

in the two cylinders to deal with the topic
the first is elizabeth derek ross
the ceo of sire
expert on south african foreign policy
especially with respect to africa
and the region we have linda
freeman canadian that's in ottawa
thanks uh linda for joining us she's a
military professor at carlton but linda
i've known linda since the 80s
went through the canadian political
science association
so i'm glad to have connected thanks to
david david moore who
put us in touch last but not least we
have tonight with china
as involved in south africa with
work as a journalist will of course
inform the discussion but also
as one who has been a functional in the
government of south africa for the last
two decades in the various portfolios
that
he has been through we
of significance here is that we have
linda freeman
she's done she's doing a book on
entitled the albatross
of history south africa and zimbabwe and
then becky and becky years
and it'd be interesting to hear the
comparisons
in terms of tackling this mobile
situation
between the mecca years zuma years
and of course the fossil years we also
have discussions we've been engaged
with the zimbabwean south african
situation with psp
from the international crisis group
which a very
renowned analyst on both
zimbabwe and south africa

matata a very senior journalist
renowned journalist in south africa
from the 80s already and
he will certainly give her some
sound bites on the on the on the nature
of the relationships
shaped between zimbabwe and south africa
then we have uh division
zimbabwe also a leading
journalist
and an an astute
observer of these south africa zimbabwe
relations
and then we have stephen cruz from syria
he's head of the african governance and
diplomacy diplomacy
program at science and
last but not least nicole bears with
south african personal scientists also
have been doing research on zimbabwe
and of course our very able moderator
er valid conda will take us through
the conversation violet
thank you dr mendeza and hello and
welcome to
viewers in zimbabwe south africa and
the rest of the world as dr mandela said
this is the fourth
in this sappy's trust policy dialogue
series on zimbabwe's deepening crisis
and we are looking at what we have to do
now
the theme today is south africa's policy
towards zimbabwe and the fundamental
questions will be asking uh
why doesn't south africa use its clout
and
influence to stabilize the country of
such importance in sadaq
and also how does one make sense of
south africa's posture
as usual we are live streaming on the
sapi's facebook page
and participants watching on zoom can

type questions for speakers
right here or raise your hands during
the open forum
later in the program we will start with
presentations from our main panelists
followed by a question and answer
segment and
and then contributions from a number of
selected
discussions it's now my pleasure to
introduce our first guest speaker
elizabeth cedaropolis
who is the chief executive of the south
african institute of international
affairs
elizabeth
great uh thank you thank you violet and
and thanks again to
uh ibo for uh uh
for uh proposing uh this collaboration
um uh on on a topic
that uh certainly in in my career um
at sire has uh has constantly been one
of the issues that
um that we have focused on um and thank
you also for a very provocative title
uh igbo uh in terms of the discussion
and really unpacking
uh what each dimension of that means
what i thought i would do with my
opening remarks and i'm sure then violet
can
can dig away afterwards with her
questions
is is really to to look a little bit at
where we've come
from but that that isn't really the the
focus
rather to actually look at what we can
do at this
juncture uh in terms of and we i i mean
here um south africa
uh historically south africa's focus in
its engagement with zimbabwe and i think

violet you've you've posed some very good questions here which i will be addressing to some extent uh south africa's focus has been on stability over democracy or better governance so it's about making sure that the um that the state uh remains stable and we can argue whether that has been successful uh and it has done that often uh as a trade-off to sort of uh pushing for uh greater um opening up uh of the democratic space uh greater accountability and etc um and i think it has made some substantial inputs um over the life particularly during the mbeki years but i think it failed really to see them through and i think perhaps the gpa and the gnu are good examples of that i do believe that at this particular juncture we need to engage on this issue with substantial resources and i say that bearing in mind that at this particular juncture uh i think the bandwidth of south africa uh is particularly strained it's strained both from a financial perspective but also in terms of what's happening with covered and clearly what is happening uh domestically after nine years of state of state capture but i do believe that actually it is in our interests uh uh to have a working democratic zimbabwe

as our neighbor and that therefore we
have to invest in that
and that so there is an interest
dimension to it but i would argue there
is a value dimension
to it and and and the the issue about
values here is that
certainly in the last couple of years
under the
ramaphosa administration and and the
minister and the department of
international relations and cooperation
there is there has been an attempt
certainly
uh at least in in in word uh
to to emphasize that
um uh values
have to be a an important element of our
foreign policy that we have to capture
recapture the moral high ground that we
lost a long time ago
and that we have to uh give space also
to a human rights
dimension to our foreign policy all of
these things of course are not mutually
exclusive
but there has been that that that
emphasis
now let's let's just look at uh a little
bit of where we are
in in zimbabwe as i indicated in terms
of my particular
uh career at syre the crisis is now 20
years old and xayah has been engaging
with us in
in in in in very
many different uh foreign and different
ways over that entire period
in this period the economic and social
crisis continues
governance institutions and the rule of
law continue to be undermined
and to have been significantly eroded
there is a political impasse between the

main political protagonists
and has been for some time people have
voted with their feet
and trust in the body politic has eroded
the 2008 global political agreement in
the gnu were in retrospect simply an
interregnum
that in 2013 return to the polarization
fragmentation
all of the the governance issues that uh
that were never really resolved in that
period and that characterized
the preceding period and the change of
god
in 2017 was seen by many as carrying the
potential
of turning a new page but absent a
willingness to address the political and
governance
challenges including the vested
interests of the ruling elite
including the military the crisis
continues and is being
exacerbated by covert so this is clearly
you know we've got to do something
we've got to do something differently um
i think
because this has uh uh
as as i've indicated this is not uh
something that actually is in the good
of
in the interests of south africa uh
notwithstanding that we have gained uh
skills and so on and certainly not in
the interest of we
of a region particularly at a time when
we're talking about greater more
effective regional integration in the
context of the continental free trade
area
now over the years south africa spent a
lot of time on zimbabwe as as sadx
mediator
if we look at where we are today we can

argue clearly that it's not been effective
uh perhaps its crowning achievement was the gpa
in 2008 but then keeping zhanu to the gnu and the gpa commitments
after that just things just uh frizzled uh away and with the elections in 2013 i think south africa almost you know and static sort of stepped away and said well our jobs are jobs done in in retrospect none of the deep structural problems were addressed fundamentally
and if we look at the most recent imf article 4 consultations report that indicates that efforts were made in 2019 to tighten from the government's perspective
some of the fiscal dimensions but actually noted the report noted that the staff monitored program was off track so the economic dimension was not happening the significant governance reforms were not happening and they were concerned of course that uh with the onset of covered um uh this economic and humanitarian crisis would be exacerbated and had already been exacerbated by policy missteps and climate-related shocks
and it would really require difficult policy choices from the authorities and support from the international community and i quote this because they also made the point quite strongly that the need there is a need to address governance and corruption challenges and trench vested interests and enforcement of the rule of law to improve the business climate and support private sector-led inclusive growth

such efforts must be instrumental would be instrumental to advance re-engagement efforts with the international community and mobilize needed support and that's where i'm i'm sort of if you were seeing my written document i said emphasis added by me and i and i make that point because of course on the other side of the equation both south africa and sadiq have over the last uh several months uh made calls for the immediate lifting of sanctions uh first in august at the static meeting last year most recently uh president ramaphosa in in april made that point also called the lifting of sanctions in the broader context of covered and he also called for the sanctions to be uh to be lifted uh in the case of uh of sudan so there's been uh a focus on on getting sanctions lifted more so now under covered in order to create more fiscal space for for for zimbabwe to be able to deal with us as indeed it's a challenge that that we're all facing but the truth is that unless significant changes are made and this is not about tinkering with policy but actually significant reform changes are made in terms of the overall governance and rule of law that is not going to um uh you know the rest of the the international community is not going to respond uh to that call for removing sanctions and i think that must be clear so we're at an impasse

the sanctions to be lifted zimbabwe will have to undertake both political and economic reforms but such reforms are also integral to the country's overcome overcoming of its two-decade-long crisis so the country needs a new social and political compact but fundamentally the politics have to be addressed first that we can't simply be tinkering with the economy and thinking that some somehow it's all going to kind of pull together and i say that because i think this is important also for us as as south africans to uh to realize and to and to take uh to take into account i think in in november last year uh our minister of international relations and cooperation uh naledi pandor actually made some um some important uh observations in terms of the of the zimbabwe situation firstly she said south africa should not be arrogant that it had the solutions to the problems and i think that's an important it's an important point to to put out there so yes we are the bigger neighbor but we don't necessarily know all the answers um can we exert more influence yes but we don't necessarily have on the all the answers the solution clearly lies with the zimbabwean people or at least zimbabwean people have to be integral to a process that could be facilitated uh by by external actors but they need to be at this very center of it she went on to say that it seems

clear that even as we support the call
for an end to economic sanctions
the political dynamics are inextricably
linked to the economic
and that should be confronted
simultaneously
we may have to devise innovative forms
she goes on to say of institutional
collaboration that would help sustain
and perhaps restore
the efficacy of critical institutions
okay so that i think is important it's
recognizing that
actually something has to give something
has to change
so the question now is how can south
africa help
south africa help and does it have the
bandwidth or the resources
as i indicated earlier south africa has
an interest in a stable and prosperous
zimbabwe but it should now be clear that
this is not
possible without real and lasting
reforms so we can't sort of
begin a process and then back away
without continuing to put the requisite
pressure
on the parties to see these reforms
through
these reforms will by definition if they
are done properly
and efficaciously reduce
the political and economic power of
vested interests and here
this is we're talking about designer pf
as a party and we're also talking about
the military
this means there needs to be a genuine
desire from all sides in zimbabwe to
resolve the crisis
once and for all the question here is
are all the parties ready for such
an engagement if they are ready what

should we do as south africa
well again i think south africa should
not be arrogant about what we think we
can achieve
but equally we should believe that we
can play an active role in helping
zimbabwe and i think
in the last few years particularly post
2013 i think we've taken our foot off we
have taken our foot off the pedal
zimbabwe unlike libya does not have to
contend with a whole host of external
players
wanting to exert influence and advance
their interests
this does actually make it easier for a
meaningful engagement with the parties
from south africa by south africa and
indeed
by sadiq i mean yesterday i was in a
discussion on
the external actors in in libya and to
really try to unravel that situation is
is is a complete nightmare and i can't
see much
light at the end of the tunnel in the
short term but zimbabwe is
is not that and i think we can be
thankful for that
and so this meaningful engagement and
again
you know south africa has had various
meaningful engagements but at the time
focused on quiet diplomacy focused on
recognizing that we can't
push too much because it's we we respect
the principle of non-interference in the
affairs of another state
we also have uh uh uh um
sort of concerns we i think the
government at the time did have concerns
about the rise of a trade union movement
and what that might mean if if there was
regime

