

Zimbabwe: Towards a National Transitional Authority

greetings greetings to you all we have
joined us
on zoom on facebook from across the
region
the continent across the world and of
course in zimbabwe
at home
this is the sixth in a series
that has attracted hundreds on zoom
and thousands on facebook and youtube
across the globe but in particular
the southern national region itself
with the focus on the crisis in zimbabwe
and including a reference
to its diaspora which stands
roughly at 5 million or as i have said
before
75 of all professional as
and skilled zimbabweans outside the
country in the diaspora
we're holding this session
against the background of contesting
or contested perceptions
on the one hand we have a government
which claims that there's no crisis
it reminds me of 2008
when a former president a mediator
asked the same question when he arrived
in
was it addis ababa or cairo
was asked is there a crisis in zimbabwe
says what crisis
here we have almost systematic the last
fortnight or more
denialism which is normally associated
or characteristic of governments
under siege regimes under siege
we are holding this in the background of
the 31st of july
benchmark and the
the the rise of the zimbabwe's lives
matter

movement which began the diaspora
and is spread like wildfire
interestingly the last month or last
few weeks the events
during coincide
very curiously with some of
the discussion we've been having here
for example
on the 23rd of july we had a
session here on south africa
policy towards zimbabwe we ask the
question then
is it a case of the tale wagging the dog
indifference in capacity
or harvesting on a neighbor's economic
hoes
and of course this was the week before
31st of july
a momentous occasion which as we
reflected on the sixth
of august
that it was it had less to do with
what appeared at least from the from the
perspective of the state
as a failed demonstration then a
highlight of the crisis in zimbabwe
itself and indeed as we're discussing
what will it take to reach a settlement
in zimbabwe that very evening
received the news that president syrah
mapos of south africa
had decided to send three invoice to
that following weekend
and did they arrive on the 9th
they were here on the 10th and left on
the 11th
and on the 9th of august we had
the au commission almost in support
of president ramaphosa's initiative
declared too that they were concerned
about the crisis in zimbabwe
on the 14th of august
we had the momentous announcement by the
catholics

the zimbabwe castle bishops conference
the title of the personal letter the
march
is not ended
momentous i said and this provoked
a massive attack by the state
denied there was a crisis an attack on
the au
itself unprecedented for an african
state to attack the au
in the same claim no crisis
and in the face of the visit by the
invoice
same statement no crisis
the response
to the to the churches was enormous
by the other churches themselves
at home and abroad in the region
by civil society in general in support
of the of the
of the bishops by the zscu
by the academic intellectuals pcc
the ngo forum everybody laid in
highlighting that there is a crisis in
zimbabwe
so what is the reality
of the crisis and what and therefore the
urgent need
for its resolution
today only today
there were at least three if not four
meetings on the crisis in zimbabwe in
cape town
with topless and some chairs who have
just joined us
they had crisis and construction in
zimbabwe
it was citizens manifesto
which some of us were participating in
again on the crisis zimbabwe and the
need for comprehensive
a comprehensive national settlement
corsatu and the zctu in jobac
in the meeting crisis in zimbabwe

and also the southern africa
plays an office similarly the crisis in
zimbabwe
tomorrow the anc and zimbabwe greg mills
and his colleagues
including 10 diabetes will be hosting
that
and of course ours this evening so
the title of our session today
zimbabwe towards
a national transition authority
presumptuous others call it
yes perhaps are correct because we don't
intend this topic to be prescriptive
the origins of it the idea of transition
authority
broadly historically refers to a
situation
which usually following a conflict
sometimes of conflict especially
bloodshed and even war
there's need for peace talks
to discuss the transition the next stage
of peace
and development for us
here goes back to 2016
when as the platform for concerned
citizens
we coined the term in the flight of
growing crisis
which crisis only a year later led to
the coup in november 2017
and there were three major factors which
made us call
for a transitional authority first the
weakening capacity of the state
to reform neither politically nor
economically
secondly the reality of the secular
state
which became had become evidence since
2000
in the man in which the military had
intervened in election processes

and outcomes and thirdly
the need even then 2016
to restore constitutionalism
a constitution which had been approved
in 2013
hardly implemented and the return
of the military to the barracks
as is the case in the rest of the region
we have an accountable executive
a vibrant legislature and a fiercely
independent
judiciary all of which we must agree
as absent in this melbourne polity
so the nta
is being was proposed by some of us as a
largely non-partisan
group of zimbabweans all of whom
or rather about whom there will be
agreement among all political parties
and civic bodies
that these are the people who can lead
small way between
now and the next elections
and that these main the main agenda for
the transitional authority
could be first of all political
political reforms
such as have referred to return of
concessionism
and the return of the of the military to
the barracks secondly economic
reforms in particular a reform agenda
that will restore this urban economy to
what it used to be
on the back of enormous support from the
region in the international community
the return of the diaspora of a large
proportion thereof
home as investors
and active participants in the
development program
they were also attached to it elements
such as those we had
in the lancaster house agreement amnesty

which which clearly given the background
or the backdrop of atrocities
abuse kukuraundi
china the 2008 violence that killed over
300 people
the current abductions and so on and so
forth in which
the military and security sector has
been highly capable
and to see how to deal with that as our
neighbors south africa did through the
truth and construction commission
also included the idea of repatriation
of the billions out there including the
15 billion for the diamonds
and how to get that home or most of it
hope
while offering amnesty
to those who have
taken money out to the country so as i
said earlier on the nta
is not is not prescriptive
but seeing simply anything similar to it
that you can see us across
the rubicon and there are three critical
questions we should consider
are we on the eve of a national dialogue
that reflects the nature of the crisis
and the need to resolve it a national
deal that is all-inclusive
goes beyond an elite pact such as you've
seen
the gnu in 2009. secondly
who will play the mediation role
can south africa in particular play its
traditional role
as it has done in the past since 2007
or some from sadek of all three
south africa sadiq and the au can they
pull it off
and thirdly can this happen before
the crisis becomes a conflagration
because there are cynics out there who
say well we've not reached the stage

where ng is possible there must be more
blood
on the floor we hope we don't
share those kind of views so tonight
we have a panel to assist us in
unpacking
and debating the way forward is about
not as conclusive not as prescriptive
but perhaps as a beginning
to begin discussing and seeing whether
there is a kind of coincidence
or kind of partnering between what we
are doing and saying
and the kind of things going on in the
background we know
for a fact that the south african
invoice are returning
some of us were asked last week to make
our submissions and they've made our
submissions
so we have justina
justina has become a symbol
of the struggle for freedom in zimbabwe
she was she must be very tired she has
been on two panels
previous to this one and probably going
to another one after this
we bring air today just you know the
second time or third time
and we promise that this won't be the
last time
but we bring it here as the vice chair
of the
national convergence platform
a body of civics brought together in a
convergence
on the 13th of december 2019.
welcome justina
then we have roger sagan
emeritus professor in sociology adverts
many of you know him from his fantastic
book
liberation movements in power probably
in 2013

a comparative analysis of the poor
celebration
situation in namibia south africa and
zimbabwe
and rogerson he's an ardent
observer and commentator on this mobile
situation
only only a few weeks ago and that's the
reason why we
regimented him here we got an
interesting article
on south africa and zimbabwe and said
some comments to make
for example that he thought
and perhaps with justification
that the idea of national transition
authority in zimbabwe
is a pie in the sky at this rate
it will explain itself for sure thirdly
and i hope
uh yusra al-bashir will have joined us
by now
yusra is an award oh welcome
award-winning journalist
from the sudan just
we've seen her work in bbc and senior
financial times the guardian
one of my questions described as one of
the bravest
reporters particularly for a role
in the coverage of the 2019 sudanese
revolution
in fact we are bringing us here
precisely for that reason
as a reference point because only a few
months ago
the sudan concluded a national
transition authority
she can tell us more about it and the
prime minister there
yusra for your information hamduck
m doc worked with us at surprise trust
in the late 90s
yes so we gave you we gave you a prime

minister
then discussions we have musa kika
constitutional and human rights lawyer
one of our bright sparks
he's executive director of the zimbabwe
human rights india forum
he's trained in national dialogue and
peace mediation
in switzerland available and you help us
unpack this thing called the
transitional authority
then we have pillars i'm sure we must be
tired too because he was
busy sharing a session on
crisis and construction in zimbabwe this
afternoon
a very academic outfit it was
a difficult in international debate from
oxford
as a student activist in his time as a
president of the student union
active member of the civic society at
home
and in the region a public intellectual
note
with his mark even though he's hardly
grey like some of us
welcome he's based again one of the 75
percent in this diaspora
he's now in western cape welcome to
zara we hope
that lindy with zulu south africa's
minister of social group will
join us anyway are you anywhere nearby
well no sign of her so now
i'll begin with justina i'm sorry i've
took a bit long but i think we need to
give some kind of background
to this discussion um
so i'll now invite justina
give us her thoughts on the subject
thank you so much uh doc
and as you said in your introduction
it's been a long day um in terms of

