block as part of the Pan African project. liaise with each other and create a a kind of composite policy framework. Which to avoid investors including the Chinese. From playing one country against the other. and instead have a kind of a continental development plan into which all investment can can get into. So for example in that regard I'd like you to make some comments at the end on the kind of things happening in the East African community. Now I forgot to mention this is part of my post pilgrimage to East Africa. Um and I hope Moles is there to listening but I discovered that the East

African community is way ahead of SADEC. No. with very practical In particular with respect to open borders. within and between their countries of East Africa. And there is no talk of anyone being a foreigner in Mister Africa. Assess that. and certainly Kenya it's pumping. And I think it it soon overtake South Africa. But more important for me it was the the developers in East Africa. The East African Commission in particular which are the most of great interest. I like you to comment on those issues. Uh before I come back to you I'd like to hear or have responses to my to my question to those who were there people like Moret Mbeki. And Gordon Moye for the comeback. Femi from the come please some comments. What is to be done? To increase Africa's capacity. To run its own affairs. To capitalise on the investments. The competition that's at at play. And move the continent forward. Anybody? before period sums up. Gordon Moyo. Chennai again later. Gordon. Uh thank you Igbo. Uh I think for me the starting point is the African continental free trade area, the Africa if Alpha Kafta is to develop the wings to fly and defeat to walk and jump. Um it should in one way or the other contribute to the questions to respond to the questions that you have

raised. Number one for me, the biggest problem is that we do not have a shared or commonly Africa position when we are relating to countries like China. We have a small country like Zimbabwe engaging China with our fourteen, \$15 million, engaging \$1.6 billion. Uh we have small countries in our legal countries engaging China as a bilateral level. But if we are to use the Afcafta and we have our one. 3, 1.4 billion people in Africa. With almost 3 trillion dollars as our GDP. And engage in China have a common position In trade, investment in various sectors of our economy. Extractive industries. Then we will have a voice. Then we will have a space on the table where we can use our African agents to to to demand. Because we do have what these countries want. What China wants. We do have the energy. Uh the energy resources. The mineral resources. All these resources that we have. China would want to have them. But they are having it easy. Simple cause they are engaging as a bilateral level. So if we are to go back to the African continental trade area, try and galvanise it and use it as a tool, use it as a vehicle. Um for pushing for pushing forward. A more pan African agenda in terms of our our of our development. We'll go a a very long way. So I'm putting

on the table and submitting that. Um the African continental free trade area is the starting point. But obviously their their weaknesses. Uh they are always interferences and people taking advantage of that. The external world including China and the rest of the Euro-western countries will always come in to make sure that even the African coordinator of Free Trade Area does not take root as it is supposed to. So I hear you and I think that's the starting point and let me leave to to others to complete the the picture. No thanks Gordon. Molexi. Mveki. Welcome Moletsi. Yeah, hi, thank you, thank you Igbo. Well, I, I think the, our starting point, we have to repeat it over and again, which has just been made by the previous speaker. Africa is one of the, if not, the most well-endowed continent with natural resources is Africa. Um, the rest of the world knows this, but we, the Africans, seem not to fully understand what what what the implication of the, of that is. Uh, it means that Africa has a huge negotiating power. If it wants to negotiate, we, we have the ability. We, we have leverage, we have massive leverage. Uh, you, you have, for example, geological formations like the great dike in Zimbabwe. Which you find anywhere else in the world. Uh so you you you have

this massive endowment. That that that Africa has. And you can look at many other at many other reasons. The water and so on and so forth. However we we have to realise that colonialism destroyed very fundamentally the self-confidence of the Africans. And it replaced the African elite, our indigenous elites. It replaced them with a colonial middle class, which which is what became the nationalist movement. We, which doesn't have the confidence that our indigenous elites of of the aristocracy who led the wars against the colonialists. They had the confidence that they could fight and defeat the colonialists. The the new middle class that was developed during the colonial era does not have that confidence. Uh and and this is one of the crisis that we have to address especially us the intelligence here in Africa. Is the issue of replacing or or changing the mindset of of of of the intelligence here in Africa. Uh from that of dependence which is what we we have now amongst the elite in Africa. Just to give you an example. The standard gauge railway that's that are being built in in East Africa. Far from them integrating East Africa to the rest of Africa. They are actually isolating East Africa from the rest of Africa. At a massive cost that is

unnecessary. To build a standard gauge railway, it costs 40 times more than building the normal gauge railway that we use in Southern Africa. The the Gage Railway we have in Southern Africa which goes from Cape Town all the way up to Lobito, Benuela, Lubumbashi, Dare Salam, in fact the Chinese built Tazara is part of the that that exists in in the whole of the Southern Africa region. What has happened in East Africa, the elites there was told to be more than you have to build a standard gauge, which is 40% more expensive to build at that gauge. I raised this with the Secretary General of Komesa. I asked him, who is a Zimbabwean by the way? He retired recently. Uh Cindy Songwe. I asked him, did he allow the East African governments to build a standard gauge which is a hugely costly undertaking. Which is totally unsuitable, unnecessary. For for the needs of of Kenya and Uganda and and so on. So he said hê actually met with the presidents of East Africa. And told them that it's not necessary to have a standard gauge. But they said they want to be modern. And they understand that being modern means you have to have standard gauge. Now Kenya has incurred this massive debt which they are now unable to pay. So so those are are really the the the major challenges