uh change but the fact is we need to actually re-open
uh the way in which we've engaged with zimbabwe and at this point it does have to be tentative um because i think it's really about testing and seeing how we can build consensus for a process that brings all the parties back to the table again so this is not about saying you have to do this you have to do that but it's about really beginning a process a series of informal discussions with all the parties individually but not just government including the mdc including civil society formations i know that many of these civil society organizations often battle to get appointments at derco i know because they they come through jobert they come through pretoria and we often have discussions with them and they battle to actually get a hearing and i think that's that's a problem there seems to be a discomfort among the south african government officials to engage meaningfully with the sector outside government we should make it easier that easier to help inform our thinking about how to resolve this long-standing impasse there also needs to be hard discussions with zanu and the military south africa can certainly play a role in helping to remove sanctions but it can only be successful if there is meaningful change if it has something to put on the table
uh uh in its in its engagements and its

negotiations or discussions with not
negotiations discussions with the
international community
the external community will not do
anything unless it sees
significant changes in the way zimbabwe
is governed
and so here there could be a a
a a a sort of a a i don't want to use
the word symbiotic
but an interlinked relationship that
actually helps to advance
uh both better governance as well as
then addressing
uh the the external environment and the
sanctions
the objective would be to bring all the
parties together around the table
at a later stage with the informal
engagements intended to lay the
foundation
because currently the climate is not
there second
and i've made that point and i'll make
it very quickly south africa really
doesn't have the resources that it had
in the early 2000s it cannot provide any
financial assistance or use that kind of
assistance as an incentive and covert i
think has made that even more
problematic
the most recent figures show that we've
you know we've lost three million jobs
in the last few months
but i believe that putting resources
into helping zimbabweans overcome their
impasse
and the economic and political malaise
is an investment worth making
if there is one foreign policy priority
we should have
it should actually be zimbabwe if
zimbabwe is able to resuscitate its
economy

which is based obviously on sorting out its political issues it can become an important partner for south africa in the building of a regional economic community based on regional value chains an important building block for the achievement of the continental free trade area and a resolution of the crisis in zimbabwe becomes all the more important from a south african perspective in light of developments in northern mozambique in cabo delgado we don't want and we cannot afford to have another neighboring country descend into significant instability and we and and zimbabwe still remains uh this gaping hole in what uh from an economic perspective and what can really should ideally be a key player in in in the economic uh development of the region which is why really pushing and here just my last remarks really pushing for sincere dialogue and recognition especially especially from the ruling elite of the of the need to make changes in opening up the civic space fighting corruption reestablishing and independent institutions are vital and this is where i think south africa really has to exert its influence and it doesn't have to be about shouting absolutely but it does actually have to um uh re-engage at a senior level with both the government and then with the other actors the fact is that emerson managua has not brought about a sustainable spring so something has to given to change and south africa can play a midwife

uh role in that otherwise i think we can
we will be discussing this again
in in 2013. um
so i cannot emphasize enough that the
parties inside zimbabwe we need to be at
the point that they can recognize
that this is necessary and that from our
perspective from the south african
perspective we are willing
to engage not just by the way uh at a
governmental level
but let's look at this uh in a
multi-faceted way which uses all south
african actors at the
disposal in an integrated a coordinated
way so it could be the anc the think
tanks csos business and the churches
taking advantage of the different
leverage points
that different actors uh may have uh
with
uh with partners in in in zimbabwe
let me leave it there thank you thanks
elizabeth just a couple of questions for
you
on the issue of south africa is ready to
intervene or
come and help the the key players in the
country what happens if they don't
actually
uh sit down and talk because at the end
of the day that's one of the biggest
problems that we've seen in zimbabwe
where the political parties
are failing to sit and talk so does
south africa have to wait for
zimbabweans to actually
do something before it can intervene
um no i think it has to actively
engage with all the parties to get them
to a point where they need to recognize
to be
that they have to be at the table and i
use an example and i know this is

it can it can be a hard slog but i use
the example of um
of of how the process began in south
africa in the late 1980s
i mean in in 85 86 the national party
government wasn't going to sit down and
have any conversations with anybody
but there was a series of engagements
even before we got to 1990 and 91
and i'm hoping that it doesn't take that
long there were a series of engagements
of
all of of various non-state actors
with the informal uh
uh hidden involvement also of of some
actors
in in government who believed actually
that
that some conversations needed to begin
to get us to where we got to in in on
the 2nd of february 1990 we have w to
clerk announced this
now i'm not drawing parallels between
the two but i'm i'm using that as an
example of how do you break impasses or
how do you
make people appreciate that they need to
come to the table and perhaps
covered is an opportunity because
covered
implications i think for the region as a
whole
are going to be significant and they're
going to go beyond
sort of the next three months they're
going to be really really significant
and so this is perhaps this crisis
perhaps
will make us focus our minds both in
south africa and in zimbabwe
that actually we cannot afford not to be
sorting this out
not to be sitting down on at the table
uh and and trying to get out of this

vicious cycle that
we've been in for 20 years i mean that's
that's the message
and we've seen what's been happening in
mali uh
for example and we've seen western
governments coming in to
mediate in regional crisis
but in in sadaq in the southern african
region we we hardly see any movements
why is that
um why do sadaq governments let things
uh get worse before they actually you
know can do something about it
well i mean i don't necessarily think
that it's a good thing necessarily to
have
say french involved in or british
involved in in the mediation in
in southern africa we've had the um we
you know we know how also the the uk
engaged on
on on some of these issues uh both more
recently and
and in the past um i think there is
i think part of the the inhibition is
that
we um we don't want to upset our fellow
leaders and our i mean all of us in the
region i don't mean specifically south
africa we're always very very careful
about getting people
calling leaders out we see that also in
the context of the african peer review
mechanism and my colleague steve is in a
much better position to talk about it
there
we're also very careful about not sort
of bruising egos
and i think maybe sometimes we actually
need to bruise egos they need to be
bruised
and so we we kind of have this delicate
dancing act

around you know maybe you can do this
and maybe you can do that and that's
important that's part of the process
but at some point you actually have to
recognize that this doesn't work now and
you actually have to now
uh really make use of your influence uh
as
um as in in the case of south africa as
the bigger
economy as the bigger power but i think
you also have to do that in a way
uh that uh brings the the part the
internal parties along
because we have too many experiences of
the fact that you go in there you think
you know what is best and then you
uh you you leave and the problem then is
left with
uh with with the citizens and you know
it's not the case of
you make the problem you earn it you can
leave and i think that's
also something that i think south africa
has been extremely conscious of
um but i think historically south africa
has not wanted to call out
any leader uh uh in in in sadiq
and and that i think has been a static
modus operandi okay no
thanks elizabeth we'll come back to you
again later let's
let's now go to linda linda freeman
who's an african political economist and
she's actually written a book on uh
south africa
and zimbabwe relations linda
what does your book say about the topic
before us
well it's still in the process so it's
not a has written but
is writing and i think that
first let me start by thanking ibo and
sapez

for including me in this talk i think
i'll learn as much as i'll
offer but i'll step back from what
elizabeth has done
and offer a slightly different
background look at why the present is
the way
it is and
it will started by talking about the
south african support
uh of the mugabe and minnega government
so soon after the
end of apartheid as paradoxical and i
would agree and i think
one has to look back to the 90s to get
some sense of the orientation
which set the south african government
up in uh
the 2000s uh there were three cases
one of course was nigeria where mandela
was humiliated when a bachelor
executed kensarowiwa and the agonies
the second was the military bungle in
the sutu and the third was the debate in
sadiq
over intervention in the drc and from
this
three lessons were taken and the first
was never stray
out of the african consensus and i think
that's what elizabeth was talking just a
minute ago
about the second was never even to begin
to consider taking on the zimbabwean
military they did so badly against the
lesotho
military that obviously that wasn't
wasn't on the table
and the third was at all costs to avoid
getting into a quagmire
like zimbabwe did in the drc and i think
that
that predilected uh in becky uh
to take the approach that he did now uh

he was centrally concerned with supporting fellow liberation movements all over the region but particularly in zanu-pf even though they'd had a rocky relationship for two decades after apartheid and uh i think that much revision of history ensued but nevertheless that was the commitment that becky talked about over and over again in his ansi today articles and so i think we have to take it seriously um and in service of that he abandoned the moral approach of south africa's early years the mandela years which he hadn't agreed with anyway even though it cost him western backing for nepad and also uh his desire to be the voice for africa that clearly went into the ditch in the early 2000s on this issue so um in terms of the options which were given for us to consider in the forum today i would agree with tail wagging the dog mugabe regarded mugabe as his junior uh and becky always went up to harare for uh discussions uh whereas in the past in the old apartheid daisy and smith was summoned to pretoria i think the difference is symbolic but it it it said something um in mugabe regarded in becky as his junior uh he'd renege on agreements that he made with imbeci uh the the airplane would hardly be in the air before uh mugabe uh

disavowed everything he'd agreed to and
he made a fool of him becky over
and over again and becky did not use
the tools that he had available he
he accepted it and it was almost like
the vision
of a battered wife uh in an abusive
relationship
certainly given the effort which becky
put into finding a solution you can't
call
his approach a a product of indifference
the intensity of his effort however
misguided
and fruitless does command respect and i
think more so than any of his successes
as a south african president
as to incapacity i don't think so
i think the general approach which was
adopted was what limited the options for
the south african government
and the final option the economic
benefit for south africa
of zim's economic woes uh with the
collapse
of the zimbabwean economy obviously some
industries in south africa benefited the
retail sector manufacturing
agriculture mining plowed ahead as it
always
had however i think that if you look at
the climate for business in
in zimbabwe are ranked in some years as
the fastest shrinking economy in the
world
it was hardly enough to drive south
african government policy
at least in the short and medium term
and price controls the prospect of
indigenization the absence of the rule
of law and property rights all of these
things
heightened the precarious nature of
doing business in zimbabwe for south