talking about the crisis in our country
and um today i come
putting on ahead of the
national convergence platform and
people will be also aware that
the zimbabwe catholic bishops conference
also spoke about
the comprehensive national settlement
that the ncp
concluded as a solution
to the crisis that zimbabwe is facing
at the moment and the national
convergence platform finds
its feet from the sabbath core
by zimbabwe heads of christian
denominations
um i think there was a whole lot of
issues around that and
the national convergence platform was
then
uh bathed out of discussions around
the sabbath corps and it was then the
task
of the national council to work on the
comprehensive
national settlement and i will begin to
look at
the principles that guided this
and those principles include inclusive
participation
um non-partisan and i think this
is really in line with um what
dr eba was talking about
in terms of national dialogue that is
all inclusive
and the principles also speak about
local ownership
um issues uh need to be consensus based
holistic solutions and being people
centered
and then i think in term the the ncp
has called for agent attention
to the following issues one of them
being

the first one a victim-led process which follows globally accepted norms and international law where there is dignified space to speak out about experiences of violation and loss as well as proposals for acceptable closure perpetrators and alleged perpetrators may receive amnesty in return for truth-telling and no one can dispute that we have an issue where the victim is not recognized and the voice of the victim is actually muzzled to the extent that we have narratives where where people when people speak about abductions they are told that they have abducted themselves and that narrative muzzles the voice of the victim and as the ncp we are saying a process that we need is a process that is victim-led that will make the victim uh the center of everything that will be done and then number two a broadly agreed reform process towards constitutionalism and the rule of law where there will be renewed trust in the electoral process and minimal contestation of election results political parties will not only compete for power but also cooperate for policy integrity and there is a recovery of the independence of the institutions of the state security sector reform and the whole nation

redefines its unity in diversity
within a devolved unitary state
and i think in all this as we are
talking about
issues of trust if we are going to look
at the role of our security forces
there is very little trust that citizens
have
in them and we are saying what is
important is to renew
citizens trust in those institutions
because if we go to the constitution
they actually have um a big role to play
in terms of um ensuring that
um the human rights of citizens of this
country
are protected and also for them to be
able to
um protect both life and property
which are things that we feel that at
the moment
um nothing is really happening in that
regard
and i think what is very important is
for people to feel
the confidence to say if something
happens to you you feel
really confident to say i will approach
a police station to go and report what
has happened to me
in rather than being afraid
that going to report will actually mean
that
i am also being arrested and then number
three
a new social contract on the basis of an
inclusive national
economic vision where the national
natural resources
serve both present and future
generations
while preserving the environment a
formal redefinition of the relationship
between the citizen

and the state and there is a nationally agreed framework regarding wealth acquired through corruption or other unaccountable means no one can dispute the fact that zimbabwe is well endowed as a country in terms of the resources that it has got but at the at the same time when we are looking at the situation on the ground no one can really tell that we are a country that is really rich and this is what we are talking about in terms of the social contract and then number four a broad-based and inclusive national humanitarian and emergency task force guaranteeing effective management of the covid crisis establishment of food security and rehabilitation of the health education and other social sector institutions i think in terms of all these um sectors that i have spoken about they are gaping deficiencies that all of us pray will be able to be resolved and this is why the the um the national convergence platform proposes that they should be a broad-based and inclusive national humanitarian and emergency task force that will guarantee that at least we will have a country that works and delivers in terms of the needs of its citizens and then last but not least number five mobilization of regional continental and global support to end international isolation on basis of a participatory international

re-engagement framework
guarantee the resolution of zimbabwe's
international debt
and underwrite the national settlement
and the transitional arrangement
that must follow ensuring incentives
for implementation and i think in terms
of these five
we think that is the national
convergence platform
this could be one way of attending to
zimbabwe's
crisis at the moment thank you doc
thank you very much just to know
i'll leave my questions for later
because i want to bring in uh
yusra who wants to get away sooner than
most of us because she's at work so
roger i'll bring you in last uh as a
panelist you don't mind i'm
bringing you sir yusra welcome
thank you we would be grateful if you
give us some
some understanding of the transitional
authority
in sudan the historical context
within which it was established
and how it's doing so far yeah um
we are actually one year into the
military civilian
power sharing agreement that was signed
in august of last year
um this came after a long period of
negotiations that
within that there was continued violence
so the
massacre that took place on june 3rd
actually
happened after rasheed was deposed after
the former president was deposed
so there was a continued power struggle
and a 5-4
civilian rule even after um ahmed
rasheed was ousted for power

and it was actually a march on uh
july 30th uh june 30th during an
internet blackout
that pushed uh the military
junta to start actively
engaging in a civilian power sharing
agreement
so before that it was sort of a back and
forth and they kept you know
we you know the public and as
journalists we would hear about
hours long meetings that really ended up
with just
it was just a genuinely a power struggle
from you know in all meetings of the
term
um so june 30th really was a watershed
moment
um i think for the military to see
hundreds of thousands you know some say
millions but hundreds of thousands of
people take to the streets during an
internet blackout planning
you know grassroots planning for this
mass protest
i would say was quite a wake-up call for
the military that even after the
massacre even after
such a violent dispersal of
a two-month protest camp in front of the
military headquarters
that the people weren't going to give up
that easily so
a lesson in resilience it definitely was
but um
after the power sharing agreement it was
definitely a process of feedback i mean
we saw at the signing that no women were
involved in the signing of the document
and that caused quite an outrage online
and so to our um
pleasant surprise uh female ministers
were actively brought in the ratio was
still not was

still wasn't what was stipulated um by
opposition at the time but we saw that
there was definitely a feedback cycle in
which the
the those in charge were listening but i
think what you said or earlier doctor
really rang a bell for me when you said
an elite
pact and that's really what it feels
like even to this day it's a pact
between
uh you know the military elite those who
have been climbing the ranks for
for decades even during the bashir's
rule and
civilian elite leaders you know our
prime minister hamduk was an expat for
many years he's a well-respected
economist
but what a lot of people are frustrated
with on the ground
is the fact that you know the change
feels very performative so a year on
and hamdock obviously has a very very
big task ahead of him you know he said
he says that it will take six billion
dollars to mend
the sudanese economy and and i you know
wouldn't be surprised if if
the zimbabwean economy was in was in a
similar state of you know
disrepair it it takes a lot of money to
mend a whole like that but not just a
lot of money a
lot of expertise and know-how in order
to really
you know cleanse the the system and the
infrastructure of
decades of corruption um so hamduck has
had a big task ahead of him
but uh we've seen recently with sit-in
camps and protests
erupting in in darfur and in other areas
of the country

that people on the ground feel as though
there has been a shift in the palace
there has been a shift in in the in
the negotiation room but on the ground
little has changed
i think that that is the biggest sort of
host revolution
uh difficulty it is grassroots change
are people who are hardest hit by you
know structural oppression
by economic uh to down downturn
are these people actually feeling change
on the ground
and unfortunately in the case of sudan
they're not
you know i think uh to to get rid of
bashir was it was a big
moment and it was very empowering for
protesters but
it was really only the beginning and
bashir was a face of a much
bigger wide-reaching problem um
so i think to move you know what one
thing that i've i've really observed is
that the demands of you know the
the movement need to shift constantly be
in a state of flux because what we have
found is that every time
concessions are made and every time
there seems to be
um a move towards
uh a move towards um
real progress uh the the
momentum dies down and the fuel for
change
kind of is is almost sort of withdrawn
and what happens is that
people get complacent and and then you
see you know
the military sort of reverting to old
tricks so
i would say vigilance i would say um
inclusivity
um a very clear uh

clear and focused target and exactly
what justine was saying about you know
the four
incentives you know road map towards
where you
want to see zimbabwe in the next year in
the next five years in the next 10 years
and what we have also seen is a
splintering in the opposition so the
opposition body that was planning the
protests
the sunnis professional association
which is a diasporic
group but also has members in country
they are completely splintered what you
see is
you know um i would say an inexperienced
political opposition
um an opposition that hasn't really been
given space to operate within the
mainstream political arena
and that has been kind of to their
detriment because you know
the military is incredibly politically
experienced and they've held power for
so long
and they're able to be malleable and
negotiate and move
very easily and that is what i felt was
lacking
in the opposition parties that there was
a lot of infighting that
there was a lot of um you know uh
personal uh and professional
uh ambitions at play and that's what i
think
really came to be the biggest uh
weakness
in our opposition movement but in terms
of the civilian leaders who are now
sharing power
they're they're a good group i mean the
justice minister no
dean he is from darfur he's a lawyer