that we we we are faced. China is not our problem. America is not our problem. Our problem are the elites in Africa and the holders of political power in Africa. Uh one of the big problems is their lack of confidence. And of course we we have to find solutions. Now, just to close on the question of, of borrowing. South Africa Boris has a huge debt, I think, 77% of of, our public debt is 77% of GDP. But most of that debt is rand debt denominated, raised local it. Why is it raised locally? Because the unionisation of black workers forced the capitalists to have that the black workers must have medical aid. They must have pension funds. They must have those kinds of saving. And thus so South Africa has this massive internal saving. So when the government needs to borrow it borrows domestically. It doesn't have to go to to China. It doesn't have to go to the World Bank. It doesn't have to go. In fact the World Bank Banks South Africa. to take money from the World Bank Uh So these are the dynamics that we all have to start to seriously look into. Igbo mentioned that what happened in East Africa in Darasalam in the 1970s. Well we have to reproduce that experience that that we had in the at the University of Dara Salam in the 1970s. We have to reproduce that kind of a centre. We because it produced

a very distinguished analysis about our problems. And it produced also activists and people like Nyerere were in Kawunda were responsive to the analysis that came out of the of the Dara Salam School as it as it was called. So that's one of the things that we we have to really revisit although are those kinds of processes that had already taken place in in Africa. Now finally the Igbo was saying East Africa is the head of Stradek. Actually East Africa why East Africa has better cooperation processes. It's not because of the East African community. It's because of Komesa. Komesa is way ahead in terms of regional integration processes. And the East Africa and community countries are using the processes that were developed by Commerce. Uh I'll end there. Thank you. Thanks for letting of a fascinating contribution. Uh thanks a lot. Uh I will call on Femi and then after Femi I have go back to to Chennai. And then last but not least. Our panelist Juliet Terry. So Femi back again Karibu one. Femi. Feel me? Yeah, yeah. So, so as you know, Femi is a typical Yoruba name from Nigeria. And I'm living in Dawsalam. I, I, I strongly, strongly believe as most of us probably do on this call. In the an African verb that, you know, really must be regenerated in a, in a very

powerful way. Now, do you, last caller, let's see, you're right in saying that the intelligence, yeah, it is critical in all of this, but I, I actually also believe that what for me and I'm the engagements I have particularly with the youth is you know a popularisation of the ideas you know breaking them down making things very simple and very accessible to you know our everyday folk I think often times some of the wonders of what has happened in in the past have sometimes not always but sometimes stayed in the ivory towers we need to get this out to you know the people. This needs to be a force that becomes we've always known how great the continent is and it has been great. So it's not a question of you know our past 500 years is the sum total of the Africa experience on on you know globally. It clearly is not. And and that is known. But it's about regenerating this concept in our everyday lives. So that you know getting the youth to really take up the mantle as the new areas of the the encrumas have done. The have done. a very kind of simplified way and leveraging technology now. It's a different age. You know the way in which you've I mean I I have all of us probably have kids or or someone. The adult kids, young adult kids, the way in which

they you know traverse this continent now is incredible. You using and leveraging technology. In the global African kind of verb. You know really getting this the ideas of you know sharing amongst ourselves. It doesn't it's not to the exclusion because the point is we're everywhere now. And that's why it is a global African discussion. So how do we as as you say how do we not so much reliance there is the reality of you know these big infrastructure projects and how they're financed. But you know this can be brought back home. I loved what you were saying. Well let's see about you know self financing within the continent. There is resources. There's an abundance of resources. We have recalibrate. Use if we if we need to. A different form of, of, of, you know, kind of valuation, a different form of exchange. I know this is some of this is controversial, but it's something that we ought to be able to do, and the thing is this, and I'd, I'd, I hear often, and I do capacity building as a, as a lawyer and so on and so forth. But actually, you go around the continent and the expertise in the continent or from the continent, because often times we're not in the continent and we're doing elsewhere is phenomenal. We do have the resources plus the human human

resources to get this job done. It's about bringing ourselves together again. I know it's an often is maybe cliché but it stops there. It's time to bring our pieces together. You know, we need to be one in that much more. I leave it there. Thanks. Thanks, Olga. Thank you very much. Uh Chennai, your last words. Thanks, Ibbo. than really ah reiterating what everybody has said. I will say that Africa needs a change of guard. I think that's the elephant in the room. Currently the presentation we have is of the mindset that Africa we are beggars. We need help. And yet what all this is telling us is evidence to support the idea that we are very resource rich. That actually all these things that where we've got Chinese interest. They're selling these things back to China. So we are resource rich. We have something that the world needs. So we need to stop viewing ourselves on the back foot as somebody looking for help or for free hinders here and there. We are a resource rich continent. We need to come together to appreciate what we have and to restore back some sanity into the way that it is financed. So that we can have something to hand over to generations to come. As opposed to this scramble for Africa, from whether it's the west or it's from China. We really need to look at ourselves in a

different light and present ourselves in a different light too. I think I'll end there.