african firms
operating in an economy where power and
fuel shortages
and foreign currency shortages inflation
limited the possibilities for growth
so i guess my conclusion on this one is
that south african corporations took
advantage of the opportunities
presented by the crisis but they'd have
done even better
had zimbabwe stayed on an even keel
generally as zimbabwe had been
southern africa's second most
diversified economy its economic decline
in the 2000s
has had a major negative impact on south
africa and the region
so i think that we can put to rest the
notion that
uh this was a sort of conspiratorial
effort of south african capital to
reap benefits out of a collapsing
economy
some did but i don't think as a whole it
drove policy
or has been all that great i mean people
who had farms and
wildlife conservancies they were taken
over it's appropriated in some cases
and are still fighting for their
property
the larger question of why the south
african government didn't use its
clout and influence to stabilize a
country of such importance in static
i think elizabeth's already covered this
in the in the in becky period the
government stated over and over again
zimbabweans could solve their problems
well um
at the same time they provided
substantive backing for the zen opf
government
and adopted a patronizing and dismissive

attitude to the opposition so
this notion of of keeping hands off was
a bit of a smoke screen
none of in becky's successors has
deviated from this position
not motlantha uh nor zuma nor ramaphosa
they all
uh have made very clear where their
loyalties lies there's never been much
follow through if you think of
after matalantha's report zero was done
um why is pretoria unable or
unwilling to put pressure on the regime
in
harare in terms of democracy in terms of
the integrity of its finances and
resources and so on
i think unkind as this may seem from an
outsider and i apologize if i'm stepping
on toes here but
after zuma one might say that the south
african government
under ramaphosa is struggling to put its
own house in order
on all of these fronts uh the larger
conclusion which i'll end with without
exception is that the dominant position
of liberation movements in power in
southern africa
and i say this as someone who spent most
of her personal and political life
supporting them
in earlier decades have proved both lord
acton and george
orwell wright absolute power corrupts
absolutely and the parable of animal
form has been worn out by history
hence the tentative title of my book on
south africans and buffering the
albatross
of history thank you that's very
interesting linda and
already we are receiving quite a lot of
comments

um online and offline and one that i've just received
on whatsapp says what kind of regime does south africa see
in zimbabwe some of us see a military regime
with a civilian face linked directly to the november 2017
coup the fact that south africa and other actors approved of the coup was a mistake do you think so
and also the ad they're going to say they can't help to resolve the crisis in zimbabwe unless
they identify the type of regime they are dealing with
what can you say about this well i think that's true and
uh ibmo is the expert on this he called zimbabwe this a chiropractic state
uh and i think that there's no question that
uh uh the fact that uh mungo came down to south africa and was in
discussion with senior people in south africa before he returned in triumph to lead the government
i think as long as you have that military and zlpf
alliance however shaky it is you know one could see
future clues coming out i i think that talk of a transformation and the kind of very important
uh conversations that elizabeth was talking about with civil society with the opposition
which although i think over and over again it's shown to
in the past definitely if one looks at elections like the one in 2002 without question
had the majority supporter treated as

rather a
rather uh well they're dismissed as
has not been quite up to par that they
shouldn't be at the table or certainly
not given consideration
in those early years um mrs damini zuma
even becky jacob zuma would come to
zimbabwe saying they were negotiating
and the mdc would hear about it on the
radio
so they've never been treated properly
and i think one has to understand that
underneath all
everything that's going on there is a
certain kind of regime in zimbabwe which
and a certain kind of regime in south
africa not a military one thankfully in
south africa but certainly
a regime in in zimbabwe which has
uh right from the get-go have the
military at the core of power
in the seizure power and you heard
um elizabeth saying that south africa
needs to have
um a hard discussion with zono pf and
the military
now just going back to what happened in
2017
um did the failure to call the military
assisted transition
mean a lost opportunity for strong
international diplomatic
intervention and lose an opportunity to
reform the zimbabwe states permanently
well at that point i don't think anybody
outside had all that many
options the military were in power
and i doubt that anybody could have done
anything about it
and that's the worry for the future is
with the extraordinary power of the
military
what is the future going to bring uh
they're certainly not all that happy

with the
meningaku if one thinks of the way in
which they
themselves unilaterally took decisions
uh about the country's
finances in the last few weeks uh so
there are signals of unsteadiness
uh and i'm not sure that so i could do
much about it at that level
i always thought it was a shame that
becky right at the beginning
hadn't done what he could have done he
had all the leaders of power if
one looks back at the way the apartheid
regime dealt with ian smith
if he and smith didn't do what the
government in south africa
wanted him to do they would uh you know
pull
some uh refrigerated cars they would
hold
traffic they would pull military
assistance
and smith came into line it that in a
sense the regime in rhodesia
ended in pretoria uh when avoirster
and others said time's up uh
becky had all those levers of power but
never even considered using them these
were
liberation brothers and uh it was out of
the question
and and had he had the foresight and the
strength
and the unity within his government i'm
not sure he would have had
he could have done something right at
the start after that
you know in a sense there is a tide in
the affairs of man
and they missed it and so the all the
shallows and miseries we've seen in the
decades since
i actually wanted to ask you a a final

question about that
um but going back to the time of
gugurawundi and i wanted to find out
what do you think south africa should
have done um
at these major historical points in
zimbabwe from the gugurawundi the land
reform in subsequent elections
just briefly well the good core funding
the anc was
in the region it wasn't in power
so obviously uh the the
sad thing about that was that the nc
kept its mouth shut then
and after they they were in a sense
dependent
on uh south africa not invading uh
zimbabwe they and they they did as
eleanor cesaus pointed out they they
never really did their part
uh land reform well that that all was
kicked off in the early 2000s
and in becky's equivocation i think uh
he felt was necessary but i think
it was open sesame for what happened
afterwards
and i think this is a question that has
come from
facebook um it's uh john foster
eventually pushed ian smith
to the negotiating table that led to
independence why has ramaphosa
not done the same with monagha will we
ever have frontline states to our sister
zimbabweans who are now standing alone
against an armed and militarized
government
the dismal answer is you know
that they they didn't they wouldn't
and they defended their their their
choice i mean and becky was
very very clear he was an alliance he he
kept
defending this policy of talking to the

cows come home
and uh you know indulging
mugabe when he had had all the levers of
power but they were new in power i think
that's part of the story too they didn't
use what they had
they didn't have the strength and
foresight and i think it's a rare
leader who has the the intelligence
and the strength to do that to to take
that major step and
and as he didn't then then the rest
followed
okay i'll i'll come back to you again
let me just move to move on to
um tendai tendai dumbo china
hi and i are you online
yes yes a journalist
and political analyst based
in in south africa he's going to be
talking about
the lack of political will tendai
thank you violet thank you dr mandaza
and the surplus trust for providing this
platform for this very important
dialogue exchange of use um
i will be brief and answer the questions
posed in the subject matter
is it a case of the tail wagging the dog
yes it is i'm glad that linda referred
to
the relationship between mugabe and
and tavon becky with gabe seeing uh
becky as jr
if i can shed a bit of light on that
relationship
and what made
becky almost global to
to um to mugabe you'll recall that in
2002 the 2002 presidential election the
the commonwealth decided to send an
observer mission
which produced a report
that was very damning now the agreement

uh the communist leaders had
made was that they will be guided
to what they do by the
report so the troika
of uh turbo becky i think obasanjo
and john howard the australian prime
minister
were to meet in london to to to make a
a decision on the matter whether to
suspend zimbabwe from the commonwealth
or not
now what happened between the election
and that meeting is that tabon becky
uh promised mugabe that he would veto
uh any decision by
the troika to suspend zimbabwe because
the decision had to be unanimous
so he went to london and when he when he
got to london
on the morning of his arrival uh tony
tony blair's
close um friend peter mandelson
had written a letter in one of the
british papers to say that
if the africans i.e obasanjo and
berkey um vote against the suspension of
zimbabwe
kabum becky might as well
uh taboo back
which was going to sell to the g20 in
canada
would be dead in the water and
so becky was then forced to to vote with
the
two other leaders for a suspension so
after that
becky felt that he owed
mugabe a lot and he and his father mr
kosasana
global quite a bit to restore the
relationship i thought i would just make
that point
um is it indifference
no it's not it's complexity

is it here in capacity no it is not
is it harvesting on a neighbor's
economic walls
i agree with the other panelists that
that is not the case but the main point
i wish to make
which answers all questions posed is
that south africa
has no will to provide leadership in
sardar
let alone the rest of africa this is
despite the fact that
its economic output is more than
that of the other 13 set of member
countries combined the anc belongs to
what is called the formerly variation
movements of southern africa
which comprises the mpla
frey limo chamachama pinozzi suapo
and zanu-pf this solidarity group
alleges agnosium that imperialist forces
are bent on
sponsoring regime change in their
countries
they seek to support one another to
repel these imperialist machinations
and ensured that they govern in
perpetuity
the anc's support for zanu ps must
beyond their bilateral relations
we also seem within the wider context of
this solidarity alliance
so the anc's posture on zimbabwe
is predicated on its policy to support a
sister liberation movement
in that country
if i may just make this point south
africa's willingness to provide
regional leadership is not just confined
to zimbabwe
if you look at sutu and swaziland these
are two small countries
almost entirely dependent on south
africa for their economic survival

lesotho has been developed by chronic political instability which south africa has failed to resolve in the case of swaziland despite pleased by the opposition to demo alliance south africa continues to malikata an absolute monarch who denies his people the most basic and human rights this begs the question if south africa is unwilling to use the enormous leverage it has over these two countries to effect change how can it be expected to do so in zimbabwe on the issue of um harvesting your neighbors was as i said i agree with the first two panelists that this is not the case south africa does not gain from zimbabwe's economic goals there are some private companies that exploit the cheap labor of undocumented zimbabwean migrants migrants but it is not in the interests of south africa for the economic meltdown in zimbabwe to continue we must bear in mind that the threat south africa faces looking at the future is that of political instability caused by a shrinking economy in the resultant high unemployment and deep levels of poverty it is not in the interest of south africa to have many zimbabweans in its country competing for jobs and scarce resources with its citizens it is a situation that will get worse worse in a post covered 19 reality of a contraction of the south african