trained in george washington and again
you know when you what you said doctor
about diaspora returning
we are seeing diaspora returning and
wanting to build the country and there
is literally a campaign saying
we will build it headed so there is
an incentive for change but i think
again
grassroots change is really difficult um
to really uh see it to plant
um in a country where there is so much
ethnic division there is a lot of
tribalism
you know we recently had clashes tribal
clashes in port sudan
i think what our transitional
authorities are finding
is that the civilian side at least is
that
for the 30 years of bashir's rule there
was an active
fragmentation of the country along
religious lines along tribal lines along
political affiliation there was
genuinely um a campaign
to to to fragment and to isolate
parts of the country and um
it's a very difficult job to kind of
mend the pieces and bring them together
but i think again inclusivity uh
resilience
vigilance strategic planning um
a very uh detailed road map
towards um you know
reform social political economic reform
i mean i'm very engaged online
with the sudanese community online and
that's it's a very young population and
it's it's
you know very interesting to see even
just social issues
being debated in terms of colorism in
terms of sexism in terms of sexual

harassment
and these are all things that will come
to the surface during
um you know this flux and it's really
important to
to have the infrastructure in place to
have the groups in place
to be able to uh educate and inform
these conversations
because one of the things we would say
in sudan that this is a revolution of
consciousness
you know and the young people would say
this is a consciousness revolution this
is a shift in our attitudes as well as
our country
and i think that that's something to
keep in mind um
that you will have a lot of young people
who know nothing but
the last 20 25 years that
zimbabwe has has experienced and that
it's very traumatic and that in itself
needs to be taken in consideration
especially because you know uh the
political elites are very
old older group of people and in order
to really
keep the country in safe hands there
needs to be an active training
of young people in terms of you know
politics
economics social advocacy work to really
feel
a sustainable um long-term change
thank you
thank you thank you just another a few
questions the first is
does the nta in sudan therefore reflect
the balance of forces
between a very strong military
i think the council is made up of ten
people
four military and six civilians

as i said at the beginning in the
zimbabwe model we are look we are we
well i want the military back to the
balance yeah yeah
would you say that it was a short fall
in terms of the expectations of civil
society
that you end up with the nta in which
the military
look dominant yeah i mean four four is
not a small number
one that doesn't have to guess who's the
who's the power bloc broker in such a
council
whereas in the as then you mean the
military are the minority in the council
no i'm saying they're minority numbers
but four are quite formidable
yeah a retired
army army okay sir as well um
i think that realistically uh hamdul
seems to be the face you know he's a
very very great face
but in terms of who's calling the shots
it does feel like oftentimes it is
it is um who is the head of the
sovereign council and who
is who is who was in bashir's inspector
general
but at the same time because of the fact
that the military
are looking for popular consensus and
they are actively working on their image
within the country
so they often default to the civilian
face
and and are working with the civilian
leaders in order to
try and to reach at least acceptance
in society which they are really
struggling with um
so concessions are made from the
military side
um but at the same time you know

it is who has the guns it always boils
down to who has the
the power and and the the manpower and
we have seen that when things you know
with protest now
the the responses is a lot more docile
you know when i first was reporting
there were snipers on the roof you know
now it's tear gas and you will hear of
of
um a dozen or so casualties from from
crackdowns
but they have definitely taken a step
back and are definitely trying to
you know allow for sudan to enter the
international fall because they want
sudan to get off the sudan
state terrors of sponsors list the u.s
sanctions list
you feel like there there's a very
active effort
to to allow for the civilian leadership
to take the helm but we also of course
can't forget that
you know on that sovereign council is
mohammed hamdan
who is um a former genji leader
and his militia that was active in that
ford during the atrocities committed
uh in in during the the
uh i would say genocide directly say
genocide
um he sort of rebranded his forces uh
rsf the rapid support forces
and they've been absorbed into their
paramilitary but they've been absorbed
into the sudan armed forces
and that definitely for a lot of people
it's a thorn in their hearts you know
how can we have progress when there's a
war criminal on our sovereign council
so it's a tug of war it's constantly a
tug of war and i think that
the one thing that is is in the favor of

the people
is that they are sort of very used to
taking to the streets now and they they
feel like they have nothing to lose
just one last question so you would say
or there although the nta is a
compromise
between the military and civil society
nevertheless
nevertheless a good start the thing is a
good start with a lot of potential
i think it's a good start i think it's
uh there there is
uh the fact that there is a civil their
civilian voices in the room is a very
good start
and you know a lot of a lot of people
prefer
for there to be full civilian leadership
but then there's actually quite a
majority of people in the country
and i i can't speak on my own behalf but
a majority of people in the country feel
like the military presence is necessary
to maintain stability because there are
ongoing peace negotiations with
uh the rebel groups in south korea and
in darfur
so a lot of people are actually like
we're happy with this balance because we
know that
we are still um in safe hands
which again i think that that's active
propaganda and active campaigning
and and still we have this amazing uh
technocrat uh diplomat as as the face of
our country
reduce uh in the transition how long is
supposed to be
um it is a three year long transition
and it's supposed to be split
uh the first half is meant to have a
military head of state which is bolhan
and the second half is meant to be a

civilian military state and we are one
year in and i think it's 18 months 18
months
so yeah we have not long left and and
i mean i would say it's quite optimistic
to think that there would be a peaceful
handover of power
from from a military head to a civilian
head but i think that will be the real
test
as to how much this is a power sharing
agreement how much this
is uh you know a balanced balancing act
and if they would be willing to hand
over power when when 18 months are up
because that will be very telling
well thanks very much sir thank you
thank you very much really helped us and
i think it has informed the
discussion on zimbabwe it doesn't sudan
might be it's
quite remote in terms of uh
distance between the two countries but i
think you're
i think our our guest was correct we
would learn something from the sudan
in this regard and thanks very much for
finding time today
you're all the best and you're in your
channel and i'm sure you'll be in touch
with
me thank you thank you very much
roger and reach yourself yeah
can you is we all right okay okay roger
you okay welcome
you have got to reflect upon not only
the the
expectations around zimbabwean
transition but
there you have as a scholar of african
politics
there you have the sudan experience
which i knew
something about but i think i know more

about it now
yeah so what is your take
okay well thanks very much um
i'm gonna talk a little bit about the
difficulties of getting the military out
of politics
um i think that uh
those of us who are familiar with uh
zimbabwe particularly from outside i i
think a lot of the
uh emphasis on thinking about zimbabwe
in terms of democratization and so on
has very much been upon um
zanu-pf and the elections and how you
run
free and fair elections and so forth
and the realization that
obviously the connections between
zanu-pf and the military have been
um but they've been wedded together
really since
throughout the liberation um
and that this is continued um going
through from the early
um uh 1980s with
you know with the genocidal um
interventions and particularly of course
i think since particularly from the
election of 2008
everybody has been very very aware of
the growing influence of the military
on politics and the security forces in
general
in zimbabwe um many instances of this
the statements by various military
leaders that they would not accept an
mdc government they wouldn't accept
schwangeri
and so on so i think everybody is
perfectly
aware of the uh very close ties between
zanu-pf and the military and that goes
without saying
but i think that um the

and all that was to culminate obviously
in the coup that wasn't a coup
in 2017 and the arrival of a general
basically in power
um so i think if we want to look at
something we would like to think of as a
return to democracy
i think we need to think not just simply
in terms of how we
manage a transition how we uh manage
uh to get elections which are
democratically and correctly run
but how we actually need to demilitarize
politics i think we need to put much
more emphasis
upon that than it's been given now
my chief research method at the moment
sitting at home during this crisis is um
google and wikipedia but um
a quick look through the
uh emphasis the the literature on
demilitarization tells us
it's quite a complicated story just a
little checklist here
you're talking about the reversal of the
size and influence of the military
you are looking at the allocation of
resources
away from the military to civilian
purposes
you're looking at increased civilian
control
over the armed forces
and you're looking at the decline in
size and
maybe some disarmament um and these are
all very complicated
processes for a start if you if you if
there's a decline in size
you don't want to let a lot of
ordinary soldiery onto the streets
who are not provided for they've got a
lot of experience
running around with guns so you have to

take the guns away
and you can't just dump them on the
streets and leave them unemployed
so clearly it's going to be a very very
complicated process
and we need to ask questions about who
is going to do it who is motivated to do
it who is actually going to do it
in zimbabwean case would zanu-pf let
alone the military accept it
um and i think who would be the
implementing agency because i think
you've got to realize that
uh someone's got to be in charge of this
so i just want to look very briefly at
the
southern african context because i think
we've got
some lessons to learn from here
if we go to the south african
example
i think we have got a pretty successful
process here but it's
i think there are always key differences
with
zimbabwe in south africa
obviously there was a long struggle but
the liberation struggle in many ways was
was less militarized in south africa of
course
the struggle outside south africa
was huge and there were the the
sadf was uh
very uh active outside the country in
the wars in angola
namibia and so forth but within the
country
i think we need to stress first of all
that the sadf
was ultimately under civilian control
and
equally mk was under civilian control in
terms of the anc
so i think that that tradition of