Thanks Janai. Thank you very much. Gilead. The last word.

Yes, I concur with what let's say I'd I'd said you know I've found the same information in some of the experts that I'm talking to with respect to the meter gauge railway. Um you know, they say Japan and Australia also runs majority of its railway freight as well still in meter gauge. So, I mean, it was really I mean, close to a full zero and trying to go this long route or achieve a sort of an expensive an expensive way. Um but yeah the the question you asked about what we can do now avoiding being played for a fool. Two things came into mind. I think there are several economic solutions and there are couple of political solutions that need to happen. One I think integration is is a huge solution as much as there is a lot of institutionalization of that. The political favour of it has really died down. Um in East Africa is one case in point that you know there are a lot of challenges now. I mean there was a time when within two years passed without heads of states meeting because one will not meet if the other is present or something to that effect. I think institutional strengthening could also be

quite a useful path. So reducing, you know, political interference, enhancing ah, oversight and ah, you know, the ability of these institutions and technocrats to sit in the, with the Chinese and ah, and engage, that's very important. On the, on the political solution, I think, I mean everyone has spoken about Pan Africanism and making sure that there is political engagements between countries, a commitment, ah, not just verbal, but also in action to some of these engagements and ah, ah, and agreements that we enter into. Be it ah you know continental free trade area ah or or else and I think the element of Pan Africanism just having that sense of dignity and confidence and just going out there and making sure that we as African can certainly congregate together and ah and make things work ah on our terms is is something that has to start from the mind and bit of a collective ethos that ehm our communities and our people need to develop to to to complement all these other ah ah institutional institutional works. Ah on that not you know professor Ibbo, I really appreciate the opportunity to, to be here today and and to share my thoughts and my research with with this group. Uh, it's been a fascinating conversation.

Thanks Gilead. I see a hand up there. Unless it's very urgent.

I I wish to close the meeting.

Uh identify yourself. They will end up

Okay. Okay. Yes. Thank you Doctor Mandesa. It's fine. It's fine. Sorry for coming very late. Yeah. Ja I'm sorry about that. Um but anyway. I just want to get very brief.

Intervention. Yes. I think what is needed? Um of course there are many approaches to dealing with this problem. The missing link in my view is the people power. The bottom up approach my work is largely in the communities where the destruction is taking place.

And I've seen the collusion of our politicians, parliamentarians, including the opposition, parliamentarians, with Chinese investments. But they have also seen something that can work in certain situations where when the people are mobilised and are contradised and are unit it. To stand up against the Chinese investments. Um putting the the record straight on what they want and what they don't want. Sometimes I've seen the Chinese backtracking. Sometimes I've seen the government itself speaking the language of the people. And recently we had a case in Mutari where the Chinese wanted to start quarry mining. It is a mountain that is very dear to the local people and very close to the

city centre. And the had endorsed the deal. The city council had pocketed money. But we mobilised the residents, the civil society.

public and say the city. They want to destroy an ecologically sensitive part of the city. At first the Chinese also issued a statement and said we are puppets of the west. But we did not stop and we even threatened the litigation. We threatened to go on site. And say the army can come and kill us. But we are going to defend our mountain. And after a while the Chinese said they are backtracking. They cancelled the So I think whilst political and eh institutional interventions are important.

Let's also capacitate the African people to unite and stand up to this Chinese bullying. Thank you. Well thanks very much chef Faray.

Farah Maguire is doing fantastic work across the country. Uh at a grassroot level and I'm sorry you came in late. We are expecting you earlier. But I'm sure we'll be to this kind of debate eh soon. I think the major takeaway is that the Africans we as Africans need to be get organised. And take advantage of this crash of empires. And and not allow a repeat of the scrambler of Africa in 18 eighty-four. Eh which has left us where we are. And to see how we can using a pan African kind

of a platform. Both the AU but also eh you'll be pleased to know that we were convening in Kampala next week eh at the steering committee of the movement. To plan the eighth Pan African Congress. And and one of these are some of the issues that will be on the agenda. For the next congress. And to see how we can work together. With African governments and the AU and the regional organisations. Get out out of this mess. Man don't like thank again. Uh Deborah and for leading us in this discussion. We will of course publish their their presentations. We shall already recorded and I will Facebook and YouTube. Uh we'll also publish them in the form of policy policy briefs. and and and make that available to all of you. So on that note I'd like to thank all of you including those who have joined us from afar like David Johnson, from Trinton and Tobago. Um and Femi and many others who have come across. Patricia. and all these Patricia McFadden from Swatiland Eswatini. Uh Shasa Shasa Jogi. Uh eh welcome to to this forum. And thanks thank again To all of you. For joining us. Uh we meet again in a fortnight. Uh we'll be looking at either the Malawi crisis. The corruption scandal in Malawi. And all other crisis points. Including as Tony

mentioned earlier on. The possibility of looking at US interests in Africa. is part of and and invite people like in in in Joburg to read the discussion. Thank you and goodbye.  
Bye everyone.