economy
sadly with many foreigners embedded in
poor south african human settlements
sporadic eruptions of xenophobic
violence
are inevitable the anc is fully aware of
the dynamics at play
but cannot summon the political will to
have a frank and open discussion with
zanu-pf
and other parties in zimbabwe to resolve
the the crisis south africa has the
leverage to do this
there is no lack of capacity in 1974
the apartheid government used this
leverage to force ian smith
to release black nationalists from
detention to open the door
to a political settlement based on
universal adult suffrage
that leverage still exists but what is
absent
its political will on the party on the
part of the anc
to use it to nudge the nuclear
towards a genuine dialogue with all
parties
to end crisis the politics of solidarity
seemed to trump everything the current
post of the south african government of
zimbabwe
is irrational and inimical to its
own interests south africa needs
zimbabwe and other
african countries to prosper
economically for its companies to trade
and invest
in a market crucial for its economic
expansion
thanks attendant tendai on on on the
issues that you've raised about
xenophobia um can you um
talk a bit more about um these issues
from like a humanitarian

um point of view because it appears they are increasing anti-zimbabwean sentiments as some south africans feel that zimbabwes are taking over their jobs so in particular what can the south african authorities do about this in terms of the living conditions of zimbabweans in in inside south africa well it's not the living conditions of zimbabweans wrongly it's the living conditions of poor south africans if you if you come to johannesburg or any of the major metropolitan areas you see the informal settlements and some very poor sections of the of the tensions now the problem that you have is that uh in those poor areas which are overcrowded especially in hotel which are overcrowded there's so much pressure on the health services there's so much pressure on finding places for children in schools there's so much pressure for for for for housing in those uh human settlements all very poor human settlements you have poor foreigners the majority of whom are zimbabwes embedded in those communities right so that is a very very uh um dangerous situation it's a it's a powder cake and as i think linda and the previous finally said the south african economy is in very bad shape

and will and things will only get worse
because of combat
and those people the pressure
on those people will even be be hashtag
that is why i say that the eruption
of xenophobic violence is uh
inevitable so but what options
does south africa have within a
situation like this
at the moment you have well
south africa doesn't have many options
because
uh there are no resources to to
better the lives of these people in in
in the informal settlements and in the
townships
um the likelihood that the situation
will
we will get west uh municipal governance
in south africa is very very poor
levels of corruption are very very high
so
to be honest um
there is no way one can be optimistic
about
uh the living conditions of those poor
people both south africans and the
foreigners
but what i'm trying to say is that in
those situations the local people
will blame the foreigners enhance the
violence
okay thank you thank you tendai now let
me now go to
our discussions and start with the
pierce
pierce pergoo who's with the
international crisis
group he's a senior consultant for
southern africa
uh pierce could you start by perhaps
a talking about the
south africa's foreign policy towards
zimbabwe and

linking that with what elizabeth was talking about earlier
well i mean i'm wondering uh violet if we can't look at a bit more of a forward-looking agenda now in terms of what's feasible and i wanted to leverage off the clear pivot in in south africa's narrative in terms of its foreign policy in november with naledi pandor making the statement which effectively pushed a focus on governance and connecting the political with the economic and i think this is a this is an important uh shift of intent this now of course has not been translated into any kind of policy uh position yet this is something still under discussion within the south african government uh as they explore ways to see how they can influence and uh to use mr dumping as uh terms to nudge uh zimbabwe forward of course uh you're not really dealing with an administration in harare that wants to be nudged forward you're not dealing with an administration that wants to have a proper conversation about the issues of sanctions and so forth uh where south africa could possibly play a role so what can they do in this situation i think one of the big challenges uh coming out of zimbabwe is that you have this polarized narrative on the one hand with critics internally and externally pointing to uh reform deficits on multiple levels and the zimbabwean government

on a regular basis wheeling out claims
of progress around reform these little
government matrices that they send off
to people and so forth
and there's been no basis for a
discussion between the two sides so to
speak
uh around what reform really means now
and and that in turn
frustrates and uh adds to the opacity
around what developments they really
have been on the governance front
the tendency has been to to
fall back into interfaith crude
allegations nothing's happened or no
everything is under
uh is is being attended to
i think a useful thing for the south
africans to do right now and
they should also bear in mind that they
have a serious credibility
uh issue in zimbabwe
in terms of the concerns that many have
as to whether they have been honest
brokers in the past and there is a
legacy to that past
sometimes still popping up in terms of
how they have
been biased in favor of of of zanu-pf
now there's a series of bi-national
bi-national agreements between zimbabwe
and
and south africa these need to be
publicized they need to be clear
on exactly what those areas of agreement
are
that have been put together 30-year plus
agreements there
and there needs to be a light this needs
to be a framework also for south africa
to examine for itself
the extent to which the zimbabweans are
moving on the governance issues that
uh not only in the lady pandora but we

saw our own ambassador ambassador betty
raising that in the polite economic
uh summit earlier this year
governance is south africa's uh new sort
of lead motif
for engaging its foreign policy beyond
zimbabwe as well and i think governance
is the lens
which uh zimbabweans and others need to
uh to attach a range of issues from
human rights issues institutional
integrity issues
and so forth in order to lock down
the focus on these specific issues
because i think what we've seen
with what we've seen with president
mononga and his administration
is an endless stream of claims but no
real interrogation of the substantive
concerns that have been put on the table
by a range of domestic constituencies
echoed
by uh the international community and
and recently this year by
the international financial institutions
only on this way
in this way can we actually have an
honest discussion about what's going on
and i think south africa
does have a particular opportunity to
facilitate shining the light on these
issues
this is something the zimbabwean
government does not want to do
this is not intervention this is not a
violation of sovereignty
and it's something of course which uh
which would echo
uh i think very strongly with zimbabwe's
own constitutional principles and values
thank you yeah but but still um to going
back to
to to my um question to you because i
think it's important

also um and i think um tendai also
touched
a bit on liberation solidarity and i see
some comments
in the chat room where martino churchill
says
south africa does not have the will to
provide leadership in sadaq or in africa
and
um they're asking but why so can can you
go back to that uh
question and also can you tell us about
the campaign
report which was published later after
pressure from
ngos and some people like you because
it's these kinds of things that people
didn't say
south africa is not quite serious about
wanting
um to intervene and um
stop with the partisan interventions
what can we say about that
well i think you know as i was saying
earlier uh
the current situation we're dealing with
a legacy uh
of mistrust and and and one which is
well earned in many respects
uh i could deal with that can pepe issue
first
uh that that south africa uh
it's its leadership has been
consistently seen
to to uh effectively cover up
uh its uh prejudice and its bias
uh at a number of levels the campeo
reports
well it's a report that was written by
two judges uh former deputy chief
justice dichong mossaneki
and constitutional court judge cece
campe
who were dispatched to zimbabwe for the

2002

presidential elections and they wrote a report to mr mbeki which effectively said that the election had not been free and fair uh contradicting the report of south africa's own observer mission and saddax observer mission at the time and then for the next 12 years uh the becky administration and the zoomer administration fought off attempts through the court to access that report uh by the mail and guardian in fact who were the lead uh protagonists uh on that and eventually in 2014 south africa's constitutional court uh uh ordered the zuma administration to release that report and so we can all see it now and we can see that president becky and president zuma effectively lied and covered up uh two to the south african public and to the zimbabwean public there's been no subsequent explanation from either of those two gentlemen as to why they did that uh uh and the consequences of that uh on to your earlier question about uh uh south africa's uh reluctance to move in in terms of of its foreign policy positions uh i mean this is not unique to the zimbabwean situation either it has a position of working through multilateral institutions whether it seeks the cover of sadaq or indeed the au it is uh the term used by many the reluctant hegemon uh unwilling to to to throw its weight around but also wanting to be distinctly different from its predecessors that did this i mean it was an

interesting parallel that linda raised
about
uh uh pretoria with the smith regime and
and uh
cracking the whip this is not the
approach to foreign policy that south
africans
uh wanted to to take on in terms of
pushing its weight around
however sitting on its hands on a number
of issues
uh uh has not been helpful either i want
to recall one anecdote
uh zuma i think this was in the wake of
operation murambatsfina in 2005 when
questioned by by journalists when she
was foreign minister about
why is south africa not doing anything
and she turned around and said well what
do you want us to do
roll in the tanks to harare as if the
two options on the table were
role in the tanks or quiet diplomacy now
there's of course a range of different
options
in terms of messaging in terms of
specific actions that south africa could
have taken
but it has chosen not to do that it is
also chosen
to hide behind a notion of of liberation
solidarity which is a revisionist
position in many ways and let's also be
clear
when the anc takes a position on
something it doesn't necessarily mean
that that
uh in its foreign policy that that
necessarily extends through
to uh the actions of government and
swaziland is the key case where the anc
for some time
has been pushing for a much harder line
uh uh by the government on on

on the autocracy in in uh in swaziland
so you know these lines are not clear in
any way whatsoever and it does go down
to the political will of the key
individuals that have taken
responsibility for zimbabwean
foreign policy which has essentially
been in the presidency not adequately
inside durko and i would imagine
also unfortunately polluted by some of
the political
thinking of key individuals within the
security and intelligence establishment
in south africa as well
thanks pierce let me just bring in um
dr mandeza to just give us a brief
comment about this
issue of uh and um published
reports i understand that there was
another report
um that was done by south africa in fact
by the generals south african generals
which up to now has never been made
public
and dr mundus understand that you gave
evidence to the commission of generals
at the south african embassy at the time
a few years ago
why has the generous reports not yet
been made public what can you tell us
about
this i think it's a scandal
i think it's a scandal along the lines
that piers and i have just
outlined
it's more than just cover cover cover-up
i think
it it speaks to the incapacity
today says it's not incapacity it's the
lack of freedom will
but that is incapacity like a particular
world in
speaks to in an incapacity and i think
it has to do with uh

just take the the general's report the
general's report
was prompted by the violence
that followed the 2008 elections
especially the violence
where 308 people were killed many were
maimed
and i took three people
two of whom had lost their hands in
bindura in zimbabwe
during the runoff took them to the
survival embassy where i gave evidence
to the generals
genos romano geraldo romano
broke down in tears
what he saw and he said i can't believe
a liberation movement could do such a
thing
and i think and i was fortunate that i
traveled with him
back to south africa it was taking uh
into a meeting in south africa so on the
same flight and he gave me sight of that
report
report was was really detailed
and i think it is that those
details that shocked becky and and his
government
especially juxtaposed as it was
with the level of inaction not only in
action but a level of complicit
behavior on the part of making in
particular in the manner in which it
sought to cover up the the the excesses
of the
regime in 2008 and and and and and even
the cover up of of what was the cool in
fact 2008
when nanga went uh and um
uh prevailed on gravity
not to give in to the election results
i think it's well documented but so i i
want to say really it has to do with
i had the level of