civilian control over the military has been very important in establishing the role of the military in south africa's democracy since 1994. um i don't know enough about demilitarization in mozambique but uh it does seem to have been that despite the civil conflicts the extensive civil wars which happened since independence and nonetheless that has been a successful uh demilitarization process with a very substantial reduction in the numbers of the size of the military some figures i got today were that it's down to about eight or nine thousand from about 65 000. i don't know whether those figures are accurate now but nonetheless we we don't get the same sense that uh frey limo is under military um influence in the way that zanu-pf now an interesting case lesotho you would think that uh demilitarizing lesotho would be a relatively easy task to complete compared with zimbabwe but nonetheless here we have a country of uh about a million plus population stuck in the middle of south africa surrounded by south africa um but it's been in constant trouble with the military uh since 1970 when what was then the police mobile unit intervened on behalf of the lair bureau jonathan government and of course there was an actual coup in 1986 and they've been various coup attempts since that and the military has got tied up with the political parties the different political parties support

different factions inside the military
and so it goes on and there has been a
complete failure
of external attempts to withdraw the
army from politics
um sadaq has made quite a few
efforts to demilitarize um
politics in lesotho um
involving particularly a troika of south
africa zimbabwe and botswana
but uh what we find is that
it continues um the
sad act tends to go in or south africa
goes in after the latest crisis
and then there is a withdrawal
of uh military influence a bit and then
it then it comes back
so the question i've got here is if
we've got
such difficulty in getting the military
out of
civilian politics and lesotho i think
zimbabwe is going to be a much
harder not to crack given the fact that
the
we've got a much more powerful army
and we've got a much more forceful and i
think organic connection between
zanu and the military than ever there
has been in lesotho
uh and apart from that of course as um
you know jahasuli shumba in particular
has uh
outlined there is extremely close
connection between zanu military
and politically linked businesses
in the economy in other words the
military is also getting
quite a extensive uh
presence inside the economy
and so that makes the whole issue of
withdrawing the military
even more complicated so just to
wrap up i think first of all we need to

put much more attention on the whole
process of demilitarization
as part of thinking about
democratization and a transition to the
nta i think much more is needed than
the phrase which uh ibo has been using
of getting the military to draw from the
barracks
i think that is probably
um a minimum exercise i think it's
necessary of course
but it implies exerting civilian control
and trying to exert civilian control
um is probably not going to work if sanu
pf was going to be back in power
so it's you've got that process
would you get the military to accept
demilitarization
and who is actually going to undertake
the process is it gonna
um is there going to be some form of
international involvement for instance
would saddak
have the stomach to do it i have severe
doubts
um and so i think we've got a lot of
questions to think about in thinking
about
demilitarization in zimbabwe
that's it roger you finished there
for the time being roger yes
are you finished for the time being i
don't know i wasn't sure whether you
finished
you was a glitch on your side no no
that's fine i'm finished i'll
reason one or two questions roger
the first is to do with
the sudan president i think yusra made
the point that the military had a long
history in politics and
much more formidable than the zombie
army in that regard and even in terms of
content

do you see a difference i want to say
i'm waiting to hear from the zimbabwean
discussions from zamchi for example
i think first of all the relationship
between zanu-pf and the military
is a bit exaggerated um
we take into account the declining
of power of zanu-pf even in terms of
content
it's not the same party that it was in
1980
far from it but the point order asked
really do you see a difference between
the military being the military being
central
in politics to the point where
zanu-pf has become an appendage of the
military
as a party and the military being a tool
of the politicians which was the case
in the in the 80s when mugabe
would simply send out the military on
the escapade in gukrahundi for example
and in the june that period the army was
clearly under civilian rule to a point
where
the abuse of that of the military by the
politicians like mugabe
led to a situation where they become a
very central
where the state has become secretive as
it is so you see a difference between
the military being central as it is now
and the military being a tool of the
politicians
i think i don't know enough about sudan
but i think that the
fact that uh i suspect the military
in sudan is even a lot stronger than it
is in zimbabwe
as you're implying um and i think the
uh the implication of the compromise
agreement in
sudan is that the military is going to

go on
uh basically having
a co-equal power for quite some time we
shall see where the transition works
there let's hope it does
i think you're right that the what we've
seen in zimbabwe is
some continuous flux and change with the
relative influence of zanu pf
and the military and
that i think we need to be aware of that
and try and analyze that
i think you're suggesting that
uh the influence of the military may be
exaggerated
i think the problem is that you've got
the
my guess is that the military influence
is not just the people in uniform but
the connection that the fact of the
a lot of the people in key jobs of
people who have
taken their uniforms off and so
trying to disentangle the military from
zanu-pf
within many state institutions actually
becomes quite difficult
okay i don't know i don't know really i
think i have to move to the
discussions some of the questions that
i'm asking you
are really not for you i think for these
for zimbabweans to answer that um
and therefore i'd like to begin with uh
maybe some cheer
and then come to um to musa later on the
constitutional and legal aspects
but maybe zamchat if we can
continue the discussion on the military
one of the questions i have is that
is the question the point i made earlier
do you think the
military the military is exaggerated
both in terms of numbers by numbers i

mean that those who
are the apex of the of the
of the military forces both in terms of
age
they say former zamla in terms of
leadership maybe two or three
and the army now i mean hierarchy is
interestingly largely former zipper
the top six considering forces former
zebra
who are not sanu they have no relation
with zanu at all
some would argue they actually anti-zanu
given the experience in the 80s where
zipra and zappo were purged
and secondly that the people i'm talking
about
the six or so of them including spanda
may have survived the purge of zebra and
zappo
in the 80s mainly
because of the relationship with
that they're all from beringwa and might
even be related
all of them all the six of them and that
this
leaves them rather vulnerable
or better still amenable
to have the military return to the
barracks
because of the very narrow social base
the vulnerability and the graying
noise of civil society
pilani zamcha
uh thank you very much uh
evo uh i think that's a
that's a very fundamental question
the starting point is that
the zimbabwean military i think at the
moment
is not a homogeneous unity
is quite differentiated along
ideological lines
you talking about the zipper

element this angle element
they are indeed fundamental differences
in terms of their ideological
orientation from the liberation struggle
and from the way they were trained the
zebra element obviously historically
would more willing to gear towards
a more professional army as compared
uh to to some of the elements within
zandla
we are more integrated in
in party politics but outside that
because of the changing demographics as
well
you also have a generational divide
within the military in zimbabwe
the command element of of the military
your commissioned
commanders that is from the post of your
lieutenant
lieutenant to the generals and so forth
um they are
the old generation but the army
has recruited you also have the young
ones
who are in there definitely that points
to a generation or divide
and others participated in the
liberation struggle
but some did not participate in the
liberation struggle
it's also another area a fourth line
so i think it's a myth uh to point
to the zimbabwean army as a homogeneous
unity
it is divided perhaps what we should
look at
is how the military operates uh maybe
it's a common this
hierarchical order if you have your
200 commission commanders there
giving orders and so forth and we know
how the army operates
they're probably more powerful uh than

the junior rents
but is that sustainable
uh in the current uh economic crisis i
don't think it is sustainable at
all i also don't
think that the
the commissioned commanders are happy
with the current economic crisis in the
country
remember one of the reasons why they
said that they had stepped in to remove
um gabriel was to be able
to take the nation forward in terms of
economic reconstruction
in terms of transformation and so forth
but they've realized that the military
cannot fix the economy whether you have
robert mugabe or
whether you have um emerson mnangagwa in
charge
they certainly cannot solve the hunger
crisis
uh multiple crises that are unfolding
they cannot do that and i'm sure by now
the military
they actually know what their limits are
and we should not exaggerate their hold
on to
power now because there are a lot of
issues that
do militate against
against them i think the first thing
actually is that
you cannot just rule a society in modern
day based on croatia
based on the bullet you need some level
of consent
you need some level of social consent
from the citizens and that is not there
so how do you sustain it
it's going to be very difficult for the
military to sustain that
we have also seen the divisions um
within zanu-pf they are no longer a

secret issue it's no longer clandestine
i think it's yesterday or yesterday but
one
that zanu pf fired chisema
and two other guys from the politi
bureau because
they are leading
they are they are leading the debate
that amazon
nanga must retire and and go back home
because he has failed
these are things that that you can't
hear of any president especially
in the first three years of their term
it's unheard of
so when people talk of the national
transitional authority
uh they did they think of it just as
something that is
kind of idealistic and so forth but i
would like to say
there are civilians within zanu-pf who
also see that they are going nowhere
and that they are going for a crash they
might not say it publicly
but behind doors they are looking for a
solution
they are military people
who think that they are going norway
they might not say it publicly
but behind the doors they are saying we
really need a solution
out of this message because zimbabwe is
going to crash
and once you get to a stage where you
have a totally failed state
it would be very difficult to extricate
them
so maybe just to conclude what might
need to be done is number one
how do you make this idea of a national
transition authority
gain popular support it needs to be mass
based and not to be seen as if it's

coming from
me or attorney who are considered to be
the elite sections
of society and the good thing about it
is that
we have a precedence there was a
constitutional movement in 1999
in 2000 when it started it was seen as a
very elite idea
but once it was taken to the masses
it became very popular that everyone in
zimbabwe now talks about the
constitution and constitutionalism but
when it started it was seen as something
that was
quite idealistic so you need an
all-inclusive
uh civilian national park on the need
for a national transitional authority of
some sort
and once you get that you also need
some form of regional consensus from
civilian progressive
unions uh civil society in the region
to say this is the way to go then the
second step
now because zimbabwe is an advantage
that um
there is no glaring or quite of that
political vacuum at the moment
and like what had happened in sudan
where there was
political vacuum and what had happened
in egypt
where there was political vacuum and the
military had to step in and act as the
transitional authority
or we may talk of the revolutionary
authority elsewhere
in zimbabwe at the moment this is the
opportune time
to talk about the national transitional
authority and give it form
and substance to say what is the

zimbabwe that you need to see
it can be there can be other processes
like
your transition coalition whereby
you then move from the civilian uh
national
park uh to a civil military pact
and roger was talking about the
possibilities that sadaq is not
interested yes
sadaq might not be interested but there
are also prominent and eminent uh
political players
within sadaq and on the african
continent
who have links with the military elites
uh within zipra and within zanla
like your joachim chisano and so forth
who can come in as a regional reference
group in order to
strengthen this idea the military the
moment that they see that they are
increasingly becoming isolated
both from their junior ranks and from
the civilians
i think they will be able to come to the
to the table and as justina said
you need to make certain concessions
in order to accelerate the
democratization agenda
in in zimbabwe uh you know when ideas
start they always seem
impossible when morgan chandra
started this idea that he was gonna
challenge robert mugabe
some people thought he was being crazed
until he defeated
robert mugabe in 2008 the constitutional
struggle
and nobody even ever thought that the
generals were going to
turn against robert mugabe i mean the
greater share of
intellectuals until it actually happened

and robert mugabe was taken out by his own former general so it's important for the civilian democratizing forces to be able to come up with these ideas on the table and so far this is the only concrete proposal that i have seen and i hope that the political elites within the mdc are not going to play an intransigence role because they have very limited options however they they deal with the military gender which is in place it's not going to allow them to win elections even if they win elections it's going to have a fatal power to reverse the outcome of that democratic election so it's high time that they should still think about this 2002 2008 2013 2018 they can't keep repeating the same mistake i think i should stop there and just summarize that what we need to do is to allow ideas on the table it is uh to debate them the the the state is highly militarized but there are vulnerabilities within the military and within this npf political elites actually they fear the military more than what opposition political leaders do so there should be a solution in the form of a national transition authority thank you very much i think it really helps the the debate by unpacking it even further and and leaving us

with musa also how do you see the trajectory
if any towards an nta given that we have
we have uh sufficiently unpacked the the
forces attendance to this bubble
situation
and uh and i think uh zamasu
more or less agrees with the contention
that
the the military is exaggerated in terms
of his
power and influence in the zimbabwean
polity that on the contrary
it's actually declining force and that
many of them
including leadership meaning the
leadership would welcome an nta
uh if also because it is uh it might
redeem them
from their dilemma which they which
faces them now
i the growing crisis economic and
political
musa thanks ibo
uh and thanks to those who came before
i think where zamchiya uh left is a good
place to start
zimbabwe is in a peculiar situation in
that unlike other countries where the
national transition authorities it's
because there's been a power vacuum
uh like in the case of sudan oh it's
because there's been conflict and
violence
uh currently in zimbabwe we are not at
that stage we do have a constitutional
order that is intact
at least in form never mind the
substance so
and that's a good thing um justina
earlier spoke about
agenda number two of the national
convergence platform
being constitutionalism so it's a good

thing that we still have that
um fabric of constitutionalism intact at
least in form
now when we are to consider a national
transitional authority at the moment
it's going to mean there is some level
of political buy-in that is going to be
needed and this is where the legal and
the political now
uh get entangled and come together you
have
the ruling parties on pf you have the
mdc and the other versions of the mtc's
at the moment uh for you to be able to
come to that point where you say okay
let's change the governance order now
let's come up with a
an nta you are going to need the
political
forces that are in the fore
to essentially agree that that is a
workable solution
so there is a lot of advocacy and
lobbying that is then going to go into
that
for the political forces to buy in and
that's that's important for a point that
i'm going to make later on
the legal architecture of trying to put
this together
you are going to need a political buy-in
because you are going to need political
processes to lead to that
the number one thing is that having an
nta
you need it to be legal
you need that entity to be legal you
need to do it
within the constitutional uh framework
however there are those who then argue
that you know but we
we do have you know uh scheduled
elections we do
have an a and a government that is that

was elected and confirmed by the constitutional court
what's the legal basis now to have an nta that's something that is extra legal
uh now that argument will be misplaced in many respects firstly we find ourselves in an extraordinary situation which essentially calls for extraordinary solutions and that doesn't mean that we cannot explore solutions beyond what tabulated legalism at the moment says
an idea cannot be unconstitutional it only becomes unconstitutional if it is implemented in a manner that is not supported by the law
but the idea itself the whole conceptualization of an nta in the transition of phase cannot be um unconstitutional uh
so nothing also prevents us from imagining and reimagining our society beyond the confines of our current constitution
the constitution as we have it at the moment uh is
is a statement of intent it's a statement of aspirations of the zimbabwean people
uh but nothing stop us stops us from from from confining ourselves uh to the four corners of that document if we are trying to imagine and reimagine
what a different society would look like constitutions by their nature are amendments they are meant to save society it's the social contract people coming together and saying this is how we want to be governed
and when something is seriously not working in that matrix
the people retain the power to reform in a manner or in a way uh

that that architecture so in the zimbabwean case we actually do have precedence where we have done this before uh albeit it was in the case in the case of the gpa the gnu uh although the nta proposal now is a bit different but we had that before uh and we legalized and constitutionalized that through an amendment to the constitution and that was constitutional zimbabwe amendment number 19 in 2009 that essentially ushered the gnu period so something similar can be done for us to usher in the national transitional authority uh the processes are there the legal processes that support that are there at the moment um so so when we then speak of bringing this creature into being essentially we are speaking about uh rearranging uh or offending in a way provisions in the constitution around the executive a constituted executive we are also touching on legislative powers the existence the tenure of parliament we are also touching on the right to vote which is a right in the bill of rights but the issue of the right to vote comes in when a a national transitional authority is projected to cross over a scheduled election period if it is to come within the year period we will do elections in zimbabwe at five year intervals if it is to be instituted and to terminate within that period then the right to vote is

not going to be suspended at any point
so issues to do with suspension of the
right of what may not necessarily
uh come into play but what then comes
into play
is the need for us to simply
constitutionalize the architecture that
will put in place
to facilitate an nta so
how exactly would we do
that uh and i have already given an
example
uh of how we have done it in the past
essentially i'm ending the constitution
what we did in 2009
was to put in a an addendum to the
constitutional schedule
uh that allowed for a suspension
in in the way of operation of certain
provisions that were to do with the
executive
in the constitution our constitution
doesn't have any provision that
deals expressly with with with
suspending provisions
but it has a provision on amending and
the way
amend is defined in the constitution is
so broad
to allow for suspension of certain
clauses even within specific periods
without necessarily doing doing away
with those clauses permanently
so that is something that is allowed in
terms of section 328 of our constitution
what it then means is that
you are going to need political buy-in
for for those in parliament to see the
need
to put in place this legal architecture
essentially you're going to need a
constitutional amendment bill
in terms of the constitution and if you
look at how our parliament is

constituted at the moment you have two thirds from zanu-pf
uh you have the others from from from the mdc and
and the independent one you are going to need a
massive buy-in from the political players
for that kind of a bill to be passed this this
this is why i mentioned at the beginning that this is where you find then
the entanglement of the politics and the legal
so you are going to need that process uh referendum whether we need the
referendum or not
one can approach this from a technical perspective but one can also
approach it from a practical uh perspective from a technical perspective
if you are going to have an nta within the five year period that i
have spoken about
without crossing over uh you know a scheduled election period you may not
necessarily need the referendum because you are not suspending the right to vote
at any moment
you are people are still going to be able to vote when the 5 year period
come in and you know
essentially technically you will not necessarily need to then take it to the
people
uh in terms of the constitution because our constitution only requires certain
chapters to be taken to a referendum if you are suspending or amending them that
is chapter 4 and chapter 16
chapter 4 being the declaration of rights and chapter 16 the one to do with
agricultural land
but that is as far as the technicals