uh arrogance on the part of
those in charge of foreign policy at the
time in south africa
and in and in this regard i think it is
a
kind of a fear uh to confront realities
as they are
in private in private
south african government officials will
admit
that there is everything wrong in our
area
even the highest level in south africa
but they are unable to translate that
into a policy and
at some level it comes to it speaks to
the level of
almost indifference hoping that things
will
will will wish themselves
away and and of course the level of
complicit
i mean uh linda spoke about
zuma meeting
it's no secret now the level of
complicit
complicity of this african government in
the coup 2017
i hope the the analysts
at sire and elsewhere
can do some more work on that when
pierre said just now i think the level
of
uh dominance of foreign policies
by the intelligence the military and
intelligence
speaks loudly in our countries and
including south africa
and i think that's where we should uh
examine more closely
um to understand
what is the intelligence vision
of southern africa of south africa stuff
and of zimbabwe

because i think at the moment they are
the ones running the show the
intelligence
and the military thank you
thank you let me go to matata
who is a former executive director of
the national editors
forum um matata i also want to
just um read a comment that's in the
chat room from eleanor
sulu who says worse than the camper
report
was a report of the generals that igbo
mendez has just talked about which was
sent by
becky after the 2008 runoff
that report of the most um that report
of the most horrific human was the
of the most horrific human rights
violations actually disappeared
so i'm wondering why didn't what has
happened to the civil society in south
africa
um they pushed for the campaign report
to be made public
how come this has not been done also
when it comes to the generous report
matata uh thank you
no i i don't know why the
the people who have been fighting
to get the competitor report i would
have not
uh pushed for the general's report
uh to also be released
but i'd also wanted to just start on a
little
minor thing that as much as there
is no country called rhodesia anymore
there is no country called swaziland you
know
it is srt whether we like
swati the king and his shenanigans or
not but
that is what that country is now called

and uh
i just think it's important that we
use the correct terminology when we
refer to countries
the the issue
around whether south africa is
incapable of
doing anything about zimbabwe
for me um i think
in order for us to understand it we have
to go back to
why there was the economic meltdown
in zimbabwe and that takes us back to
lancaster house ibo
where there was that whole agreement
that the land redistribution program
would be financed by the
british after a number of years
when those years were about
the anc was in discussions with the
brewers here and
they because the uk was not willing
to live up to its commitment to
the agreement in lancaster
the zimbabwean government was about
to start redistributing land
irrespective of those agreements at
lancaster
the anc through people like
becky and oliver tumble
were the ones who went to
zanu-pf and said don't do it
now because you'll scare these guys and
this
discussions won't go on let's finish the
discussions
and we will see how we can help once we
are in power so
when they get into power of course uh
all sorts of things happen
but the critical thing is that for the
anc
there was no way they were going to
confront mugabe when

the veterans started going around
repossessing land because they were the
ones that
said it shouldn't happen way before when
in so far as the zanu pdf position was
concerned
that time was much more conducive
for that sort of action to happen rather
than 20 years
down the line which is where as south
africans
we are now the agreements that were made
in this country
have not transferred economic power
and all sorts of other things to the
majority
and the chickens that came home to roost
in zimbabwe
20 something years after liberation are
about to arrive home here now
so for me it's not about incapacity
it's about being checkmated by your own
uh agreements with the likes of
uncle bob yeah
right so but coming to the present
situation
right now and looking at south african
policy
and what they've done over the years
since you know this is
especially since uh the anc uh took over
what can you say um what can what can
the south african authorities do
or under what conditions should south
africa consider intervening in the
zimbabwean situation
i think the south african government has
always intervened
but whether that intervention
one met the expectations of a lot of
people
or two was effective it's a completely
different matter
there is also the internal dynamics

within
zimbabwe and within the mdc
in particular and how it
was responding to things and fracturing
so
when people say the south african
government didn't want to meet with the
mtc
sometimes you have to say which mdc
were they supposed to meet because at
any given time you either had two or
three or sometimes
even four so the the interventions were
there
uh including the
provision of um
for zesa for example to access
electricity without
necessarily paying for it immediately
just to make sure that the economic
situation doesn't really collapse
immediately
so there are people who seem to think
that
maybe the tanks can roll over
by bridge into
machuingo and
bring a different kind of regime change
it is not going to happen both for the
reasons that
i mentioned around the solidarity of
liberation movements but for me
particularly because
for the anc it is totally compromised
because
it is the one that said to zanu-pf
don't do certain things now because you
would cover
our ability to become a government in
south africa
but does quiet diplomacy require silence
about the gross human rights
uh violations and in fact
to to to to add to that um

has written a direct comment for you she
says matata i have doubts about that
story you mentioned
um the only source of that story seems
to be becky
in any case south africa did not have to
oppose the land distribution
it could have confined itself to
opposing human rights violations
what can you say about that
no no i mean illinois is my sister i
i don't want to say that she's entitled
to her doubts
but that is probably my answer um
the the
the question around land for the anc
is a precarious issue because even here
at home they can't
go and do something out there
that they would not be able to do here
and justify
it that that that's that's the reality
that that
confronts them here
right okay so let me just
um go to zimbabwe um
for now and see if we can get to mesani
malaya who's the zimbabwean journalist
to give his thoughts on all these issues
that we've
we've been talking about dumisani
hello hi dumisani how are you doing
no i'm fine violet how are you good good
ken your
your initial thoughts uh on all that
you've been hearing now you've covered
this
uh crisis for many years
and also um you know the the role that
south africa has had in all this
what are your initial thoughts
well my
understanding of this situation
the relations between south africa and

zimbabwe
i interpret them in the context of
how the two states have related with
each other
historically and then after
a freedom and independence
and indeed in the context of interest
in the context of ideals
previously during the apartheid era
and the colonial
era in zimbabwe south africa basically
acted on zimbabwe based on a
foreign policy approach which was
largely
guided by interest which was basically
realism
it was more real politic than anything
else
the south african government of the time
they were more concerned
about rhodesia as a buffer
to what they saw is the advance of
communism down south
and indeed they related to smith
on interest if smith played ball on
certainly
important uh foreign policy and
political considerations
they were willing to support him if they
didn't if he didn't
it was always a a stick and current
approach
and then when you then take it
into zimbabwe in south africa
after a 94 the approach has changed
a great deal because of how the
liberation movements related
with each other of course i mean
zanu-pf was not part of the so-called
original
sixth it was zappo zanu only came in
later
at later stages so at the beginning it
was

the authentic six parties that included
zappo
the pla and all these other parties
liberation movements in the region that
we know of but how then zimbabwe
uh relates to south africa after 1980
becomes a different story from how
apathy south africa related to rhodesia
after 1980 the anc
which was example ally during the
struggle in other words not the ally of
the ruling party in zimbabwe or the
party that won the elections
it then sought to realign
itself to the new ruling party in
zimbabwe
in other ways to build a new relations
with the uh
zanu-pf from out of lusaka
oral temple after muhammad won the
elections
he sends tabon back down to harare to
sim gabe to find out if
gabba was willing to cooperate with the
nc and to further the struggle
and they of course say mugabe is saying
that
becky was not so much of a senior
a a carder in the anc at the time
he then delegates nanga to deal with him
they try to afford
to forge a relationship but what then
happens is that
god was not willing to support the south
african struggle beyond
political and diplomatic and moral
support
he refuses to offer the ac
the mk any basis in zimbabwe and the
relationship is developed
within that context and
when things started going bad in
zimbabwe
the ac approach or the south african

government approach then becomes
a an approach that is guided by its
own foreign policy uh
premise or ideals and how it relates to
the former liberation movement in the
region
first of all south africa internally in
terms of its own foreign policy
it is a country that he clearly believes
in multiple reasons
it doesn't believe in unilateral
interventions
and so far as the issues of other states
are concerned
unless if it is mandate from
a multilateral partners it also wants to
be seen
as the voice of africa to be seen as the
youth voice of africa
it has been accommodated in
international platforms on that basis
so what he seeks to do is to get
consensus
insofar as approaching questions foreign
policy questions
complicated ones on his doorstep like
zimbabwe so that's how south africa has
been proceeding
it has been trying to approach this
bubbling question
based on consensus which is different
from for instance how foster
dealt with a smith that was unilateral
it was based on
idealism based on
interest south african approach is not
based
entirely on interest in zimbabwe it's
based on a mixture of that history of
the liberation movement
it is based on its in a limited way on
it's a economic and commercial interest
but most importantly is based
on idealism and

ideological considerations that zimbabwe
is one of those fraternal countries
where brothers we're sisters
so how we deal with the question of
zimbabwe must
embrace all those considerations realism
is marched down the pecking order when
south africa approaches zimbabwe
that is why you then see that
what the people on the ground like
zimbabwe and average
expecting south africa to apply a real
politic
or a realistic approach a realism based
approach and resolve this bible question
is not happening because south africa in
terms of its own fundamentals
in its foreign policy they are not
rooted
in realism in dealing with questions of
foreign policy
they are based more on the ideals uh in
the multireleasing
so that that is complicated how
you match the expectations between
the zimbabweans and what these muslims
want
and the what the south africans can
potentially do
and of course there's also the question
of deliverables
in terms of a capability yes south
africa is a big economy
there's a big army it is uga a
capabilities compared to zimbabwe
but the question is are those
capabilities deliverable
in the current context of what is
foreign policy supremacy is
and how it approaches this bubbling
question the answer is no
but for foster visa smith it was a
deliverable because
it was about interest and realism to say

we're just going to deal with the
rhodesia
and so far is our survival as the upper
the state was concerned
these are no longer the same concerns so
bringing it up to speed quickly
about what is happening don't expect
south africa to take a realistic
a realism based approach on this bourbon
question expect
south africa to continue based
uh pursuing this bible in question based
on the premise of its current foreign
policy
its current foreign policy is
multicultural based
it's a ideals based that is your
governance your human rights
that is your your your democracy
considerations
but it wants consensus around zimbabwe
south africa does not want to be seen
as imposing its will on the zimbabwean
question
and necessarily that translates in
interpretation to
lack of will political will and other a
realistic or a a
effective instrument of approach
so so de misani that's what i wanted to
to ask that
do you think that zimbabwe is taking
advantage of
south africa because zimbabwe knows that
south africa will do nothing
yes yeah south africa it clearly is
taking advantage because it understands
zimbabwe i'm saying do you think
zimbabwe is taking advantage because
because it knows that south africa will
not do much
yes zimbabwe knows that it knows that
south africa is not going to do
much beyond talking it knows that