will go
but when you look at the political the
moral
and issues to do with national cohesion
equation it is advisable and wise
for this kind of arrangement to be taken
to a referendum
why uh zamchi raised the issue of
this being a mass based as opposed to it
being driven by the elites
uh the issue of trust has been raised
trust is eroded at the moment you are
going to need a lot of trust
you are going to need buy-in of the
people and the agenda essentially
is to try and craft an inclusive
vision an inclusive uh future
for this country that would be the whole
idea behind bringing in an nta for a
particular period
so it's important for the people to have
a stake in deciding whether this should
happen or not
so it is advisable to take this to to to
to a referendum even though they may be
technical arguments that may support one
not taking this to a referendum
uh you are going to need the buy-in
uh of of the people so i think uh
that's what i can say uh broadly
regarding the legal implications of this
at the moment
thanks thanks musa this is excellent
this is very excellent
i'm learning a lot too from the
constitutional legal aspects of this
animal called nta i didn't follow up
closely the
jail the genu but
we'll come back to you now
to the questions from the floor as we
say
i'll begin with reeler but i'd like to
warn those who have put up their hands

already chris marilyn
oswald bina jananube
pearl matibe and norman nazema
those are the first i'll take i'll begin
with tony rila
tony hello and good evening
it's been entirely fascinating
uh my first observation is and having
listened in to
the previous five and listen to this one
is
that we are very good at
identifying all the problems that will
prevent us from having a solution
now as phil said uh
i'm one of the guilty of trying to push
this notion of a national transitional
authority for a very long time
and the rationale was that as uh igbo
pointed out in the beginning
that some of us coming together thought
that
zimbabwe was heading for a hard landing
and i doubt we could think of a harder
landing than the one we've got
presently and that was based on the idea
that
the state and the military
and the security states and all the
reasons that roger southall was pointed
out
were likely to be a major impediment to
any kind of reform
so we tried to think of a vehicle that
would move us forward what would be
a way that would change the nature
of the solution
for zimbabwe and in front of us was also
the notion
of the gpa that musa has just talked
about which
in the view of many of us at the
particular time was a
peace treaty and not any serious attempt

to perform
so we've been thinking about this for an
enormously long time
and and looked at many many different
examples and i think that
as we began these conversations
two sets of arguments really came to us
one was the inability to ever make this
happen that the political forces would
never
accept this and we always went back to
the point was
that when the landing is hard enough
what happens in countries
is that you go to political settlements
that's what we did in 1980
we went to a political settlement
but it wasn't a transition of a
transformative kind and we were thinking
about a transformative kind
the other arguments were those that
musa has dealt with that many lawyers
said to us
that any attempt to implement this will
be
massively unconstitutional you will
violate something that the people of the
country have fought for
so hard that they will be unwilling to
give up
i think the answer is that you can deal
with the constitutional argument
without violating the constitution but
the biggest question
about this beast of the mta is what the
heck is it
what would it look like uh
who would be in charge how would it work
and over the years we gave many answers
all of a an advisory kind
we looked at the cadessa process in
south africa
and the establishment of a transitional
executive council could we have a

transitional executive council in
zimbabwe
composed of a representative group
chaired by the leaders of the two
major political parties you know
a political place and a civilian place
with churches and labor and civics and
women and youth
how would the government run we put
forward ideas that
what was necessary to have were people
who would
undertake the process of the reform who
were
competent to do that we posed the notion
of technocrats people who knew how to
run economy
people who know what's going on in
health people who know
what we need for agriculture etc etc
and when ebola makes a point and has
made it repeatedly
that half our skill resides in the
diaspora
we have an immensely talented population
outside there where we can find the
people
who are able to do this technocratic job
if we try to marry these things you
still
left with a parliament until 2023
and the hope would be and this is a big
hope i might say
in the polarized politics we have that
parliamentarians would see
the value in being the
midwives of a transformation that they
would do their job
sitting in parliament and pass the bills
and the pieces of legislation
that would allow the country to move and
i think when phil says
in the state and in the party and
everywhere else there are all sorts of

people
who you would not think are interested
in
transition and transformation i believe
that in amongst the zimbabweans are all
manner of well-meaning people
even within zanu-pf who would see
a valuable job in moving us to the next
stage
so this is very visionary talk but i
also think it's immensely practical
because as we've seen in recent weeks
what we're faced with
is continuous coercion by a state that
is unwilling to give
power a state that is
unwilling to agree that the country is
in the worst crisis
it's been in since independence
we see a region that is looking
for a solution and what they don't hear
from zimbabwe
is what is the way forward and i've been
struck
in so many of the conversations during
these sapes dialogues
where the people have said well we won't
do anything until the zimbabweans tell
us what to do
right well there's a voice one of the
voices
that came out has come out from the
churches when they said
we need a comprehensive comprehensive
political settlement
the ncp and they're echoing what the ncp
has said that justina outlined before
the issue is comprehensive national
settlement
to what and the answer we would give and
we've been giving for four years
in the platform for concerned citizens
is a comprehensive national settlement
towards an mta there is no other way

thank you very much thanks tony
thanks very much we'll come back to that
chris marolan chris marolan
chris are you there yes i i i
am the one nice to see you
good evening and thank you very much for
allowing me an opportunity to
um us this fantastic panel that you have
put together a few pointed questions and
these
are really around the dynamics of what
a possible interlocutor or let's call it
a
the arm voice who have been deployed to
zimbabwe what
is the advice that we would give them
given the fact that
if i follow the conversation correctly
it has been pointed out that possibly
the balance of power in terms of the
civil military relations of zimbabwe
seem to indicate to us the dominance
of a number of
leaders within the zimbabwe defense
forces who have
a liberation history that is more
aligned let's call it
to the zipra movement
and certainly in terms of ideology tend
to move towards
a conventional formation and
engagement of the military is it then
and possibly dr zamchik can assist us
here and also you
dr mandaza to say that is it not
then important for us to call upon
any other grouping that would be
involved in
some kind of facilitated process to
consider this
and also look at the points of influence
specifically regarding to what are the
points
of influence in particular to

the south african envoys uh given the
closeness of
the zipper formation from a historical
and liberation movement perspective
with them condo is it possible for us
to give them pointed
talking points and engagement points
that they should be
focusing on in order to move forward the
process
or dr zamchiya would it be
a situation where by doing so
we effectively undermine the
important role that the broader civil
society
the citizens of zimbabwe must play and
certainly other
opposition political formations by
putting
an important premium on the need to
understand and unpack the
the levels of engagement and
understanding
of this group of high level
let's call it leaders within the
zimbabwe defense forces i'll leave it
there
thank you very much
thanks chris uh with the panelists and
discussions take note of these questions
i'd like to
get more questions and comments before
we come back to you
uh also winner
what's work
what's work
okay uh thanks thanks thanks dr mandaza
um um thank you for giving me this
opportunity to just
ask a question um
my evaluation or analysis of our current
situation i think that's break from
to the period just after independence
if you look at the culture of zimbabwean

politics
it does not respect any other national
stakeholder
whether it's labor business
or its civil society
politics just bulldozes every other
stakeholder
and listening to the presentations
especially from musa and the dr
zamchi the general militarization of
institutions in zimbabwe has
has been going on for a for a long time
in terms of state deployment
into critical portfolios
and the elephant in the living room has
then become
the fact that um maybe the military
realized that the political arm
of the stakeholder configuration in
zimbabwe is the most effective
to what extent is the initiative of the
nta
looking at engaging deeply some
political
architecture that will probably
do down the awareness of
the potential um
you know good uh beneficial
outputs of this initiative from the
ground
up to this level of the academia uh
and the well-informed it appears as if
if it does not respond to that
particular aspect
it will remain very elitist and
remaining elitist
it will certainly not find its way into
the actual realms
where it should be utilized for for the
greater good but that's my question
thanks thanks sir also thanks very much
get to jannah
in china
januk and meet yourself can you hear me

yes i can hear you and they can see you
too great
thank you welcome welcome
thanks um i think the point i wanted to
make perhaps it's a question
um as well uh i liked the
way uh we brought in sudan as a
very poignant i think experience for us
to learn from
as zimbabwe um although i also know that
the people of sudan learn from our own
experiences and our struggles over time
where we've not had the successes
we've wanted to have um
and also the experience of 2008-2009 of
the inclusive government
we at the moment are dealing i think
with the machinery
that is in absolute denial and does not
recognize
the challenges that exist for the
country so
it's the description that you hear from
government from zanu-pf
of the zimbabwe we're experiencing is
not the description that justina made
today so uh 2008 2009
happened because there was an
acknowledgment from zanu-pf
and government that there was a crisis
in the country
um sudan was a different situation where
you had the leaders
in absolute denial and the people took i
think
a certain type of action that compelled
the kind of negotiations that led to the
changes that we saw
i think the big question for us in
zimbabwe
20 plus years later is um
dealing with a regime that is in
absolute denial that
is describing a different experience of

zimbabwe

um what do the panelists uh
advise um and what thoughts
do we prefer uh for ourselves um in
terms of a way forward
that uh should in a way for me
compel um and uh force for
folks to the table to actually be
willing
to accept that there's something going
on wrong musa well pointed out
that no matter what you do at the end of
the day you will need
some political engagement because it's
political processes
that will create legal frameworks for us
at the end of the day as a people so
that i thought
it's a a a question that is being
expressed as a thought
thank you janna before you go i have a
question for you
yes are you still you are still on the
presidential advisory committee
you have a question for me yes
yes uh along the lines of your own
question
do you think as advisor
that you are that on the phc the
presidential advisor committee
do you think that the political
leadership in zimbabwe including the
the the current head of state are
amendable
to such discussions as that which we are
discussing right now the nta
i think the answer is obvious dr
mandela's like
the flurry of letters that have come out
of government
departments the kinds of statements that
have come out
in reaction and in response um i think
triggered primarily by the churches but

they've been coming
out of different stakeholders across
this uh country
in itself tells you that it's a
government that's not willing to
exceed the world as you see it so i
think uh
that answers your question
thank you janna thank you for that for
that
brief insight yes thank you
could have pulled my tv pearl
it's pearl there
yeah and meet pearl please
pearl if she's not ready i'll take no a
norman
nazema norman
look
it's gone okay let me get back to the
panelists
raja i think you heard a lot
and especially around the military
factor
whether you will still believe that the
military is
an intractable factor in the zimbabwe
process
or you are prepared to
to view differently now roger
i think the i mean what i'm hearing is
comforting in the sense that uh
i mean certainly it's quite clear that
the military is not homogeneous
i think what i i what i'm hearing is
the need to
concentrate and when we're thinking
about getting the military out of
politics
is the inducements which are being
offered
to withdraw and i think the only thing
i've heard so far which has been
particularly important but nonetheless
may not be sufficient in itself

is the idea of um uh
amnesty and the suggestion of a of a trc
now if we go to the south african
experience
we all know that the the problem with
the trc here
was it was backed up with threats to
prosecute
uh if you didn't come forward
and basically confess your sins and if
you didn't and then then you could be
subject to prosecution
the problem is we know that model didn't
actually work terribly well
um the for start the
the number of the uh
serious people who came forward to ask
for amnesty is pretty dismal and
we know that it's one or two fish down
the
hierarchy who got caught up who came to
give amnesty
and on the whole the top cross got away
with literally murder
and unfortunately the one or two
prosecutions which have taken place have
not been terribly successful
so the the idea is
excellent but trying to actually
implement it is remarkably
difficult um
i i don't know the way around it um
but i think that it needs to be given a
lot of consideration
and while the south african model may be
an important one to
uh emulate i think one
also needs to look carefully at the
holes that were
in the process and that does imply
a willingness to prosecute if people
don't go
forth so i think this whole thing of
thinking about what inducements

you can offer to the military to
withdraw
is something which we need to give a lot
of a lot of thought to
um and that goes back i mean you don't
want to just give inducements to the
guys at the top but you need to
provide for the people in the lower
parts of the
hierarchy um
i i i see a
note at the bottom just come through the
amnesty and a pension yes i think that's
important
you need to as i suggested earlier you
need to make sure that people are
provided for
um so that they don't run around doing
other sort of things but
maybe there are other sorts of
inducements you need to think about too
uh newton newton kanema can you come in
before i go to
musa newton
newton yeah
hear me now welcome newton yes welcome
yes thank you thank you thank you very
much uh
i guess this entire conversation which
is
quite interesting has established
one thing that the military
is a big player to whatever is happening
in zimbabwe
and it's undeniable that zanu-pf
has got two-thirds majority in
parliament
in the event that there is
anything that could be
a acceptable to
zanu-pf you would need
there are two thirds to amend the
constitution
and if you have got this line to say

the military have to go back to the
barrack
they are so powerful and most
arms of government have been militarized
there is no
incentive for both the military
and zambia have to do this with these
conversations that have been going on
what attempts have you made to engage
those two powerful forces whereby
these conversation could begin to
influence
their thinking or show them a window
for a solution in the absence of them
the truth of the matter is we are
phoning ourselves
and speaking to ourselves thank you
yeah it's obvious that newton has not
been home for a long time
so what you see is what he sees on paper
as someone said earlier on these things
are much more fluid
than this
the
i will ask uh some chitia to deal with
your question later
but for now there has been a question
about
the amnesty also within relation to
those
with ill-gotten gains we were talking
about
the alleged uh money is outside the
country
which run into billions uh
so would would musa try to answer that
i'll try to answer that ebook i'll also
try to attempt to answer a question that
oswald raised when it comes to amnesty
internationally amnesties have been used
as a carrot
to try and bring people to the
negotiating table and to drive towards a
desired outcome and i think in the case

of zimbabwe it won't be
any different we have people who are in
government people who are in the
military
with uh massive human rights violations
that they've
they've perpetrated with massive
uh cases of corruption and looting under
their belts
and for those people to come to the
table and to see
the value of an nta you must speak to
the personal
they must know what is the need for them
how this is going to extricate them from
from you know
from the hole that they have they have
dug for themselves
so so it's an exercise of lobby and
advocacy that involves speaking to the
personnel
in addition to speaking to the broader
contextual uh
collapse crisis issues i think that are
there for everyone to see
other than that uh it's really going to
be difficult to convince those in xanopf
and those in the military
to see the need for this because they a
lot of them or at least some of them
they feel uh they see some sort of
security
uh in them holding on which is really a
false sense of security
uh the big question around amnesty's is
always when to introduce amnesties
do we speak about amnesties now as we
are mooting the idea of an
nta or we introduce the question of
amnesties at an advanced stage
or we introduce when we are at the
negotiating table
that's always the biggest question when
it comes to amnesties

when do you introduce them uh and i don't have a clear answer for that i think it it's context specific it depends on what we have achieved how much ground we have covered uh and only then can we determine whether we can introduce the issue of of amnesties but i want to speak before i hand back to you but i want to speak to a question that also raised regarding how politics permeates permeated bulldozes essentially everything in zimbabwe and this question was eh you know how is the nta that is being proposed going to deal with that and i think for me the answer lies in what you do during the transitional phase where you have the nta in place uh what it means is as the idea is being mooted and pushed people need to be clear uh on what's gonna what what the game plan is what's going to happen during those two or three years when we have this national transitional uh authority otherwise it's just buying time and after that we go to an election and we know what elections uh bring in ziba and life goes on so there must be a clear game plan on on on the kind of reforms that we want to achieve during the transition period and the kind of mandate that we are giving this nta to achieve during that period otherwise there might not be a good end to it thanks i'm sure can you deal with uh chris

malone's question
john and um but more more crucially
that raised by newton kanema just now
about the nature
and content of the power block that
might be zanu-pf and the military
combined
uh thank you
uh thank you evo i think
all those are very very important
questions
um is question
i think let me try to start with that
one
i think that there is a relationship
between most of the zebra
uh commanders and those from the anc
zoom control s visa
so that relation has been there during
the
the liberation movement and
uh there are still
social and political connections that
can be leveraged
on so it is it is still
very possible to get uh
the the the
revolutionaries from the anc talking fro
to the revolutionaries uh in zebra
but we should also try to be honest with
history
uh there is this kind of uh revisionist
history
revisionist narrative kind of patriotic
history being sold
by the by zanu
that they were at the forefront of the
liberation of the region and of the
african continent
and i think that is not entirely uh
correct because if you look at some of
the zandalar commanders
we now have information that they were
actually working

with the apartheid government in south
africa
in order to suppress zappo
in order to designate zappo if you go to
the anc
comrades it will be very difficult to
get people
even with direct links to a general
former general
like constantine chewing but if you go
to the freely mo guys in mozambique
it might be easier to get links to
people to get people i mean with links
to the zandalar commanders so this is
not going to be just
a south african issue it also needs
a regional buy-in and my point is that
even if you don't get sad against any
entity
you can still get a regional reference
group
backed by the international community
uh that can be able to support
this initiative and that regional
reference group can be made up by those
people
uh who have links to the zebra element
to this under element and also to the
civilian
element more importantly actual
actually so yeah it's it's it's very
possible
uh to deal with that then uh people are
talking about
uh the need to
have a negotiated settlement
or not i think you definitely need to
have a negotiated settlement if you look
at the realities at the moment
uh there's no way that you're not going
to have
incentives disincentives small and big
actions
short-term and long-term plans you