zimbabwe is not going
sorry south africa is not going to do
much beyond persuasion
because of those historical issues
because of its economic and commercial
interests
and because of the premise of his
foreign policy which is
approaching questions like this based on
multiculturalism and the negotiation and
diplomacy you can
look at sudan or south africa project
you can look at the commodores
how south africa approached it when it
was the at the un
you can look at how it approached
questions even far afield as those of
uzbekistan in the belarus and myanmar
is the same approach as they are
applying to zimbabwe okay
i'm going to come to uh steven agrees
next but before we do that i see that
there's a lot of chatter
about what
matata had said earlier on
let me just uh read some of the chats
and then maybe we can ask
dr mandela to briefly come in and give
us his views on this becky land issue
um let me just read a bit
sorry just bear with me i can't find the
chats
let me speak to it anyway sorry
what are you looking for can i speak on
that
issue yeah dr mendez you can go ahead i
think as eleanor
sulu said there's no corroboration at
all
to make his narrative about the land
issue in zimbabwe
in fact i would go further and say that
it's called it's a false narrative
first of all the the lancaster house

agreement i was there myself
as a background boy at the time
specified
ten years during which there should be
no
tinkering with the land land question
that ended 1990
okay um
there was nothing to have stopped us not
even the lancaster agreement
to us as a government and i was in
government to to have done
something with the land except one
important factor which was the
nationalists
mugabe included did not believe in land
reform
i remember innocence telling me one day
that we
we did not give lent to
to to our people because they don't know
how to farm leave the white state to
farm
in shona you want those different enzare
that was a mood in reality in in
in government and doesn't explain
for example why land reform began as as
so-called
began in 2000 the reasons for the land
reform beginning in 2000 well no
it had to do specifically
with the defeat of the land
of the constitutional constitutional
commission
report in february 2000
and the need to retain power
uh i think um tambara and others are
writing on
mugabe and gabe is said to have
regretted very much having pursued the
land from the american which
was done not to mention the
the kind of excesses that they are the
fact that

most of the zimbabwean elites
governing kuri mugabe himself and his
family actually got title deeds for the
funds they took from the whites
so there it's a whole narrative which
has to be really examined but i just
want to say that
i think matata needs to to re-examine
his sources again that narrative
there's so many different versions of
this story because jimmy addison
wrote in the chat julius nierer's
private secretary confirmed the story
that matata is given
um and um ps progress is blessing miles
tandy backs and baking
claim and says it is confirmed by the
former general
we await a copy of the interview
obviously someone is lying so we don't
know
but anyway let me let me go back to um
to to what we are discussing today and
i'd like to go to
another discussion stephen uh gruesd
who's the african governor's foreign
policy analyst at
the south african institute of
international affairs
um stephen to what extent can it be
argued that
in the final analysis uh south africa is
more concerned at the obvious economic
benefits to itself
than to actually resolve to help in the
crisis in zimbabwe
uh thank you very much and thanks to evo
for inviting aside to be part of this
conversation
um you know i think that
south africa as as elizabeth and others
have said has got limited
bandwidth i think there's been a kind of
benign neglect of zimbabwe over the

years
uh particularly in the zuma years uh
after the activism of
becky and you know i
i i just it doesn't make the news like
it used to uh
frankly um but we cannot ignore
zimbabwe we cannot we our destinies are
deeply intertwined and uh but
to expect um uh tanks to roll over by
bridge is not is not realistic i
remember
when the land reform was going on people
said well why didn't we just switch off
the electricity
well now we have problems with uh
keeping the lights on here so
i don't think that's an option either
but it's it's often contrast
uh with the way for example nigeria
behaves in ecowas
and it was instrumental for example in
getting yaya jamie to leave
leave power when he lost the election uh
we just i think
for all the reasons that that people
have already just discussed
uh the dynamics are so different in in
southern africa the
liberation history um uh the the ties
the the rivalry i think between south
african zimbabwe
the the personal chemistry between
between leaders or lack thereof
i think that all feeds into into this
and and
uh you know i think now in the age of
covert 19
and the um the the real crisis in south
africa where we were approaching
i'm sure today we've gone over 400 000
cases
um now i think uh hirari is looking over
his border and saying

gee what's happening in south africa we
we've got to be aware of this whereas
it's always been
the other way around
and and it's my mic
muted okay and and and stephen just
in terms of um uh
what the international community uh uh
can do can you give us your thoughts
on um the the bricks for example you
know russia and china always blocks um
uh at the united nations when zimbabwe
comes up with the zimbabwean issue comes
up
how does being a member of brics affect
south africa's foreign policy on
zimbabwe
um you know i think south africa itself
did
a bit of defending of zimbabwe as well
if you remember in 2008 after the
after the elections with the election
violence south africa
was uh in its first term on sitting on
the security council
and it did everything in its power uh to
keep zimbabwe off the agenda
um i was in i was in harare a year ago
exactly and we've just uh the report
from from the work that we did has just
come out
um it's on our website but i was
privileged enough to go
and meet zimbabwean stakeholders and
some of the diplomatic community
in uh in in harare
and there was so much riding on the 2018
elections
that it was almost everybody wanted to
give it a stamp of approval and move on
there was zimbabwe fatigue
um and it almost worked uh until the
post-election violence
and then the um the outbreaks of

violence in
in january of 2019 and and
the international community is is not
going to move until it sees
genuine reform somebody put it to me
when when i was in harare that
you know we lack a lot of things in
zimbabwe we lack petrol
we lack electricity we lack jobs but
what we
the biggest lack is trust and and almost
universally with
to the people that we spoke to um they
talked about the need for this dialogue
for
uh the churches to get involved for
example um the international community
would definitely support that
but uh speaking to to zonopf while i was
there a very obvious
uh answer was well we were we won the
elections we wanted fair and square
the mdc lost the court case and uh why
should we talk why should we talk we
went we won we're in power
and that we don't want to negotiate
ourselves out of power so
um i think if the situation is worsened
it's it's uh the economic decline hasn't
been arrested at all
it's going to get worse under covert uh
and one wonders where the bottom is
uh for for zimbabwe thank you stephen
let me go to dr nicole beardsworth who
is a south african political scientist
and has done extensive work on
uh essay relations
nicole what should africa's policy be
oh that's a really tough question you
know i think
so the one thing i some of my
reflections that i wanted to bring up
in this um is that something that every
all of the other panelists have kind of

blast over is
that there was a very short window in
which south africa
or a particular south african president
took a harder stance
on zimbabwe and i think we often forget
that there was a period early in the
zuma administration
where he actually appointed charlema
and lindiwe zulu as his envoys to
zimbabwe
and gave them a fairly strong mandate
to push mugabe and to try to engage
further with the mbc
and so there was this period uh for a
couple of years where zuma's
administration took a harder line
on zimbabwe and i think it's a it's kind
of
instrumental and important uh it
provides some important lessons
for the um the current situation
basically because
if you'll remember so zuma
is taking a harder line on zimbabwe
mugabe is particularly unhappy with this
and then zuma starts to see
a domestic insurrection personally
within his own party so
the anc youth league which then was
headed by julius malema starts to
aggravate against zuma's leadership and
starts to
to challenge the policy positions of the
party he pushes for land redistribution
along the lines of the zimbabwean
example
malema spends a lot of time in zimbabwe
he receives 20 head of cattle from
savior kasugawa
in 2010 and in 2014
uh malema allegedly gets 400 000 from
the same
minister um and so there's there were

all these suggestions at the time
that mugabe was intentionally fermenting
domestic insurrection within the anc
in order to uh to get zuma to take his
foot off the pedal
which ultimately did happen um so
zuma starts to concentrate more on the
domestic situation on the crisis within
his party but also
on a broader crisis of legitimacy that
starts to bubble up during this time
and then uh in 2013 he removes lindy
where zulu after president mugabe calls
her a street woman
so we kind of see this flip-flop when
zuma becomes more concerned with
domestic policy issues and domestic
problems
so that's the one lesson the second
lesson from that story
is the intransigence of the zimbabwean
state at that point right um that they
appear to be reforming but there's no
substance to the reform
and the third thing that i wanted to
mention as dooming malaya
already pointed out is uh the south
african government's commitment to
multilateralism so during this period
when zuma
is pushing a bit harder on the mugabe
administration
we also see a kind of um
a core of support for this approach
within sadiq
right so we had jakaya kokwete and ian
kama
both of whom were fed up with the crisis
in zimbabwe
and had given a broad mandate uh to the
south african mediators to push hard
so now if we think about what we see
currently in zimbabwe
you know we see the same kind of thing

we see intransigence in zimbabwe we see these attempted changes of the constitution which we all know are regressive rather than progressive we're seeing the repeal of posa and its replacement with equally bad legislation so there's this attempt to demonstrate reform without the substance of reform that's the first and then we don't see the kind of multilateralism that we saw during the zimbabwe crisis from within static there's really no commitment to pushing a harder line on zimbabwe and so south africa in the absence of that multilateral stance is less likely to want to take a leading position in pushing this and then the third thing as has been pointed out by others and i don't think really needs reinstating is that you know these domestic issues really are fundamental and south africa is currently facing you know a myriad of crisis ramaphosa inherited a broken and battered state filled with all kinds of people who opposed him who had been appointed by his predecessor and he's still battling that same problem two years later so i think it's very difficult to see at this point how south africa might pressure zimbabwe particularly because we don't currently see a point of pressure you know i think if zimbabweans had gone to the street or if uh if there was some kind of dialogue process where south africa could try to sort of influence the process perhaps we

might see a more assertive south african stance but i think in the absence of multilateralism and all the domestic crises we don't seem to see anything like that emerging anytime soon and then it's you know finally it comes back to as many people have said previously balancing the carrot and stick which has always been a question for south africa zimbabwe relations because the two countries are pretty fundamentally intertwined and currently south africa has run out of carrots and the sticks we have are a not very effective and we're not very committed to using them so i think for the meantime we're unlikely to see any major change in this relationship although you know i think it is instrumental to remember what peers have pointed out about the recent statement by the minister and hopefully that is borne out thanks nicole and you know some have accused south africa of retreating uh to safe positions and i think you outlined that um very well um and and and then currently also is ramaphosa unable to handle the zimbabwean situation because of all the other issues that you you've mentioned or the zimbabwe situation is just too complex for him i think it's a bit of both um i think as i said you know there's no point of pressure really where he can where he can influence any kind of

reform process at the moment
it's incredibly complex as it stands we
don't see a strong
zimbabwean opposition that is able to
speak with a single voice and advocate
for
a kind of mediation of the crisis or any
kind of change and
of course we've seen the arrest of Jacob
Garema
who has been calling for protests but of
course he's also quite a small
quite a small party so it's hard to see
a way in which Ramaphosa could do this
but at the same time he is very much
under pressure domestically
from COVID and a myriad of other crisis
and you know one of which is potential
instability
around livelihoods and the question
of xenophobia which many
people have brought up I think is pretty
fundamental to this you know
it's in South Africa's interest for
Zimbabweans to be able to go
home and be able to live dignified lives
but at the moment it's just hard to see
how
South Africa can influence that process
thanks Nicole just to let everyone know
the chat room is open
so please raise your hands if you'd like
to contribute uh
directly so I will take a few um
calls from the from from from Zoom and
then I'll go back to the panelists to
just get their final
uh recommendations because I actually
understand that there are some South
African government officials
um in this Zoom call and they are just
here to listen in and to see what
recommendations they can take from this
discussion so it will be good to

as your final words to just give us
you know some of your thoughts in terms
of what
can south africa realistically do going
forward
let me take a call from dbm
i understand that professor david
moore that's me violet thank you very
much can you
hear me yes we can and thank you
everybody for a
fascinating um display of uh
intellectual rigor and et cetera et
cetera
all protocol observed um
i think i'd follow what nicole said
actually because i think it
it um leaves dumasani's
perspective in some doubt because i
think there are various times in history
where
south africa has tried to intervene in
zimbabwean politics
in some of those cases one of the
speakers mentioned well this is one of
the reasons why south africa is not
trusted
because they may have tried to split the
mdc at times
um but i think we can go
let's go to 1998 i think table and becky
had a big role to play in the land
conference
which ended up with nothing happening
because the british
left so of course a lot of what south
africa does
is related to anger with britain
especially with tony blair when he was
um contemplating well apparently he
asked abu and becky if
if he'd have support with military
intervention so that's this sort of
anti-imperialist and stupid british

policies
that get involved in in that case so we
we we have an effort there
and then in 2001 i don't know what
happened in 2000 really
about what south africa tried to do but
in 2001 in july chaplain becky wrote the
most
fascinating report to the anc where he
says
zanu-pf is now run by the lump and
proletariat
in other words the war veterans they
bribed people
with too much social welfare this was
sort of in becky this
kneepad state um
and then at the end of that long report
he says we must have free and fair
elections in 2002.
and we know what happened in 2002 and
that's been discussed
so that was another moment where i don't
know what happened
why um what was that document
um uh why did it disappear into until
2008 when
ben published a revised version but i
think it's interesting to
to that illustrates what what people was
saying is that there's a lot of
real unhappiness in the region with
what's happening in zimbabwe but they
don't know what to do
perhaps their hands are tied perhaps
2008 is another case
where the symbol makoni party was
purportedly supported
to a great extent by south africa we
need to know more about that
we also need to know more about 2008
after the march
election when probably the mdc won by
nearly 60

of the vote and of course it took six weeks to count that vote so-called count apparently at that time the south african policy makers were basically in sort of a tie some people wanted to have a gnu right away other people said no let's follow the constitution and have a runoff those people won that debate so i understand somebody can correct me if i'm wrong and uh the result was the um killings and and torture and homelessness of of many people some of many of whom voted for zanu-pf mps but not mugabe as president so we know what happened in 2008.

nicole raised the issue of 2013 when lindiwe zulu mentioned at the june um conference in maputo that the road map wasn't being followed and then apparently made an offer to the mdc that if the mdc pulled out of the election they the mdc would get support from south africa somebody might be able to comment on that report people in the mdc i spoke to said that well yes we did get that offer but a lot of mps didn't want to give up their seats if you know and and and who would really trust south africa to pull said into that agreement anyway so 2013 there was an effort to um move things this is not quite diplomacy this is uh undercover diplomacy um 2018 who knows um i think maybe they've given up after the coup anyway i think though

those those are kind of historical questions that that aren't just historical questions because they if we understood them more and uncovered more about the reality of those moments we would understand some of the um ways in which uh the policymakers in south africa have worked in the past and um maybe everybody can learn from that okay thank you very much everybody thank you professor moore and let me go to chorus makunda okay um thank you i'll start my question as a journalist my first question as a journalist um the south african media is the fourth state of the realm what role have they played in what role are they playing in the issue of zimbabwe are they writing fairly right the writing incisive well research to influence the people in south africa number two or especially challenging those reports that have not been released into the public domain what have they done about it what have they written about the issues about zimbabwe number two um we are saying here this it's been said here the south african government is taking certain positions taking light to the issue of xenophobia when xenophobia happens is the people at the grassroots in africa are speaking is the south african government in turn them with those sentiments or they are not representing those sentiments and also the opposition parties in south africa what are they saying what are their views about the issue of zimbabwe number three the civic society has been

mentioned

um by one of the the churches during
um apartheid we had desmond tutu he was
vocal where are the other churches are
they out are there no more bishops or
church leaders in south africa to be
speaking about zimbabwe to be
challenging

their own government in south africa and
i just want to also comment about the
lack of opposition party in zimbabwe i
think it's unfair to say

there is no opposition party to
negotiate with i think that's
that's an insult to the ziba wins um
there is an opposition party zan pf
knows the opposition party
so it's it's a lame excuse to me to say
there's no opposition party to negotiate
with

thank you okay but thank you chorus
and uh i'll just take two more from the
from the floor and then and then go back
to the panelists to respond

um to that final question about
the way forward um professor
david moyer from the university of
johannesburg

thank you thank you very much i would
like to

uh just uh very briefly i agree
with uh nicole um and uh
david moore and and few other
let's let's face it before we even talk
about

way forward the bulk of zimbabwe's
crisis i mean lies with zimbabweans
whether we like it or not i know
um becky said this way back and uh
the criticism leveled against him
i mean there is there are limitations to
what

south africa can do for zimbabwe
if we have to be fair within sadaq

itself
uh south africa has spent more resources
more than any other southern country on
zimbabwe
itself um we don't have time to go deep
into this
and the idea that it doesn't intervene
um the
so-called cool or whatever in the
military came i mean south africa didn't
say anything
and all those who had said that uh south
africa is supporting um
for whatever reason i mean it doesn't
hold water because
uh when zimbabweans were on the streets
uh pretoria didn't do anything
um if it is really indeed true
that they fully support mugabe they
would have done something
uh so going forward
um political parties in zimbabwe has to
be united
um they have to speak with one voice
um and and both zimbabwe
uh government as well as the ruling
party and opposition
must uh speak the global environment has
changed
the 2000 and what's happening uh
globally there are really no champions
for
um regime change as well as any other
views from the western world the
appetite whether in london or anywhere
else
is absolutely not not there so
the idea that there is someone out there
coming to help us
it's not only in the posts uh 1980 even
during the colonial era i mean
as africans we always thought that
people out there will help us
so i'm even among ourselves in the posts

yes neighbors can help but at the end of
the day zimbabweans have to resolve
their own issues
thank you prof now the last uh
hand up is from elena your brief comment
please eleanor
okay yes i would say zimbabweans would
handle their own issues
actually very easily if they weren't
shot at
if they weren't abused if they weren't
tortured
if their rights were denied they had
they they
they had a free media all these things
if a general's reports
had been listened to and sadek and had
shared
been shared with sadek then it would
have helped zimbabweans a lot
to resolve their own issues the main
thing keeping zimbabweans down
is the military aggression abuse torture
by state security agents and the daily
the daily grinding down of ordinary
citizens
the fiscal lunacy that prevails
those are the things that are keeping
zimbabweans down i would say
from a south african point of view my
argument for
or advice i wish ideally the south
african government would take
a human rights approach to every single
conflict on this continent
not just zimbabwe so for example if you
send election observers
and they come back with a report whether
it be malawi or mozambique zimbabwe and
they say this
election was not fair you you you
listened to the report of your observers
you had the sudden parliamentary forum
sadiq parliamentary

forum were brilliant observers they were ignored and i think in the end suddenly even got rid of them
so i would say south africa's foreign policy is not based on ideals and if it was based on ideas whether zimbabwe or cameroon or south sudan or the sahel then it could play a big role in promoting human rights on this continent and resolving conflicts and conflicts not necessarily between two political parties it's about the rights of citizens and civil society in south africa must fight to stop these torturers from being allowed to come here and do shopping torturers must be identified and we must actually raise this thing that don't let these people come here these are torturers and abusers thank you
thank you illinois and um i see demisani's hand is up so what i will do is i will just um get final words from all panelists and discussions but please can you make it brief so that we can hear from everyone and i think just before we we we we we hear from our panelists in our discussions i there's a message from uh dr alex maguire who says i'm a bit disa a bit disappointing that several candidates seem to have brought the zanu pf propaganda concerning the absence of an opposition in zimbabwe any serious observer of politics in zimbabwe knows who what the major opposition is quite apart from the other side shows so

bear that in mind when you give us your
final words so let me
start do me sunny i'll come to you but
let me start with elizabeth didn't go to
linda
tendai and then we will get the views
from
um the the discussions based on what
you've all
been covered today if we had to advise
the south african government
what will be your recommendations
regarding the policy on zimbabwe
just brief uh responses please as your
final words
well i think um i think i i've made some
observations in my
presentation and also i think just to
re-emphasize based on the inputs from
everybody else
that at this particular juncture and i
agree actually with all the cons
the the points that people have raised
about how difficult it will be
it may be or how against uh south
africa's practice
uh in engaging with difficult situations
in the region
uh uh it might be i don't think
uh if we don't want to be having this
discussion in 2030
i think south africa has to lead has to
lead with
using sadiq uh because i think uh
you know that feeds into its uh uh point
about
uh not doing it unilaterally but it has
to lead
and if you l if you are a leader and i
think
certainly there has been a narrative
shift as uh
i like the word that appears used in in
in south african policy engagement

that we need to lead and we can't necessarily sit back and wait for things to happen much as i think as we have been doing for 20 years but then we'll be sitting around having the same conversation in 2030.