need all those in the mix because this
is not like a revolution
where one party has just won and that
there is a rapture
immediate power vacuum there's certainly
going to be need
for negotiations in order to avoid
more bloodshed there's no need
uh you know to come up with a solution
after there's more bloodshed
there's absolutely no need i wouldn't
buy to that
so definitely you need to negotiate
because you have a political military
you have a
i mean i think more aptly you have a
patrimony of political military so
you need to have a negotiated transition
at least at this juncture of the
of the people's struggle i
really think that you
cannot say that zanu-pf
um just by the virtue of the statement
that they have been
issuing publicly and the prefaces that
they've been putting publicly
that they don't recognize that there's a
crisis i think we're being disingenuous
uh zanu-pf within the political bureau
they
accept that there's a crisis i've made
reference to the pass-through political
meetings of zanu-pf it is very clear
that
what they have been discussing is an
internal crisis that has become a public
crisis
and if we have all listened to the
acting spokesperson
patrick chinamasa he has made it very
clear
that there's an internal coup that is
brewing within zanu-pf
it's a political coup that was brewing

with those within zanu-pf
and already some people have
been suspended and subsequently
fired from zanu pf for that imagine a
politically remember
with with posters written that ed must
you see so they might not they might not
agree
and they might give this dogma of proper
infallibility
to the public but internally they are
debating this
and they are telling us that everything
is not okay and they are looking for
solutions that how do you
rescue us from this mess also but
but but but central to that is an issue
of
how do you protect their
interest as well
without being seen as if you are
perpetuating the idea of
impunity which is not going to sell very
well
uh to to some of the radicals within the
civilian democratizing elites
so i i i want to say
also lastly uh to to to
my brother newton that uh the two things
that zanu-pf
has in parliament it's it's it's a
quantitative number
it's a reality but qualitatively
in terms of moving zimbabwe forward it
has
meant nothing that's why we are
where we are it has meant
nothing actually if it could have meant
anything it could have shown us that
an incumbent transitional authority is
possible
because that's one vehicle of doing it
because thank you very much no thank you
thank you on that note

i think i'll come back to you for your last words along those lines but uh in the meantime i'm asking roger and then our constitutional lawyer to include as they sum up the following questions which have arisen one of the questions has to do with the issue of amnesty on my part i just want to add that at lancaster where i was a backroom boy the amnesty arrangements were part of the settlement it appeared to me then that the military factor uh zanja zebra and the eurasian forces with the help of the british were quietly negotiating the amnesty arrangements um so the amnesty is usually part of the settlement the second question which is raised by tsitsidangaram is is it a question of a blanket amnesty which covers both the issue of the political and uh all our political military aspects relating to atrocities abuse and so on and so forth and the amnesty relating to looted root outlying outside the country if someone has 5 billion outside the country we want it back what kind of amnesty are you could be negotiated in that in that respect and and there were there are presidents in africa just last week a basha's uh root was being returned from someone like ireland many years after his passing but the one question that i have here is from south africa it says take a leave from equos

to deal with cools within west africa
many instances of getting the military
out of politics
has taken place and
and she has personally mediated sudan
may be available for zimbabwe
if you guys are interested so there was
someone a mediator and
and she advises your mediator should not
be from sadiq region
you have to get sufficient mobilization
to accept pressure for nta
from beyond the region there's a
question
so roger your last thoughts and
reference some of these questions
raja
i don't think i've got a lot to add
actually obviously it's going to take a
it's going to be a long long process
it's going to be an
uneven process and
the uh i think it's very difficult to
to um
address that because it it is going to
it is going to drag on and it's going to
be unpredictable i think i think that i
think
my my last sort of comment i think i
mean you know you're raising it too
this whole thing how do you get the
money back into the country i mean we're
dealing with that in south africa with
just the whole
um you know the whole state capture
business
and uh you know if the
if the demilitarization is what you
might call broadly a national process
getting your money back is an
international one and there's a lot of
players out there
who will talk nicely but they don't
particularly want to collaborate

so that you know that you know that's
going to be a very important part of um
how you actually structure an amnesty
arrangement
um and i think you'd need the experts on
that one it's gonna it's um
more than i can comment upon because
you've got to go through the banking
international banking system and so on
so it's going to be a long and hard road
that's all i'm going to say
very much roger justin are you still
around
we have built out justina
she's gone so i'll get back to musa
your last thoughts and some of those
questions were raised including those of
amnesty
musa
thanks evil um i i i will speak to the
issue of amnesty again
uh since it keeps coming up uh i think
many would want to see prosecutions
because of the history that we have
endured as a country many would want to
see prosecutions
but it's not just about prosecutions
justice
healing and moving forward is a
combination of a lot
of forms of justice we need the money
back
so those we can negotiate to bring the
money back
uh in exchange of not being prosecuted
if that is a possibility
that should be accepted in some cases uh
we can you know exchange non-prosecution
with truth-telling
truth-telling is an extremely important
aspect of moving forward as a nation
and that is a part of it of course
prosecutions also is a part of
it sometimes with reduced sentences

sometimes with reduced number of counts
etc so it's it's a combination they
can't be once a one-size-fits-all
approach
when we are chasing nation building
the punitive uh approach
to accountability may not always work in
this kind of delicate situations where
a negotiated uh future of some sort is
being attempted
i think i'll end it there thank you
thanks thanks uh thanks musa
sam
your last words thank you thank you ebo
i think my concluding remarks uh i'll
start from where i ended that uh
what we have witnessed in the military
coup in 2017
is that uh you cannot have an
incumbent driven transitional authority
and also what we have learned from the
gnu
2009 to 2013
is that you cannot have a kind of a
power sharing uh
driven transitional authority is totally
failed
and given what is happening in zimbabwe
the moment that
citizens are suffering and the most
populist mantra is that
we need a revolution to to supplant
but it seems that the state
is thwarting that revolution at the
moment and we're not going to be able to
have
a revolutionary led transitional
authority
so we have two options there an
indigenous transitional authority
in the form of the nta which can be
improved
through making it mass-based action or
an

international driven
transitional authority with the
international community having power
and i think that one is going to be
difficult because you're gonna need to
go through the united nations security
council
you have russia you have china it's
gonna be complex
but also being myself patriotic i
believe that zimbabweans
of what it takes to drive their own
indigenous
uh provisional authority that can try to
resolve
the current political and economic
crisis and
fulfill the ideals and values of the
liberation
movement which were also about economic
emancipation of the indigenous
population
but freedom of assembly association
expression human rights for the
greater people of zimbabwe or who live
in it
thank you
thank the panelists and the discussion
shortly but just to
conclude this very interesting uh
session we began with the three critical
questions the first was
are we on the eve of an all-inclusive
national dialogue
that reflects the nature of the crisis
and the need to resolve it
i think we are i think we are
definitely the the plethora of meetings
around the crisis the common thread the
common theme
of the need for a political settlement
an nta
the compressive national settlement all
this rings through

the various statements in the last few days
the second is who will play the mediation role
manchester united thinks it's a clear option between an indigenous led process towards an nta or an international one which he sees as a bit complex but i think that the history of zimbabwe and the the settlements associated with this history
ever since uh lancaster and if you want to go back to 1961 constitutional talks in london it has always involved national regional and international which precludes even the u.n uh the level at which international and regional mediation can cause a national consensus towards the settlement and i thought that in our situation we should look closely at that including the important role that satoishi appears to be playing right now and the question of course we want to raise in the context of this discussion would the south africans put on their agenda for the region sadek and au put the nta on the agenda and unfortunately yustra had left us want to ask in in the case of sudan whether the au was involved and would like to ask the question i will raise that question that the mediator in the sudanese situation is available and that person appears to be outside the sudan possibly a you possibly equals the second the third question was can this happen is the nta possible i think

both zamchia and musa kika were very
very affirmative about that that can
happen
that it should happen and that it is
the only way forward it leaves us now to
consider
as we go forward how this can be put
into place
and whether what's going on in the
region
in the talk that talks about talks
it talks about envoys can return to
zimbabwe
the extent to which this issue has
become so live
in the region at the au level
can we expect in the coming weeks and
months
there's some kind of solution or the
beginnings of a solution
along the lines of an nga is possible
i'll leave it at that
but also to thank justina
roger yusra musa
in some chair for being
so combative the man in which they
approach the subject
i understand my on behalf and i'm sure
my colleague
tony will agree it went far beyond
uh what we expected we're a lot of
criticism
for even a field in the question or the
the theme
of nta as presumptuous
or even preemptive of possible solutions
but i believe
we have gone a step higher and opened
new possibilities around
the possibilities of resolution of the
crisis
so like to thank you all of you and
the many we had many questions it was
not possible to go beyond this

we will be back in a fortnight
and write in tell us what you think we
should discuss next
on the back of this discussion thank you
very much thank you all
thank you to the backroom robert and
everybody else
thank you thank you