i think south africa needs to uh to to reengage it needs to build up its credibility which is about also listening and and being open to other uh parties uh in in in zimbabwe not just zanu pierre and rebuilding that engagement to actually become a a possibly uh uh some sort of interlocutor that can begin to move the process forward it's a bit like you know a marriage you know when the one side and the other side are not talking to each other sometimes you need somebody to actually come in and intervene and it doesn't mean intervention doesn't mean sort of beating people up it means coming in and actually providing a context and providing a an engagement that actually helps the the parties to actually move forward rather than become completely immersed in in the way in which they see the world and i think it's imperative for us there is an interest dimension absolutely an interest dimension and there is uh there is a dimension that speaks to south africa's credibility as a leader in the continent because i think some of the comments in the chat box are correct i think i think uh south africa has lost a lot of that a lot a lot of its soft power that that that came with it in the early years

okay thanks elizabeth linda
i'd like to just pick up from there and
say that uh
to inject a note of caution in that
south african's involvement
has hurt uh trust credibility
it's its involvement's been lopsided it
supported
zanu-pf it started to abandon uh mugabe
in the early 2000s but it never
abandoned its
support for uh xanopf so
i would say leave with a question can
involvement uh by its partiality not
make things worse
when is the anc government
uh going to give the opposition the
respect it deserves and
and civil society the point that 20
wheeler's been making on the side
and so far there's been no sign at all
that they're prepared to abandon this
absolute
rooting branch commitment to their to
their allies
thank you another other other countries
in the region
can i and perhaps in your response can
you also answer
korres yamcunda's questions about the
role of the
civil society churches and the media and
to see if they can also play a part
in terms of helping to put pressure
on the south african government tendai
thank you i think nicole if i understood
that
uh correctly makes a very very important
point
and that is as things stand right
there is nothing for south africa to
respond to
they had they have to be developments
in zimbabwe whether

there are talks going on between parties
there or their demonstrations
or some sort of activities that
refocus the religious attention
on zimbabwe for south africa and other
member states
to respond to in the absence of that
right zimbabwe will remain where it is
at the moment which is of the of the
radar
right coming to the media and civil
society church leaders here
right there's very little coverage of um
of zimbabwe the mainstream media uh stem
because um
a there's nothing much happening there
and b uh south africa
is more inward looking because of the um
of the problems that the the the
the country faces and i think that
uh that gentleman you you referred to
also
ask the question about the xenophobia
and what the ac's
stand is the anc is embarrassed by
the xenophobic violence it has always
said to
to people that um its leaders were
looked
after in african countries during
apartheid and that um
people must therefore come their african
brothers and sisters
but of course the anc has come to the
realization that that message has no
resonance at all among
its poor followers and it's an issue
that
increasingly er is focusing
uh their minds um and next year there
will be local government elections there
will be a new party
led by the former mayor of johannesburg
which will

put their border controls and
immigration
as um as a hot
electoral issue okay
let me also just to get final comments
from the discussions
i will start with pierce pagoo then go
to
um matata table
and then do me sunny after that um
thanks violet uh i you know as a final
comment i mean i think that that
notwithstanding the trajectory that
we're on at the moment in zimbabwe which
looks set to get worse uh
it's important that uh uh south africa's
position
uh is uh premised on on factual
realities of what's going on there and i
think south africa
uh has uh to a certain extent we have an
ambassador
in in uh harare at the moment
who uh i think is reflecting openly
honestly about a number of of concerns
there i think i don't think south africa
is unaware
of the problems it's a question of how
it's going to get traction
on a number of these issues and
yes it does need those hooks from the
inside and better organization from
zimbabwe with
perhaps a clearer focus on look
south and working the
various constituencies not only in
government but civil society here
that would be open to supporting
changes in zimbabwe i think you know you
can be sitting here in south africa and
zimbabwe could be a million miles away
and i think some of the lack of
understanding of those issues has been
evident in some of the comments that

we've heard today
uh so so you know i think work can be
done but it's going to be a very
slow painful process and south africa's
foreign policy needs to be put
under the spotlight with respect to
these issues and interrogated
uh in a in a careful but in a
constructive way
okay thanks pierce for matata
is my tattoo still online you have to
unmute your mic
okay yeah can you hear me now yes we can
now
okay yeah i'll be very brief
and and say
i think zimbabweans have to
avoid falling into the palestinian trap
where every time the jewish state goes
on one of its murderers they
escaped the call is to the international
community
almost as if the palestinians themselves
have nothing
that they can do there's not much but
the the whole notion that the
international community must
do certain things um
it's a sense that i am getting here that
zimbabweans feel that south africa must
do
10 things the
solution to the problems of zimbabwe
essentially lie
in the hands of zimbabweans and south
africa has
a responsibility to
assist in any way
possible and that any way possible
it's indefinable in the absence of
whatever may be
the situation on the ground at a
particular time
and i i've seen some of the comments

here that
people mustn't say that it's not
opposition
i don't think anybody is saying that
it's not opposition in zimbabwe we're
saying
it's splintered and it is important to
actually admit
to factual realities and not live in
some kind of fantasy world
that's me
thanks matata let me go to stephen
uh two two quick things to end on
the first is i don't know if it can be
done in isolation but one thing that
south africa could insist on is reform
of the
zimbabwe electoral committee uh
commission um
because i think elections are so
critical and
there's a lot of uh it could be a much
more
uh a stronger body and that may be
something that south africa can push for
and secondly there might be an
opportunity uh zimbabwe in
february this year joined the african
peer review mechanism that i've done a
lot of work on
um maybe this is an opportunity for
civil society
and and to create that dialogue that
that is so missing uh
by virtue of the country's membership of
that
thanks steven grust and dr nicole
beatsworth thanks i think it's been a
really robust debate
i guess the thing i wanted to end on is
just briefly this
critique around zimbabwe's opposition
and i think
it is fair to say that zimbabwe's

opposition is currently speaking with many voices and in south africa as many people have pointed out uh the opposition all opposition parties are no longer using zimbabwe in question to to uh platform right we don't see uh churches taking on the zimbabwe in question we don't see anyone in south africa advocating on the zimbabwean question so i guess what i would quite like to see is the zimbabwean opposition coming together like it did in the 2008 crisis where it spoke with a single voice they had uh joint press briefings they sent delegations to static they sent delegations to south african opposition parties and get zimbabwe back on the agenda only when it starts to look like it might hurt the anc will we see the party taking a stronger line on zimbabwe thanks nicole and uh finally from uh panel discussions dumisani malaya in zimbabwe dimisun you have to unmute your mic all right okay uh i validate i i wanted to just conclude by saying that uh starting with south africa and then coming back to zimbabwe south africa must realize that it has a geopolitical responsibilities on this urban question nobody is saying that this bubbling question is a is a is an exclusive responsibility for the south african government what people are saying that geopolitically south africa must understand that it cannot sit around the problem

and escape it around it
and they in fact intervene negatively
by supporting the oppressor by
supporting the authoritarian regime
that's what people are saying
if south africa is to play a positive
role
it must stop siding with the
authoritarian regime in iraq that's what
number two
south africa needs to understand that
zimbabwe
is no longer a foreign policy issue to
itself
it's now a domestic issue for south
africa
primarily because there are millions of
zimbabweans
who have migrated to south africa
because of the collapse
in zimbabwe so that means south africa
must treat the zimbabwean question
as an immediate and urgent issue
because there is no point for south
africans in the southern government to
complain about zimbabweans
in south africa and then go outside of
south africa to support
the oppressive regime in iraq that is a
very serious contradiction which
cripples its foreign policy and then the
other point is that
south africa needs a quick and fast
foreign policy shift on zimbabwe to
engage with the zimbabwean question
all the time using all the platforms
that it has
that is direct bilateral relations
through subject through the au where
president ramaphosa is currently the
chairman
they need to engage immediately with
those
issues and then coming to zimbabweans

zimbabweans need to understand
something very quick and important
a few actual realities must be brought
home here
frequently zimbabweans must understand
this
foreign states will sometimes tolerate
and even positively assist
some dictatorships around them for
various reasons but they political be
they economically they historically they
ideological
that means zimbabweans must understand
that the strategy is theirs first and
foremost
it cannot be outsourced it must be
fought
on the ground by zimbabweans so what
zimbabwe needs is a strong
internal resistance movement right now
this fragmentation
and that has given the regime all the
a power to manipulate and infiltrate
the opposition divided so zimbabweans
need to reorganize
and this struggle cannot be fought by
political parties
bubbles need to quickly understand that
it must be fought
by a popular movement which cuts across
political parties organize people
strengthen them on the ground
make them confront the regime and that
will make it easier for south africa and
the other players around
to intervene without that with a weak
population with a weak opposition
with the lack of organization and
fragmentation on the ground
that will only give the dictatorship in
an upper end those things are not
mutually exclusive they can be done
at the same time thank you very much
malaya we really appreciate your

expert opinions on this very important
subject matter
and hope that what has come out of this
meeting can help
guide south africa's policy on zimbabwe
i will now hand over uh to the convener
of this program dr iba mandaza
for his final remarks
okay thank you thank you very much after
doing some layers a summary
do i need to say anymore i think it's
just submerged
so well i can only highlight some of the
points he made
i think the first is that the
discussion was premised on profound
expectations
about what south africa should do and i
think i hope south africa
that would have reaches that there are
immense
expectations about what south africa
could do
the leverage it has in assisting this
weapon
situation secondly there is
issue as linda says of trust and
credibility
in the manner in which south africa uh
engages on the public situation
thirdly at the estandai they indicated
the need for political will
but above all and i think matata
manchester
made the point it's us zimbabweans
ourselves who
need to get together
and form a formidable force
to be heard by everybody on the base of
which we can get support
originally and internationally and
lastly
we forgot to mention that we have
some of us propose the national

transition authority
as a way forward given the impasse
given the dire straits that zima finds
itself
and would hope that in terms of foreign
policy reactions
not only on the province of africa but
also sadek as a whole but the
international media
there is need to get the process
moving in zimbabwe it is clear
to most of us that the government of the
day
has no capacity to turn things around
none at all
it is very clear from what is happening
this is
largely an end game if you were to
preempt the descent into
violence bloodshed in zimbabwe there's
need
to do something now
and the those of us who've been pushing
the transition authority idea
i think this is the time
to engage around it and we call upon
south africa
and the region and the jewish community
to engage
and and and to influence and and
and leverage on the on the domestic
scene
towards that kind of outcome i thank you
and thank you to missandei for the
summary to the discussion
yeah and thank you very much dr ibu
mandazen thank you all who joined the
event
via zoom and those who have been
watching
via facebook and of course we will
continue with this series our next event
will be
on the 31st of july

we will be dissecting the call for mass
action
what is the way forward for zimbabwe
have a good night